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JPRIETQRP&ffiS 



NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW. 



IN TWO VOLUMES. 



BY J. J. BURLAMAQUI, 

COUNSELLOR OP STATE, AMD LATe'*PROFBSSOR OF NATURAL AND CITIL LAW 
AT GENEVA. 



VOL. I. 



TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY MR. NUGENT. 



SEVENTH EDITION, CORRECTED. 

^*VV LIBRARY S0^ c ^^ 

OF CC 5 



SUPREME c 

PHILADELPHIA : 
CAREY AND LEA— GHESNUT STREET. 

1830. 



DEDICATION. 



TO DR. MEAD. 

SIR, 

TO intrude in this manner upon your time, so usefully em- 
ployed in the duties of your profession, would expose me in 
some measure to blame, were it upon a less important occasion, 
than that of recommending the following work to your generous 
protection. The dignity of the subject, which, handled by other 
pens, has been thought worthy of being inscribed to the most il- 
lustrious personages of the last and present age, will plead, I 
hope, some excuse for an address, which is designed not so much 
to interrupt your occupations, as to avail itself of the sanction of 
your name in introducing this work to the public. And indeed 
a nobler subject I could not select for the favor of your accept- 
ance, than that, which so nearly relates to the moral duties of 
life, and the foundation of human contentment and happiness ; 
a subject, moreover, illustrated by one of the ablest masters 
of the present age, whose extraordinary ability and skill in 
curing the disorders of the mind, may be compared very 
aptly to yours in removing those of the body. One of the 
principal encouragements I had to this address is the near rela- 
tion between the following work and those elevated sentiments, 
with which you have been always inspired. Such an admirable 



IV DEDICATION. 

system of moral precepts, such noble maxims of true Christian • 
policy, and such excellent rules for the government of our lives, '» 
cannot but be acceptable to a gentleman, who, in the whole tenor 
of his conduct, has been an illustrious example of those rules 
and maxims, which are here most judiciously established. A j 
very good opportunity this of entering upon the encomium of 
those virtues, which have so eminently distinguished you at the 
head of your profession; but the little value any commendation 
of mine would have, the apprehension I should be under of be- 
ing suspected of adulation, and the c'anger I should incur of of- 
fending your modesty, obliges me to wave any attempt of this na- 
ture. However, I cannot help taking notice of that true magnifi- 
cence, with which you have at all times contributed to the ad- 
vancement of learning, and whereby you have justly acquired 
the title of patron and protector of letters. In fact, the exten- 
sive blessings, that fortune has bestowed upon you, have been 
employed, not as instruments of private luxury, but as means of 
promoting those arts, which have received an additional lustre, 
since they have shone so conspicuously in your person. Your 
friendship and correspondence have been courted by the great- 
est men of the present age; and your house, like that of Atticus. 
has been open to the learned of all orders and ranks, who unan- 
imously respect you, not only as a supreme judge of learning and 
wit, but moreover as an arbiter elegantiarum, and master of fin- 
ished urbanity. Your collection of valuable curiosities and 
books, wherein you have rivalled the magnificence of sovereigns, 
is the admiration and talk of all Europe, and will be a lasting 
monument of your love of literature. The polite reception you 
have always given to the learned of foreign nations has rendered 
your name so respectable abroad, that you are never mentioned 
but with expressions denoting the high idea they entertain of 
your singular munificence. These, Sir, are not particular sen- 
timents of mine, they are the sentiments of the public, whose 
voice I utter; they are the sentiments of your learned friends 
abroad, which I have been desired to repeat to you upon a late 



DEDICATION. V 

occasion, together with their compliments of thanks for the 
marks they have received of your great and disinterested civility. 
It is with pleasure I embrace this opportunity of executing my 
commission, and of declaring in this public manner the profound 
esteem, with which I have the hone of subscribing myself, Sir, 
your most humble and 

obedient servant, 

THOMAS NUGENT. 
Gray's Inn, June 4, 1748. 



THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER. 

THE author of the following work, M. J. J. Burlamaqui, 
I was descended from one of those noble families of Lucca, which, on 
I their embracing the Protestant religion, were obliged about two ccn- 
] turies ago to take shelter in Geneva. His father was counsellor and 
secretary of state; honors which are frequently conferred in that city 
!j upon such, as acquit themselves worthily of a professorship in the 
!! academy, particularly that of law, the fittest without doubt to form 
\ able judges, magistrates, and statesmen. Tfie son, on his return 
from his travels, was immediately nominated professor of this sci- 
ence, in which post he continued a considerable number of years, till 
the republic thought proper to remunerate his long and eminent ser- 
vices, by raising him to the same dignity as his father. The great 
I reputation he acquired in his professorship, was less owing to his 
immense erudition, in which he equalled if not excelled all his pre- 
decessors, than to the quickness of his understanding, the clearness 
of his ideas, his sound and judicious views in the study of jurispru- 
dence, and especially to the solidity of his Principles on natural law 
and civil government. With regard to the occasion of his publish- 
ing these Principles, he observes himself in the preface, that it was 
in some measure to comply with the importunity of his friends, but 
chiefly to prevent his reputation from being injured by a precipitate 
impression from any of those imperfect and surreptitious copies, 
which had been handed about by his pupils. The public indeed had 
flattered themselves a long time with the hopes of seeing a complete 
course of the law of nature and nations from this eminent hand; but 
his occupations and infirmity obliged him to frustrate their expecta- 
tions. However, as a good introduction to this science was extremely 
wanted, he thought proper, till he could publish his larger work, to 
favor us with the following Principles, being convinced that in this 
as in every other branch of learning, the most essential part is the 
laying of a proper and solid foundation, hi fact, we daily observe 
that most errors in life proceed rather from wrong principles, than 
from ill drawn consequences. 



CONTENTS, 

PART I. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT. 

CHAP. I. 

Of the Nature of Man, considered with regard to Right ; of the 
Understanding, and whatever is relative to this Faculty. 

Sect. Page. 

1. Design of this work ; what is meant by natural law, 1 

2. We must deduce the principles of this science f ~om 

the nature and state of man, 2 

3. Definition of man ; what his nature is, ibid 

4. Different actions of man ; which are the object of 
right? 3 

5. Principal faculties of the soul, ibid 

6. The understanding ; truth, 4 

7. Principle. The understanding is naturally right, ibid 

8. In what manner perception, attention, and examen, 

are formed, 5 

9. Evidence ; probability, ibid 

10. Of the senses, the imagination, and memory, 6 

11. The perfection of the understanding consists in the 
knowledge of truth. Two obstacles to this perfec- 
tion, ignorance and error, ibid 

12. Different sorts of error. !. Error of the law, and 
of the fact. 2. Voluntary and involuntary. 3. Es 
sential and accidental, "* 



CONTENTS. xi 

CHAP. II. 

Continuation of the principles relative to the nature of man. 
Of will and liberty. 

Sect. Page. 

1. The will. What happiness and good consist in, 9 

2. Instincts, inclinations, passions, 10 

3. Liberty; in what it consists, 11 

4. Use of liberty in our judgment with respect to truth, 12 

5. Liberty has its exercise, even in regard to things, 

that are evident, 13 

Objection, ibid 

Answer. ibid 

6. Use of liberty with regard to good and evil, 14 

7. With regard to indifferent things, 15 
3. Why the exercise of liberty is restrained to nonev- 

ident truths, and particular goods, ibid 
9. The proof of liberty drawn from our inward sense 

is superior to any other, 17 

10. How comes it that liberty has been contested, 18 

11. Actions are voluntary and involuntary; free, neces- 
sary, and constrained, 19 

12. Our faculties help one another reciprocally, 21 

13. Of reason and virtue, ibid 

14. Causes of the diversity we observe in the conduct • 
of men, 22 

15. Reason has it always in her power to remain mis- 
tress, 23 

CHAP. III. 

That man, thus constituted, is a creature capable of moral di- 
rection, and accountable for his Actions. 

1. Man is acpable of direction in regard to his conduct, 23 

2. He is accountable for his actions ; they can be im-r 
puted to him, 24 

3. Principle of imputability. We must not confound 

it with imputation, ibid 



. CONTENTS, ; 

CHAP. IV. 

further inquiry into what relates to human nature, by consid- 
ering the different states of man,. 

Sect. Page. 

1. Definition. Division, 24 

2. Primitive and original states, ibid 
1. State of man with regard to God, 26 

3. 2. State of society, ibid 

4. 3. State of solitude. 4. Peace, war, 27 

5. State of man with regard to the goods of the earth, 23 

6. Adventitious states. 1. Family. 2. Marriage, ibid 

7. 3. Weakness of man at his birth. 4. Natural depen- 
dence of children on their parents, 29 

8. The state of property, ibid 

9. Civil state of government, ibid 

10. The civil state and property of goods give rise to 
several adventitious states, 3G 

11. True idea of the natural state of man, ibid 
%2. Difference between original and adventitious states, 31 

CHAP. V. 

That- man ought to square his conduct by ride; the method of 
finding out this ride. 

1. Definition of a rule, 31 

2. It is not convenient, that man should live without a 
rule, 32 

3. A rule supposes an end, an aim, ibid 

4. The ultimate end of man is happiness, 33 

5. It is the system of providence, ibid 

6. The desire of happiness is essential to man, and insep- 
arable from reason, ibid 

7. Selflove is a principle, that has nothing vicious in itself. 34 

8. Man cannot attain to happiness but by the help of rea- 
son, ibid 

9. Reason is therefore the primitive rule of man. 35 
10= What is right in general ? 36 



CONTENTS. xiii 

CHAP. VI. 

General rules of conduct prescribed by reason. Of the naturt 

and first foundation of obligation. 
Sect. _ ( p age% 

1. Reason gives us several rules of conduct, 37 

fc. First rule. To make a right distiction between good 
and evil, ibid 

3. Second rule. True happiness cannot consist in things 
inconsistent with the nature and state of man, 30 

4. Third rule. To compare the present and future to- 
gether, ibid 
Fourth rule, 40 
Fifth rule, ibid 

5. Sixth rule. To give the goods, that excel most, the 
preference, ibid 

6. Seventh rule. In some cases possibility only, and for 
a much stronger reason probability, ought to deter- 
mine us, 41 

7. Eighth rule. To have a relish for true goods, 42 

8. Our mind acquiesces naturally in those maxims, and 
they ought to influence our conduct, ibid 

9. Of obligation generally considered, 43 

10. Obligation may be more or less strong, 44 

11. Dr. Clark's opinion on the nature and origin of obli- 
gation, ibid 

12. Monsieur Barbeyrac's opinion concerning this subject, 45 

13. Two sorts of obligations ; internal and external, 46 

CHAP. VII. 

Of right considered as a faculty, and of the obligation thereto 
corresponding* 

1. The word right is taken in several particular senses, 
which are all derived from the general notion, 47 

2. Definition of right considered as a faculty, 48 

3. We must take care to distinguish between a simple 
power and right, ibid 

4. General foundation of the rights of man. 4$ 



xiv CONTENTS. 

Sect. Tags. 

5. Right produces obligation, 49 

6. Right and obligation are two relative terms, 50 

7. At what time man is susceptible of right and obli- 
gation, ibid 

8. Several sorts of right and obligations, 51 

CHAP. VIII. 

Of law in general* 

1. As man by nature is a dependant being, the law 
ought to be the rule^of his actions, 54 

2. Definition of law, 55 

3. Why law is defined a rule prescribed, ibid 

4. What is understood by sovereign, sovereignty, and the 
right of commanding, 5d 

CHAP. IX. 

Of the foundation of sovereignty, or the right of commanding, 

1. First remark. The question is in regard to a neces- 
sary sovereignty, 57 

2. Second remark. There is neither sovereignty nor 
necessary dependance between beings perfectly equal, 58 

3. Different opinions on the origin and foundation of sove- 
reignty, ibid 

4. Examen of those opinions. 1. The sole superiority 
of power is insufficient to found a right of command- 
ing, 59 

5. 2. Nor the sole excellence or superiority of nature, 61 

6. 3. Nor the sole quality of Creator, ibid 

7. True foundation of sovereignty ; power, wisdom, and 
goodness, joined together, 63 

8. Explication of our opinion, ibid 

9. We must not separate the qualities, which form the 
right of sovereignty, 65 

10. Definition of subjection. Foundation of dependance, GS 

11. The obligation produced by law is the most perfect, 
that can be imagined, 67 



CONTENTS. xv 

Sect. Page. 

12. Obligation is internal and external at the same time, 68 

CHAP. X. 

Of the end of laws; of their character, differences, fyc, 

1. Of the end of laws, either in regard to the subject, or 

in respect to the sovereign, 69 

2. The end of laws is not to lay a restraint upon liberty, 
but to direct it in a proper manner, 70 

3. Examen of what Puffendorf says concerning this sub- 
ject, ibid 

4. Of the distinction of law into obligatory, and that of 
simple permission, 71 

5. The opinion of Grotius and Puffendorf upon this sub- 
ject, ibid 

6. The rights, which men enjoy in society, are founded 

on this permission, 72 

7. The matter of laws, ibid 

8. Internal conditions of a law ; that it be possible, useful -, 
and just, 73 

9. External conditions of a law ; that it be made known ; 
and accompanied with a sanction, ibid 

10. Whether the promise of recompense is equally capa- 
ble, as the commination of punishment, to constitute 
the sanction of law, 75 

11. Who those are, whom the law obliges, 

Of dispensation, ibid 

12. Of the duration of laws, and how they arc estab- 
lished, 76 

13. How many sorts of law, 77 

CHAP. XI. 

Of the morality of human actions. 

1. In what the morality of actions consists, 78 

2, Actions are, 1. either commanded^ or forbidden, or 
permitted, ibid 



ivi CONTENTS. 

Sect. *<£«• 

3. Remarks on permitted actions, 79 

4. 2. Actions are good or just, bad or unjust, and indif- 
ferent, ibid 

5. Conditions requisite to render an action morally good, 80 

6. Of the nature of bad or unjust actions, 81 

7. All just actions are equally just ; but unjust actions are 
more or less unjust, ibid 

8. Essential character of unjust actions, 82 

9. Of indifferent actions, ibid 
10. Division of good and bad actions, 83 
It. Of justice and its different kinds, ibid 

12. Of the relative estimations of moral actions, 84 

13. Morality is applicable to persons, as well as actions, 85 



PART II. 

OF THE LAW OF NATURE. 

CHAP. I. 

IK what the law of nature consists, and that there is such a 
thing. First considerations drawn from the existence of God 
and his authority over us. 

1. Subject of this second part, 87 

2. Whether there are any natural laws, 88 

3. Of the existence of God, ibid 

4. Firt proof. The necessity of a self existent and in- 
telligent being, ibid 

6. We must not seek for this being in this material 
world, 89 

6. Second proof. The necessity of a first mover, 90 

7. Third proof. The structure, order, and beauty of 
the universe, 91 

8. The world is not the effect of chance, 92 

9. It is not eternal, ibid 

10. God has a right to prescribe laws to man, 9? 

11. This is a consequence of his power* wisdom, and 
goodness, ibicl 



CONTENTS. *vii 

CHAP. II. 

That God, in consequence of his authority over us, has actually 
thought proper to prescribe to us laws or rules of conduct. 
Sect. Page- 

1. God exercises his authority over us, by prescribing 
laws to us, . 95 

2. First proof drawn from the very relations, of which 

we have been speaking, 96 . 

3. Second proof drawn from the end, which God propo- 
sed to himself with respect to man, and from the ne- 
cessity of moral laws, to accomplish this end, ibid 

4. Confirmation of the preceding proofs, 97 

5. Third proof, drawn from the goodness of God, 98 

6. Fourth proof, drawn from the principles of conduct, 
which we actually find within ourselves, 100 

7. These principles are obligatory of themselves, ibid 

8. They are obligatory by the divine will, and thus be- 
come real laws, ibid 

CHAP. III. 

Of the means, by which we discern what is just and unjust, or 
what is dictated by natural law ; namely, 1 . moral instinct, 
and 2. reason. 

1. First means of discerning moral good and evil, namely, 
instinct or inward sense, 101 

2. Examples. 102 

3. Whence these sensations proceed, ibid 

4. Of what use they are to us, 103 

5. Objection ; these sensations are not found in all men. 
Answer ; 1. We find some traces of them among the 
most savage people, * ibid 

6. 2. We must distinguish between the natural state of 
man, and that of his depravation, 104 

7. 3. If there be any monsters in the moral order, they are 
very rare, and no consequence can be drawn from them, ibid 

8. Second means of discerning moral good and evil ; which 

is reason, 10 r » 

Q. First advantage of reason in respect to instinct * it 



xviii CONTENTS. 

Sect. Page. 

serves to verify it, 105 

10. Second advantage ; it unfolds the principles, and thence 
infers proper consequences, 106 

11. Third advantage ; reason is an universal means, and 
applicable to all cases, ibid 

CHAP. IV. 

Of the principles whence reason may deduce the law of nature, 

1. From whence are we to deduce the principles of the 
law of nature ? 107 

2. Preliminary remarks. What we understand by princi- 
ples oi natural law, ibid 

3. Character of these principles, 108 
4 Whether we ought to reduce the whole to one single 

principle, 109 

5. Man cannot attain to the knowledge of natural laws, but 

by examining his nature, constitution, and state, ibid 

6. Three states of man, 110 

7. Religion ; principle of the natural laws, that have God 

for their object, ibid 

8. Consequences of this principle, 111 

9. Self-love ; the principle of those natural laws, which 
concern ourselves, 112 

10. Natural laws derived from this principle, 113 

11. Man is made for society, 114 

12. 1. Society is absolutely necessary for man, ibid 

13. 2. Man by his constitution is very fit for society, 116 

14. 3. Our natural inclinations prompt us to look out for 
society, ibid 

15. Sociability. Principles of natural laws relative to other 
men, 117 

16. Natural laws, which flow from sociability, ibid 
3. The public good ought always to be the supreme rule, ibid 

2. The spirit of sociability ought to be universal, ibid 

3. To observe a natural equality, ibid 

4. To preserve a benevolence even towards our enemies. 
Self-defence is permitted,, revenge is not. 1 19 

17. Particular consequences, ibid 



CONTENTS. xix 

Sect. Page. 

18. These three principles have all the requisite characters, 121 

19. Remarks on Puffendorf's system, ibid 

20. The critics have carried their censures too far against 
him in this respect, ibid 

21. Of the connexion between our natural duties, 122 

22. Of the opposition, that sometimes happens between 
these very duties, 123 

23. Natural law obligatory, and natural law of simple per- 
mission. General principle of the law of permission, 124 

24. Two species of natural law ; one primitive, the other 
secondary, 125 

CHAP. V. 

That natural laws have been sufficiently notified] of their proper 

characteristics , the obligation they produce, <J-c. 

1. God has sufficiently notified the laws of nature toman, 126 

2. Men may assist one another in this respect, ibid 

3. The manner, in which the principles of the laws of 
nature have been established, is a fresh proof of the 
reality of those laws, 127 

4. Natural laws are the effect of the divine goodness, ibid 

5. The laws of nature do not depend on arbitrary insti- 
tution, 128 

6. Our opinion is not very wide from that of Grotius, 129 

7. The effect of the laws of nature is an obligation of 
conforming our conduct to them, ibid 

8. Natural laws are obligatory in respect to all men, 130 

9. Grotius's opinion with regard to divine, positive, and 
universal law, ibid 

10. Natural laws are immutable, and admit of no dispen- 
sation, 132 
H. Of the eternity of natural laws, ibid 

CHAP. VI. 

Of the laws of nations, 

1. How civil societies are formed, 134 

2. The civil state does not destroy, but improve the state 

of nature, ibid 

3. True ideas of civil society, 135 



*x CONTENTS. 

Sect. Page. 

4. States are considered under the notion of moral persons, 135 

5. What is the law of nations, ibid 

6. Certainty of this law, 136 

7. General principle of the law of nations ; what polity 
consists in, ibid 

8. Inquiry into Grotius's opinion concerning the law of 
nations. 137 

9. Two sorts of law of nations ; one of necessity and obli- 
gatory by itself ; the other arbitrary and conventional, 138 

10. Use of the foregoing remarks, 139 

CHAP. VII. 
Whether there is any morality of action, any obligation or duty, ante- 
cedent to the law of nature, and independent of the idea of a 



1 . Different opinions of ethic writers with respect to the 
first principle of morality, 140 

2. Principles relating to this question, 141 

3. Three rules of human actions. 1. Moral sense. 2. Rea- 
son. 3. The divine will, 142 

4. These three principles ought to be united, 143 

5. Of the primitive cause of obligation, ibid 

6. All rules are of themselves obligatory, ibid 

7. Obligation may be more or less strong, H4 

8. Reason alone is sufficient to impose some obligation on 
man, 145 

9. Objection. Nobody can oblige himself , 146 

10. Answer, ibid 

11. A fresh objection, 147 

12. Duty may be taken in a loose or strict sense, 148 

13. Result of what has been hitherto said, 149 
12, This manner of establishing morality does not weaken 

the system*bf natural law, 150 

16. Grotius's opinion examined, 151 
16. In order to have a perfect system of morality, we 

should join it with religion, ibid 
CHAP. VIII. 

Consequences of the preceding chapter ; refections on the dis* 
Unctions of justice? honesty and utility. 



CONTENTS. sxi 

Zkct. . Page, 

1 . There is a great deal of ambiguity and mistake con- 
cerning this subject, 152 

2. Of justice, honesty, utility, order, and fitness, ibid 

3. Justice, honesty, and utility, are distinct things, and 
must not be confounded, 153 

4. But though they are distinct, yet they are naturally 
connected, ibid 

5. Whether an action is just, because God commands it ? 154 

6. In what the beauty of virtue and the perfection of 
man consist, 155 

CHAP. IX. 

I Of the application of natural laws to human actions ; and first 
of conscience. 

1. What is meant by applying the laws to human actions, 156 

2. What is conscience, ibid 

3. Conscience supposes a knowledge of the law, 157 

4. First rule, ibid 

5. Second and third rules, 158 

6. Antecedent and subsequent conscience. Fourth rule, 159 

7. Subsequent conscience is either quiet, or uneasy, 160 

8. Decisive and dubious conscience. Fifth, sixth, and 
seventh rules, 161 

9. Scrupulous conscience. Eighth rule, 162 

10. Right and erroneous conscience. Ninth rule, ibid 

11. Demonstrative and probable conscience. Tenth rule, 168 

CHAP. X. 
Of the merit and demerit of human actions; and of their impu- 
tation relative to the laws of nature, 

1. Distinction of imputability and imputation. Of the 
nature of a moral cause, 165 

2. Of the imputation. It supposes a knowledge of the 
law, as well as of the fact, ibid 

3. Examples, 166 

4. Principles. 1. We ought to infer actual imputation 
from imputability only, 167 

5. 2. Imputation supposes some connexion between the 
action and its consequences, 167 

6. 3. Foundation of merit and demerit, 168 

7. In what merit and demerit consist, 1(}9 



mm CONTENTS. 

Sect. Page. 

8. 4. Merit and demerit have their degrees ; and so has 
imputation, ibid 

9. 5. Imputation is either simple or efficacious, 170 

10. 6. Effects of one and the other, ibid 

11. 7. If all those, who are concerned, do not impute an 
action, it is supposed not to have been committed, 172 

12. 8. Difference between the imputation of good and bad 
actions, ibid 

CHAP. XI. 

Application of those principles to different species of actions, in 
order to judge in what manner they ought to be imputed, 

1. What actions are actually imputed ? 172 

2. Actions of such, as have not the use of reason, ibid 

3. Of what is done in drunkenness, ibid 

2. Of things impossible. Of the want of opportunity, ibid 

3. Of natural qualities, 173 

4. Of events produced by external causes, ibid 

5. Of what is done through ignorance or error, ibid 

6. Of the effect of temperament, habits, or passions, 174 

7. Of forced actions, ibid 

8. Forced actions are in themselves either good, bad, or 
indifferent, 175 

9. Why a bad action, though forced, may be imputed, 177 

10. Puffendorf's opinion, 178 

11. Of actions, in which more persons than one are con- 
cerned, 179 

12. Three sorts of moral causes; principal, subaltern, 

and collateral, 180 

13. Application of these distictions, 183 

CHAP. XII. 
Of the authority and sanction of natural laws $ and 1. of the 
good and evil, that naturally and generally follow from vir- 
tue and vice. 

1. What is meant by the authority of natural laws, 184 

2. The observance of natural laws forms the happiness 

of man and society, 185 

3. Explications on the state of the question, ibid 

4. Proof of the abovementioned truth, by reason, 188 



CONTENTS. xxiii 

Seci, Page. 

5. Proofs by experience. 1. Virtue is of itself the prin- 
ciple of inward satisfaction ; and vice a principle of 
disquiet and trouble, ibid 

6. Of external goods and evils, which are the consequence 

of virtue and vice, 187 

7. These different effects of virtue and vice are still great- 
er among those, who are invested with power and au- 
thority, 188 

8. Confirmation of this truth by the confession of all nations, ib. 

9. Confirmation of the same truth by the absurdity of the 
contrary, 189 

10. Answer to some particular objections, ibid 

11. The advantage always ranges itself on the side of virtue; 
and this is the first sanction of the laws of nature, 190 

12. General difficulty drawn from the exceptions, which 
render this first sanction insufficient, ibid 

The goods and evils of nature and fortune are distributed 
unequally, and not according to each person's merit, ibid 

The evils produced by injustice fall as well upon the inno- 
cent as the guilty. 192 

Sometimes even virtue itself is the cause of persecution, ibid 

13. The means, which human prudence employs to reme- 
dy those disorders, are likewise insufficient, ibid 

14. The difficulty proposed is of great consequence, 194 

CHAP. XIII. 
Proof of the immortality of the soul. That there is a sanction 
properly so called in respect to natural laws. 

1. State of the question, 194 

2. Divisions of opinions. How it is possible to know the 
will of God in respect to this point, 195 

3. Whether the soul is immortal ? ibid 

4. First proof. The nature of the soul seems intirely 
distinct from that of the body, 195 

5. Death does not therefore necessarily imply the anni- 
hilation of the soul, 3 9G 

6. Objection. Answer, 197 

7. Confirmation of the preceding truth. Nothing in na- 
ture is annihilated, ibid 



xxiv CONTENTS. 

Sect. Page, 

5. Second proof. The excellency of the soul, 198 
9. Confirmations. Our faculties are always susceptible 

of a greater degree of perfection. 198 

10. Objection. Answer, 199 

J I. Third proof, drawn from our natural dispositions and 

desires, ibid 

12. The sanction of natural laws will show itself in a future 
life, 201 

13. First proof, drawn from the nature of man considered 

on the moral side, ibid 

14. Second proof, drawn from the perfections of God, 202 
15 The objection drawn from the present stage of things 

serves to prove the sentiment it opposes, 20& 

16. The belief of a future state has been received by all 

nations, ibid 

CHAP. XIV. 

That the proofs we have alleged have such a probability and 
fitness, as render them sufficient to fix our belief, and to de- 
termine our conduct, 

1. The proofs we have given of the sanction of natural 
laws are sufficient, 206 

2. Objection. These proofs contain no more than a 
probability or fitness. General answer, ibid 

3. What is meant by a probability of fitness, 207 

4. General foundation of this manner of reasoning, ibid 

6. This kind of fitness is very strong in respect to natu- 
ral law, 208 

6. This fitness has different degrees. Principles to judge 

of it, ibid 

7. Application of these principles to our subject, 209 
Comparison of the two opposite systems, ibid 
9. The system of the sanction of natural laws is far pre- 
ferable to the opposite system, 210 

10. Objection. Answer, 211 

11. Of the influence, which those proofs ought to have 
over our conduct, ibid 

12. It is a necessary consequence of our nature and state, 212 

13 Reason lays us under an obligation of so doing, 213 

14 It is a duty, which God himself imposes on us, ibid 
15- Conclusion, 214 
16, That, which is already probable by reason only, is set 

in full evidence by revelation, ibid 



TliE 



&&-&lt~92fr&4l-tt 



NATURAL LAW, 

PART I. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT. 

CHAP. I. 

Of the Nature of Man, considered with regard to Right ; of the 
Understanding, and whatever is relative to this Faculty. 

I. XT JLy design is to inquire into those rules, which nature Design of 
alone prescribes to man, in order to conduct him safely to the \£" a ™ k * 
end, which every one has, and indeed ought to have, in view, meant by 
namely, true and solid happiness. The system or assemblage ^aw™ 
of these rules, considered as so many laws, imposed by God 
on man, is generally distinguished by the name of Natural Law. 
This science includes the most important principles of morality, 
jurisprudence, and politics ; that is whatever is most interest- 
ing in respect as well to man, as to society. There can be 
nothing therefore more deserving of the application of a rational 
being, of a being, that has its perfection and felicity seriously 
at heart. A just knowledge of the maxims, we ought to follow 
in the course of life, is the principal object of wisdom ; and vir- 
tue consists in putting them constantly in practice, without being 
ever diverted from so noble a pursuit. 
A 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



We must 
deduce the 
pnnc.ples 
of tins sci- 
ence from 
the nature 
and state 
of man. 



Definition 



what his 
nature is. 



II. The idea of right, and much more that of natural right, 
is undoubtedly relative to the nature of man. It is from this 
nature therefore, from the constitution and state of man, that we 
are to deduce the principles of this science. 

The word right {droit*) in its original signification, comes 
from the verb dirigo, which implies to conduct a person to some 
certain end by the shortest road. Right therefore, in its proper 
and most general sense, and that, to which all the others must be 
reduced, is whatever directs, or is properly directed. This being 
premised, the first thing we have to examine is whether man is 
susceptible of direction and rule in respect to his actions. That 
we may attempt this with a greater probability of success, we are 
to trace matters to their very origin, and ascending as high, as the 
nature and constitution of man, we must there unravel the princi- 
ple of his actions, and the several states, that properly belong to 
him, in order to demonstrate afterwards in what manner, and 
how far, he is susceptible of direction in his conduct. This i& 
the \ only method of knowing what is right, and what is not. 

III. Man- is an animal, endowed with understanding and rea- 
son ; a being, composed of an organized body and a rational souL 

With regard to his body, he is pretty similar to other animals, 
having the same organs, properties, and wants. This is a living 
body, organized and composed of several parts ; a body that 
moves of itself, and, feeble in the commencement, increases grad- 
ually in its progress by the help of nourishment,, till it arrives to a 
certam period, in which it appears in its flower and vigour, 
whence it insensibly declines to old age, which conducts it at 
length to dissolution. This is the ordinary course of human life, 
unless it happens to be abridged by some malady or accident. 

But man, besides the marvellous disposition of his body, has 
likewise a rational soul, which eminently discriminates him from 
brutes. It is by this noble part of himself that he thinks, and 
is capable of forming just ideas of the different objects, that oc- 
cur to him ; of comparing them together ; of inferring from 
known principles unknown truths ; of passing a solid judgment 
on the mutual fitness or agreement of things, as well as on the 

* The etymology given here by the author was intended only for the 
French word Droit* 



NATURAL LAW. * 

relations they bear to us ; of deliberating on what is proper or 
improper to be done ; and of determining consequently to act 
one way or other. The mind recollects what is past, joins it 
with the present, and extends its views to futurity. It is capa- 
ble of penetrating into the causes, progress, and consequences of 
things, and of discovering, as it were at one glance, the intire 
course of life, whrh enables it to lay in a store of such things, as 
are necessary for making a happy career. Besides, in all this, it 
is not subject to a constant series of uniform and invariable ope- 
rations, but finds itself at liberty to act or not to act, to suspend 
its actions and motions, to direct and manage them as it thinks 
proper. 
,, IV. Such is the general idea, we are to form of the nature Different 
of man. What results from it is, that there are several sorts of ™™ n * of 
human actions ; some are purely spiritual, as to think, to reflect, Which are 
to doubt, &c. others are merely corporeal, as to breathe, to J^'Job! 
grow, &,c. and some there are that may be called mixt, in which ject of 
the soul and body have both a share, being produced by their * 
joint concurrence, in consequence of the union, which God has 
established between these two constituent parts of man ; such as 
to speak, to work, &c. 

Those actions, which either in their origin or direction de- 
pend on the soul, are called human or voluntary ; all the rest 
are termed merely physical. The soul is therefore the princi- 
ple of human actions ; and these actions cannot be the object 
of rule, but inasmuch as they are produced and directed by 
those noble faculties, with which man hus been enriched by his 
Creator. Hence it is necessary to enter into a particular en- 
quiry concerning this subject, and to examine closely into the 
faculties and operations of the soul, in order to discover in 
what manner they concur to the production of human actions. 
This will help us, at the same time, to unfold the nature of 
these actions, to assure ourselves whether they are really sus- 
ceptible of rule, and how far they are subject to human com- 
mand. 

V. Let man reflect but ever so little on himself, sense and Principal 
experience will soon inform him, that his soul is an agent, whose lhe sou ^ 
activity displays itself by a series of different operations; which 



4 THE PRLNTCIPLES OF 

having been distinguished by separate names, are likewise attri- 
buted to different faculties. The chief of these faculties are 
tbe understanding, will, and liberty. The soul is indeed a simple 
being ; but this does not hinder us, when we attend to its differ- 
ent ways of operating, from considering it as a subject, in which 
different powers of acting reside, and from giving different de- 
nominations to these powers. If we consider the thing in this 
manner, we shall find it will give a greater exactness and per- 
spicuity to our ideas. Let us remember, therefore, that these 
faculties are nothing else, but the different powers of acting 
inherent in the mind, by means of which it performs all its ope- 
rations. 
SSSwr" VL The P rmci P al faculty of the soul, that which constitutes 
truth. the fundamental part of its being, and serves, as it were, for 

its intrinsic light, is the understanding. We may define it that 
faculty or power, by which the mind perceives, and forms ideas 
of things, in order to come at the knowledge of truth. Truth 
may be taken here in two significations ; either for the nature, 
state, and mutual relation of things ; or for the ideas agreeable 
to this nature, state, and relations. To have a knowledge there- 
fore of truth is to perceive things such, as they are in them- 
selves, and to form ideas concerning them conformable to their 
nature. 
Principle. VII. We must therefore set out with acknowledging, as a 
standmris ^ x * an ^ i ncontest *bl e principle, that the human understanding is 
naturally naturally right, and has within itself a strength sufficient to arrive 
* ' at the knowledge of truth, and to distinguish it from error; 

especially in things, wherein our respective duties are concern- 
ed, and which are requisite to form man for a virtuous, honora- 
ble, and quiet life ; provided, however, he employs all the care 
and attention, that lies in his power. 

Sense and experience concur to convince us of the truth of 
this principle ; which is the hinge, as it were, whereon the 
whole system of humanity turns. It cannot be called in ques- 
tion, without sapping the foundation, and intirely subverting the 
whole structure of society; because this would be annulling all 
manner of distinction between truth and error, and between good 
and evil ; and, by a natural consequence of this subversion, 
we should find ourselves reduced to the necessity of doubting 



NATURAL LAW. | 

&i every thing ; which is the highest pitch of human extrava- 
gance. 

Those who pretend, that reason and its faculties are depraved 
in such a manner as to be no longer capable of serving as a 
sure and faithful guide to man, either in respect to his duties, or 
particularly with regard to religion, do not reflect, that they have 
adopted for the basis of their system, a principle destructive of 
all truth, and consequently of religion. Thus we see that the 
sacred scripture, far from establishing any such maxim, assures 
us, that when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature 
ii the things contained in the law; these, having not the law, are a 
law to themselves. Which shew the work of the law, written in 
their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness.* 

True it is, that a bad education, vicious habits, and irregular 

, passions, may ofFuscate the mind ; and that neglect, levity, and 

! prejudices, precipitate men frequently into the grossest errors 

i in point of religion and morals. But this proves only th;»t men 

may make a bad use of their reason, and not that the natural 

rectitude of the faculties is subverted. What we have still to 

say, concerning this point, will help to set it in a clearer light. 

VIII. Let us proceed now to a closer inquiry into the ope- In what 

rations of the understanding. The perception, or view and " ianner 
o r r percep- 

knowledge of things, is commonly formed by the concurrence tioiijatten- 
of two actions ; one from the object, and is the impression ^rnen 
which this object makes on us ; the other from the mind, and is are form 
properly a glance, or simple view of the soul, on the object it is 
desirous of knowing. But, as a first view is not always sufficient, 
it is necessary, that the mind should apply itself for some time to 
a serious consideration of the object, to the end it may acquire 
a just knowledge of things, and form thereof exact ideas. This 
application, with which the soul continues to view the object in 
order to know it well, is called attention ; and, if it turns itself 
different ways, to consider the object on all sides, this is termed 
examen or inquiry. We may therefore affirm, that the percep- 
tion or knowledge of things depends intirely, in respect to the 
mind, on its natural vigor and attention. 

IX. It is by these helps, drawn from his own fund, that Evidence, 
man attains at length a clear and distinct knowledge of things, ro,ablll ° 

* Rom. ii. 14, 15, 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Of the sen- 
ses, the 
imagina- 
tion and 
memory. 



and their relations ; as also of ideas, and the conformity of those 
ideas to their originals ; in short, that he acquires the knowl- 
edge of truth. We give the name of evidence, to this clear 
and distinct view of things, and of their mutual relations ; a point 
to which we should be particularly attentive. For this evi- 
dence being the essential characteristic of truth, or the sure 
mark whereby one cannot help distinguishing it, the consequence 
is, that it necessarily produces such an internal conviction, as 
forms the highest degree of certainty. It is true that all objects 
do not present themselves with so strong a light, and that not- 
withstanding the great care and application a man may use, all 
that he is frequently able to attain, is only a glimmering light, 
which, according to its strength or weakness, produces different 
degrees of probability and seeming truth. But this must be ab- 
solutely the case of evary being, whose faculties are limited • it 
is sufficient that man, in respect to his destination and state, is 
capable of knowing with certainty those things which concern 
his perfection and happiness ; and moreover, that he is able to 
distinguish between probability and evidence, as also between the 
different degrees of probability, in order to proportion his assent 
to those differences. Now a person need but enter never so 
little into himself, and reflect on the operations of his mind, to be 
convinced, beyond any possibility of doubt, that man is really 
possessed of this discernment. 

X. The senses, taken from the sensitive faculty, the imagi- 
nation also, and the memory, must be all reduced to the under- 
standing. In fact, the senses, considered in this manner, are 
nothing else but the understanding itself, as it makes use of the 
senses and organs of the body, to perceive corporeal objects.-— 
The imagination likewise is nothing but the understanding, as it 
perceives absent objects, not in themselves, but by their images 
formed in the brain. The memory, in fine, is no more than the 
understanding, considered as possessed of the faculty of retain- 
ing the ideas, it forms of things, and capable of representing 
them to itself, whenever there is occasion ; advantages that prin- 
cipally depend on the care we take in repeating frequently those 
ideas. 



NATURAL LAW. 7 

XI. From what has been hitherto said with regard to the un- The per- 
derstanding, it follows, that the object of this faculty of the t he under - 

soul is truth, with all the acts and means, that lead us to it. standing^ 

consists m 
Upon this supposition, the perfection of the understanding the know- 
consists in the knowledge of truth, this being the end, for leQ g e of 
which it is designed. 

There are two things, among others, opposite to this perfec- Two ob- 
tion, ignorance and error, which are two maladies, as it were, this t>er° 
of the mind. Ignorance is no more than a privation of ideas or fection, 
knowledge ; but error is a nonconformity or opposition of our JJ*^ ^o^ 
ideas to the nature and state of things. Error being therefore 
the subversion of truth, is much more opposite to it, than igno- 
rance, which is a kind of medium between truth and error. 

It is to be observed here, that we do not speak of the un- 
derstanding, truth, ignorance, and error, purely to know what 
these things are in themselves ; our main design is to consider 
them as principles of our actions. In this light ignorance and 
error, though naturally distinct from one another, are gene- 
rally mixt, as it were, and confounded ; insomuch, that what- 
ever is said of one ought equally to be applied to the other. 
Ignorance is frequently the cause of error ; but whether join- 
ed or separate, they follow the same rules, and produce the 
same effect by the influence, they have over our actions or o- 
missions. Perhaps, were we to examine into things exactly, 
error only, properly speaking, can be looked upon as a principle 
of action, and not simple ignorance, which, being nothing more 
of itself than a privation of ideas, cannot be productive of any 
thing. 

XII. There are several sorts of ignorance, and error, whose Different 
different divisions it is proper for us to observe. 1. Error, con- errors 1 
sidered in respect to its object, is either of the law or of the fact. Error of 
2. With regard to its origin, ignorance is voluntary or involun- and f [^ Q 
tary, error is vincible or invincible. 3. In relation to the influ- fai- 
ence of the error on a particular affair or action, it is esteemed r y an a in-" 

essential or accidental. voluntary. 

3 Esspp ^ 
Error is of the law or fact according as people are mistaken tial and 

either in respect to the disposition of the law, or in regard to accid en- 

a fact, that is not sufficiently known. For instance, it would 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

be an error of the law, were a prince to suppose himself inti- 
tled to declare war against a neighboring state, only because it 
insensibly increases in strength and power. Such was likewise 
the error so common formerly among the Greeks and Romans, 
that it was allowable for parents to expose their children. * On 
the contrary, the idea Abimilech had of Sarah, the wife of A- 
braham, by taking her for an unmarried person, was an error of 
the fact. 

The ignorance a person lies under through his own fault, or 
an error, contracted by neglect, and which might have been 
avoided by using all possible care and attention, is a voluntary 
ignorance, or a vincible and surmountable error. Thus the 
polytheism of the Pagans was a vincible error ,• for they had 
onlv to make a right use of their reason, in order to be convinc- 
ed that there was no necessity for supposing a plurality of gods. 
The same may be said of an opinion, established among most 
of the ancients, that piracy was lawful against those, with whom 
there was no treaty subsisting, and that it was allowable to 
eonsider them as enemies. Ignorance is involuntary, and er- 
ror invincible, when they are such as could neither have been 
prevented nor removed, even by all the care and endeavours, 
that are morally possible ; that is, judging of them according 
to the constitution of human things, and of common life. Thus 
the ignorance of the christian religion, under which the peo- 
ple of America labored, before they had any communication 
with the Europeans, was an involuntary and invincible igno- 
rance. 

In fine we understand by an essential error, that, whose ob- 
ject is some necessary circumstance in the affair, and which for 
this very reason has a direct influence on the action, done in 
consequence thereof; insomuch, that, were it not for this error, 
the action would never have been done. Hence this is denom- 
inated likewise an efficacious error. By necessary circumstances, 
we are to understand those, which are necessarily required, ei- 
ther by the very nature of the thing, or by the intention of the 
agent, formed at the proper t»me, and made known by suitable 
indications. It was thus, for instance, an essential error in the 

* See another example in St, Matthew, chap, xy. 4, 5. 



NATUKAt tAW. # 

Trojans, at the taking of their town, to shoot their darts against 
their own people, mistaking them for enemies, because of their 
being armed after the Greek manner. Again ; a person marries 
another man's wife, supposing her to be a maid, or not knowing 
that her husband is still living ; this regards the very nature of 
the thing, and is of course an essential error. 

On the contrary an accidental error is that, which has no ne- 
cessary Connexion of itself with the affair, and consequently can- 
hot be considered, as the real cause of the action. A person 
abuses or insults another, taking him for somebody else, or be- 
cause he supposes the prince is dead, as it had been groundlessly 
reported, &c. These are errors merely accidental, which sub- 
sist indeed in the mind of the agent, and have accompanied him 
in the action, but cannot be considered, as its real cause. 

It is likewise observable, that these different qualities of igno- 
rance or error may concur, and may be found united in the same 
case. It is thus an error of the fact may be either essential or 
accidental ; and both the one and the other may be either volun- 
tary, or involuntary; vincible or invincible. So much may suf- 
fice for what regards the understanding* Let us proceed now to 
examine into the other faculties of the soul, which concur also to 
the production of human actions. 

CHAP. It. 

Continuation of the Principles, relative to the Naturt of Man. Of 
Will and Liberty. 

I. JLT was not sufficient, pursuant to the Views of the Crea- The Wilh 
tor, that the human mind should be possessed of the faculty of P i ne ^ s a ^i 
knowing things, and of forming thereof ideas ; it was likewise gbod con* 
requisite, it should be endowed with an active principle to set it 
in motion, and with a power whereby man, after knowing the ob- 
jects, that occur to him, should be capable of determining to act, 
or not to act, according, as he judges proper. This faculty i$ 
what we call the will. 

The will is therefore nothing else but that power of the soul* 
by which it is determined of itself, and by virtue of an active 
principle inherent in its nature, to seek for what is agreeable t# 
B 



10 • THE PRINCIPLES OF 

it, to act after a certain manner, and to do or to omit an action 
with a view of happiness. 

By Happiness we are to understand the internal satisfaction of 
the mind, arising from the possession of good ,• and by good, 
whatever is suitable or agreeable to man for his preservation, 
perfection, conveniency, or pleasure. The idea of good deter- 
mines that of evil, which, in its most general signification, implies 
whatever is opposite to the preservation, perfection, convenien- 
cy, or pleasure of man. 

Instincts, \\ t Instincts, inclinations, and passions, are reducible to the 
inclina- . ' . .... . , . 

tions, pas- will. Instincts are sentiments, excited in the soul by the wants 

sions. f tne body^ which determine it to provide immediately against 

them. Such are hunger, thirst, aversion for whatever is hurt- 
ful, &c. Inclinations are propensities of the will, which leads it 
rather toward some sorts of objects, than others, but in an even, 
tranquil manner ; a manner so proportioned to all its operations, 
that, instead of obstructing or interrupting, it generally facilitates 
them. As for the passions, they are indeed in the same manner, 
as the inclinations, motions of the will towards certain objects, 
but motions of a more impetuous and turbulent kind, motions, 
£hat dispossess the soul of its natural tranquility, and hinder it 
from directing properly its operations. Then it is that the pas- 
sions become most dangerous distempers. The cause of the 
passsions is generally the allurement of some sensible good, 
which solicits the soul, and impels it with too violent an impres- 
sion. 

It is easy to conceive, by what has been here said, that the 
inclinations, passions, and instincts, have a very great affinity 
with one another. They are all alike propensities or motions, 
which have frequently the same objects ; but there is this dif- 
ference between these species of emotions, that instincts are ne- 
cessarily the same in all men, by a natural consequence of their 
constitution, and of the union between the body and the soul ; 
whereas the inclinations and passions, particularly considered, 
have nothing necessary in their nature, and are surprisingly 
different in different men. 

Let us make an observation here, which falls in very natur- 
ally ; it is, that we often give the name of Heart to the will. 



NATURAL LAW. U 

considered as susceptible of the forementioned emotions ; and 
the reason of this in all probability is, because these emotions 
were supposed to have their seat in the heart, 

III. Such is the nature of the soul, that the will not only Liberty » 
acts always spontaneously, that is, of its own proper motion, of in w . li 
its own accord, and by an internal principle ; but likewise, that 
its determinations are generally accompanied with liberty. 

We give the name of liberty to that force or power of the 
soul, whereby it modifies and regulates its operations as it pleases, 
so as to be able to suspend, continue, "or alter its deliberations 
and actions ; in a word, so as to be able to determine and act 
with choice, according as it thinks proper. It is by this ex- 
cellent faculty, that man has a kind of command over himself 
and his actions g and as he is hereby rendered also Capable of 
conforming to rule, and answerable for his conduct, it is there- 
fore necessary to give a further explication of the nature of this 
faculty. 

Will and liberty being faculties of the soul, they cannot be 
blind or destitute of knowledge ; but necessarily suppose the op- 
eration of the understanding. How is it possible in fact to de- 
termine, suspend, or alter our resolutions, unless we know what 
is proper for to choose ? It is contrary to the nature of an 
intelligent and rational being to act without intellection and rea- 
son. This reason may be either superficial or bad ; yet it has 
some appearance at least, some glimmering, that makes us give 
it a momentary approbation. Wherever there is election or 
choice, there must be a comparison ; and a comparison implies 
at least a confused reflection, a kind of deliberation, though of 
a quick and almost imperceptible nature, on the subject be- 
fore us. 

The end of our deliberations is to procure us some advan- 
tage. For the will tends generally towards good, that is, to what- 
soever is really or apparently proper for rendering us happy ; 
insomuch, that all actions depending on man, and that are any 
way relative to his end, are for this very reason subject to the 
will. And as truth, or the knowledge of things, is agreeable to 
man ; and in this signification truth is also a good, it follows that 
truth forms one of the principal objects of the will, 



IS THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Liberty, like the will, has goodness and truth for its object ; 
but it has less extent with regard to actions ; for it does not ex- 
ercise itself in all the acts of the will, but only in those, which 
the soul has a power of suspending or altering, as she pleases. 
Use of lib- iv. But if any one should inquire, which are those acts, 
judgment wherein liberty displays itself ? We answer, that they are easily 
in respects known by attending to what passes within us, and to the manner, 
in which the mind conducts itself in the several cases, that daily 
occur; as, in the first place, in our judgments concerning true 
and false ; secondly, in our determinations in relation to good 
and evil ; and finally in indifferent matters. These particulars 
are necessary, in order to be acquainted with the nature, use, 
and extent of liberty. 

With regard to truth we are formed in such a manner, that, 
so soon as evidence strikes the mind, we are no longer at liberty 
to suspend our judgment. Vain would be the attempt to resist 
this sparkling light ; it absolutely forces our assent. Who, for 
example, could pretend to deny that the whole is greater than a 
part, or that harmony and peace are preferable* either in a fam- 
ily or state, to discord, tumults, and war ? 

The same cannot be affirmed in regard to things that have less 
perspicuity and evidence ; for in these the use of liberty dis-^ 
plays itself in its full extent. It is true our mind inclines nat- 
urally to that side, which seems the most probable; but this 
does not debar it from suspending its assent, in order to seek for 
new proofs, or to refer the whole inquiry to another opportuni- 
ty. The obscurer things are, the more we are at liberty to hes- 
itate, to suspend, or defer our determination. This is a point 
sufficiently evinced by experience.. Every day, and at every 
step as it were, disputes arise, in which the arguments on both 
sides leave us, by reason of our limited capacity, in a kind of 
doubt and equilibrium, which permits us to suspend our judg- 
ment, to examine the thing anew, and to incline the balance at 
length to one side rather than to the other. We find, for exam- 
ple, that the mind can hesitate a long time, and forbear determin- 
ing itself, even after a mature inquiry, in respect to the following 
questions. Whether an oath, extorted by violence, is obliga- 
tory ? Whether the inurder of Cesar was lawful ? Whether 



NATURAL LAW: *3 

the Roman senate could with justice refuse to confirm the prom- 
! ise, made by the Consuls to the Samnites, in order to extricate 
themselves from the Caudine Forks ; or whether they ought to 
have ratified and given it the force of a public treaty ? &c. 

V. Though there is no exercise of liberty in our judgment, Liberty 

ll&S its 6X» 

1 when things present themselves to us in a clear and distinct erc i se> 

manner ; still we must not imagine, that the intire use of this even in re- 

. gard to 

faculty ceases in espect to things, that are evident, tor, in the lni ngs;that 

first place, it is always in our power to apply our minds to the a i * eeVi - 
consideration of those things, or else to divert them thence, 
by transferring somewhere else our attention. This first deter- 
mination of the will, by which it is led to consider or not to con- 
sider the objects, that occur to us, merits particular notice, be- 
cause of the natural influence it must have on the determination, 
by which we conclude to act or not to act, in consequence of 
our reflection and judgment. Secondly, we have it likewise in 
our power to create, as it were, evidence in some cases, by 
dint of attention and inquiry ; whereas, at first sitting out, we 
had only some glimmerings, insufficient to give us an adequate 
knowledge of the state of things. In fine, when we have 
attained this evidence, we are still at liberty to dwell more or 
less on the consideration thereof ; which is also of great 
consequence, because on this depends its greater or less degree 
of impression. 

These remarks lead us to an important reflection, which may Objection. 
serve for answer to an objection, raised against liberty. " It is 
" not in our power (say they) to perceive things otherwise, than 
" as they offer themselves to our mind ; now our judgments are 
" formed on this perception of things ; and it is by these judg- 
" ments, that the will is determined ; the whole is therefore ne- 
e ' cessary and independent of liberty." *t 

But this difficulty carries little more with it, than an empty Answer. 
appearance. Let people say what they will, we are always at 
liberty to open, or to shut our eyes to the light ; to exert, or re- 
lax our attention. Experience shows, that when we view an 
object in different lights, and determine to search into the 
bottom of matters, we descry several things, that escaped us at 
fust sight. T his is sufficient to prove, that there is an exercise 



evil 



14 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

of liberty in the operations of the understanding, as well as in the 

several actions thereon depending. 

Use of lib- vi. The second question, we have to examine, is whether 
erty with «•'/'. , ... , , , . 

regard to we ar e equally free in our determinations in regard to good and 
good and ev j| # 

To decide this point, we need not stir out of ourselves ; for 
here also by facts and even by our internal experience, the 
question may be determined. Certain it is, that in respect to 
good and evil, considered in general, and as such, we cannot 
properly speaking exercise our liberty, by reason that we feel 
ourselves drawn towards the one by an invincible propensity, 
and estranged from the other by a natural and insuperable aver- 
sion. Thus it has been ordered by the Author of our being, 
whilst man has no power in this respect to change his nature. — 
We are formed in such a manner, that good of necessity allures 
us ; whereas evil, by an opposite effect, repels us, as it were, 
and deters us from attempting to pursue it. 

But this strong tendency to good, and natural aversion to evil 
in general does not debar us from being perfectly free in re- 
spect to good and evil, particularly considered ; and though 
we cannot help being sensible of the first impressions, which 
the objects make on us, yet this does not invincibly determine 
us to pursue, or shun those objects. Let the most beautiful and 
most fragrant fruit, replenished with exquisite and delicious 
juice, be unexpectedly set befora a person, oppressed with thirst 
and heat ; he will find himself instantly inclined to seize on the 
blessing offered to him, and to ease his inquietude by a salutary 
refreshment. But he can also stop and suspend his action, in 
order to examine whether the good, he proposes to himself, 
by eating this fruit, will not be attended with evil ; in short, he 
is at liberty to weighgand deliberate, in order to embrace the 
safest side of the question. Besides, we are not only able, 
with the assistance of reason, to deprive ourselves of a thing, 
whose flattering idea invites us ; but moreover we are able to 
expose ourselves to a chagrin or pain, which we dread, and 
would willingly avoid, were we not induced by superior consid- 
eration to support it. Can any one desire a stronger proof of 
Hberty ! 



NATURAL LAW. 15 

VII. True it is notwithstanding, that the exercise of this With re- 

CTcircl to in* 
faculty never displays itself more, than in indifferent things. I §nf ere nt 

find, for instance, that it depends intirely on myself to stretch things, 
out, or draw back my hand ; to sit down or to walk, to direct 
my steps to the right or left, &c. On these occasions, where 
the soul is left intirely to itself, either for want of external mo- 
tives, or by reason of the opposition, and as it were equilib- 
rium of motives, if it determine on one side, this may be said to 
be the pure effect of its pleasure and good will, and of the com- 
mand it has over its own actions. 

VIII. Let us stop here awhile to inquire, how comes it why the 
that the exercise of this power is limited to particular goods and f-K 61 ^ 1 ^ 
nonevident truths, without extending itself to good in general, or restrained 
to such truths, as are perfectly clear. Should we happen to dis- j£n t ° neV1 " 
cover the reason thereof, it will furnish us with a new reason to truths, and 
admire the wisdom of the Creator in the constitution of man, and goods! 1 
with the means at the same time of being better acquainted with 

the end and true use of liberty. 

And first we hope there is nobody but will admit, that the 
end of God in creating man was to render him happy. Upon 
this supposition it will be soon agreed, that man cannot attain 
to happiness any other way, than by the knowledge of truth, and 
by the possession of real good. This is evidently the result 
of the notions above given of good and happiness. Let us 
therefore direct our reflections towards this prospect. When 
things, that are the object of our researches, present themselves 
to our minds with a feeble light, and are not accompanied with 
that splendor and clearness, which enables us to know them 
perfectly, and to judge of them with full certainty ; it is prop- 
er and even necessary for us to be invested with a power of 
suspending our judgment ; to the end that, being necessarily 
I determined to acquiesce in the first impression, we should be 
still at liberty to carry on our inquiry, till we arrive to a higher 
| degree of certainty, and, if possible, as far, as evidence itself. 
I Were not this the case, we should be exposed every moment to 
| error, without any possibility of being undeceived. It was 
| therefore extremely useful and necessary to man, that under 
such circumstances he should have the use and exercise of his 
liberty. 



Jo THE PRINCIPLES OF 

But when we happen to have a clear and distinct view of 
things and their relations, that is when evidence strikes us, it 
would be of no manner of signification to have the use of lib- 
erty, in order to suspend our judgment. For certainty being 
then in its very highest degree, what benefit should we reap by 
a new examen or inquiry, were it in our power ? We have no 
longer occasion to consult a guide, j when we see distinctly the 
end, we are tending to, and the road, we are to take. It is 
therefore an advantge to man to be unable to refuse his assent to 
evidence. 

IX. Let us reason pretty near in the same manner on the use 
of liberty with respect to good and evil. Man, designed for 
happiness, should certainly have been formed in such a manner, 
as to find himself under an absolute necessity of desiring and pur- 
suing good, and of shunning on the contrary evil in general. — 
Were the nature of these faculties such, as to leave him in a 
state of indifference, so as to be at liberty in this respect to sus- 
pend or alter his desires, plain it is, that this would be esteemed 
a very great imperfection in him ; an imperfection, that would 
imply a want of wisdom in the Author of his being, as a 
thing directly opposite to the end, he proposed, in giving him 
life. 

No less an inconveniency would it be, on the other hand, 
were the necessity, which man is under, of pursuing good and 
avoiding evil to be such, as would insuperably determine him to 
act, or not to act, in consequence of the impressions, made on 
him by each object. Such is the state of human things, that we 
are frequently deceived by appearances ; it is very rare that good 
or evil presents itself to us pure and without mixture ; but 
there is almost always a favourable and an adverse side, an in- 
conveniency mixt with utility. In order to act therefore with 
safety, and not to be mistaken in our account, it is generally in- 
cumbent on us to suspend our first motions, to examine more 
closely into things, to make distinctions, calculations, and com- 
pensations ; all which require the use of liberty. Liberty is 
therefore, as it were, a subsidiary faculty, which supplies the 
deficiencies of the other powers, and whose office ^easeth as soon, 
as it has redressed them. 



NATURAL LAW. 17 

Hence let us conclude, that man is provided with all the ne- 
cessary means for attaining to the end for which he is designed ; 
and that in this, as in every other respect, the Creator has acted 
with wonderful wisdom. 

X. After what has been said concerning the nature, operations, The proof 
and use of liberty, it may seem perhaps unnecessary to attempt ot llbert y» 
here to prove that man is indeed a free agent, and that we are as fr,.m our 
really invested with this, as with any other faculty. se^ is 

Nevertheless, as it is an essential principle, and one of the superiorto 
fundamental supports of our edifice, it is proper to make the an> ° e * 
reader sensible of the indubitable proof, with which we are 
furnished by daily experience. Let us therefore consult only 
oarselves. Every one finds that he is master, for instance, to 
walk or sit ; to speak or hold his tongue. Do we not also 
experience continually, that it depends intirely on ourselves to 
suspend our judgment, in order to proceed to a new inquiry ? 
Can any one seriously deny, that, in the choice of good and 
evil, our resolutions are unconstrained ? That, notwithstanding 
the first impression, we have it in our power to stop of a sud- 
den, to weigh the arguments on both sides, and to do in short 
whatever can be expected from the freest agent ? Were I in- 
vincibly drawn towards one particular good rather than anoth- 
er, I should feel then the same impression, as that, which in- 
clines me to do good in general, that is, an impression, that 
would necessarily drag me along, an impression, which there 
would be no possibility of resisting. Now experience makes 
me feel no such violence with respect to any particular good. — 
I find I can abstain from it ; 1 can defer using it ; I can pre- 
fer something else to it ; I can hesitate in my choice ; in short, 
I am my own master to choose ; or, which is the same thing, 
I am free. 

Should we be asked, how comes it, that, not being free in 
respect to good in general, yet we are at liberty with regard to 
particular goods ? My answer is, that the natural desire of hap. 
piness does not insuperably draw us towards any particular 
good, because no particular good includes that happiness, for 
which we have a necessary inclination. 

Sensible proofs, like these, are superior to all objection, and 
C 



IS THE PRINCIPLES OF 

productive of the most inward conviction, by reason it is im- 
possible, that, when the soul is modified after a certain manner, 
it should not feel this modification, and the state, which conse- \ 
quently attends it. What other certainty have we of our ex- 
istence ? And how is it, we know that we think, we act, but by 
our inward sense ? 

This sense of liberty is so much the less equivocal, as it is not 
momentary or transient. It is a sense, that never leaves us, and 
of which we have a daily and a continual experience. 

Thus we see there is nothing better established in life, than 
the strong persuasion, which all mankind have of liberty. Let 
us consider the system of humanity, either in general or particu- 
lar, we shall find that the whole is built upon this principle. — 
Reflections, deliberations, researches, actions, judgments, all sup- 
pose the use of liberty. Hence the ideas of good and evil, of 
vice and virtue. Hence, as a natural consequence, arises praise 
or blame, the censure or approbation of our own, or other peo- 
ple's conduct. The same may be said of the affections and 
natural sentiments of men towards one another, as friendship, 
, benevolence, gratitude, hatred, anger, complaints, and reproach- 

es. None of these sentiments could take place, unless we were 
to admit of liberty. In fine, as this prerogative is in some meas- 
ure the key of the human system, he, who does not allow it to 
man, subverts all order, and introduces general confusion. 
How XL It is natural here to inquire, how it was ever possible 

that liber- for any body seriously to doubt, whether man is master of his 

tyhas been ac ti ns, whether he is free ? I should be less surprized at this 
contested. . . 

doubt, were it concerning a strange or remote fact ; a fact, that 

was not transacted within ourselves. But the question is in re- 
gard to a thing, of which we have an internal, immediate feeling, 
a constant and daily experience. Strange, that any one should 
call in question a faculty of the soul 1 may not we as well doubt 
of the understanding and will, as of the liberty of man ? For, if 
we are content to abide by our inward sense, there is no more 
room to dispute of one, than of the other. But some too sub- 
tle philosophers, by considering this subject in a metaphys- 
ical light, have stript it, as it were, of its nature ; and fin- 
ding themselves at a loss to solve a few difficulties,, they 



NATURAL LAW. 19 

have given a greater attention to these difficulties, than to the 
positive proofs of the thing ; which insensibly led them to im- 
agine, that the notion of liberty was all an illusion. I own 
it is necessary, in the research of truth, to consider an object on 
every side, and to balance equally the arguments for and against ; 
nevertheless we must take care, we do not give to those objec- 
tions more than their real weight. We are informed by ex- 
perience, that in several things, which in respect to us are in- 
vested with the highest degree of certainty, there are many 
difficulties notwithstanding, which we are incapable of resolving 
to our satisfaction ; and this is a natural consequence of the 
limits of the mind. Let us conclude therefore that when a 
truth is sufficiently evinced by solid reasons, whatever can be 
objected against it ought not to stagger or weaken our convic- 
tion, so long as they are such difficulties only, as embarrass or 
puzzle the mind, without invalidating the proofs themselves. 
This rule is so very useful in the study of the sciences, that one 
should keep it always in sight.* Let us resume now the thread 
of our reflections. 

XII. The denomination of voluntary or human actions in Actions 
general is given to all those, that depend on the will ; and that J re volun * 
of free, to such, as come within the jurisdiction of liberty, which involunta- 
the soul can suspend or turn as it pleases. The opposite of J^' es ^.' v 
voluntary is involuntary ; and the contrary of free is necessary, and Con- 
or whatever is done by force or constraint. All human ac- s rame 
tions are voluntary, inasmuch as there are none, but what 
proceed from ourselves, and of which we are the authors. — 
But if violence, used by an external force, which we are unable 
to resist, hinders us from acting, or makes us act without the 
consent of our will ; as when a person stronger than ourselves 
lays hold of our arm to strike or wound another person, the 
action thence resulting, being involuntary, is not properly speak- 

* There is a wide difference between seeing that a thing is absurd, and 
not knowing all, that regards it ; between an unanswerable question in 
relaton to a truth, : ni an unanswerable objection against it , though a great 
many confound these two sorts of difficulties. Those only of the tatter 
order are able to prove, that what was taken for a known truth cannot be 
true, because otherwise some absurdity must ensue- But the others prove 
nothing, but the ignorance we are under in relation to several things, that 
regard a known truth. Biblioth. Raison. Tom. 7. p. 346, 



2Q THE PRINCIPLES OF 

ing our deed or action, but that of the agent, from whom we suf- 
fer this violence. 

The same cannot be said of actions, that are forced and con- 
strained, only as we are determined to commit them, through 
fear of a great and imminent evil, with which we are menaced ; 
as for instance, were an unjust and cruel prince to oblige a judge 
to condemn an innocent person, by menacing to put him to death 
if he did not obey his orders. Actions of this sort, though for- 
ced in some sense, because we commit them with reluctancy, and 
would never consent to them, were it not for a very pressing ne- 
cessity ; such actions, I say, are ranked nevertheless among the 
number of voluntary actions, because, after all, they are produ- 
ced by a deliberation of the will which chooses between two in- 
evitable evils, and determines to prefer the least to the greatest. 
This will become more intelligible by a few examples. 

A person gives alms to a poor man, who exposes his wants and 
misery to him ; this action is at the same time both voluntary 
and free. But suppose a man who travels alone and unarmed, 
falls into the hands of Jobbers, and that these miscreants menace 
him with instant death, unless he gives them all he has ; the sur- 
render which this traveller makes of his money in order to save 
his life, is indeed a voluntary action, but constrained at the same 
time, and void of liberty. For which reason there are some, 
that distinguish these actions by the name of mixt,* as partaking 
of the voluntary and involuntary. They are voluntary because 
the principle that produces them is in the agent itself, and the 
will determines to commit them as the least of two evils. But 
they partake of the involuntary, because the will executes them 
contrary to its inclination, which it would never do, could it find 
any other expedient to clear itself of the dilemma. 

Another necessary elucidation is, that we are to suppose 
that the evil, with which we are menaced, is considerable 
enough to make a reasonable impression on a prudent or wise 
man, so far as to intimidate him ; and besides, that the person, 
who compels us, has no right to restrain our liberty ; inso- 
much that we do not lie under an obligation of bearing with 
any hardship or inconveniency, rather than displease him. Un- 

* See Puffendorf on the law of nature and nations, book i. chap. iv. § 9.. 



NATURAL LAW. 21 

der these circumstances, reason would have us determine to 
suffer the less evil, supposing at least, that they are both inevit- 
able. This kind of constraint lays us under what is called a 
moral necessity ; whereas when we are absolutely compelled 
to act without being able, in any shape whatsoever, to avoid it, 
this is termed a physical necessity. 

It is therefore a necessary point of philosophical exactness to 
distinguish between voluntary and free. In fact it is easy to com- 
prehend, by what has been now said, that all free actions are in- 
! deed voluntary, but all voluntary actions are not free. Never- 
theless, the common and vulgar way of speaking frequently con- 
founds those two terms, of which we ought to take particular 
notice, in order to avoid all ambiguity. 

We give likewise the name of manners sometimes to free 
actions, inasmuch as the mind considers them as susceptible of 
rule. Hence we call morality the art, which teaches the rules 
of conduct and the method of conforming our actions to those 
rules. 

XIII. We shall finish what relates to the faculties of the soul 
by some remarks, which will help us to understand better their 

! nature and use. 

1. Our faculties assist one another in their operation, and, Ourfac- 
when they are all united in the same subject, they act always u Jj lies }? 
jointly. We have already observed that the will supposes the errecipro- 
understanding, and that the light of reason serves for a guide ° a *" 
to liberty. Thus the understanding, the will, and liberty; the 
senses, the imagination, and memory; the instincts, inclinations, 
and passions ; are like so many different springs ; which concur 
all to produce a particular effect ; and it is by this united concur- 
rence we attain at length to the knowledge of truth, and the pos- 
session of solid good, on which our perfection and happiness de- 
pends. 

XIV. 2. But in order to procure to ourselves those advanta- of reason 
ges, it is not only necessary that our faculties be well constitu- aad virtue, 
ted in themselves, but moreover we ought to make a good use 

of them, and maintain the natural subordination, there is be- 
tween them and the different motions, which lead us towards, 
or divert us from certain objects. It is not therefore sufficient 



%% THE PRINCIPLES OF 

to know the common and natural state of our faculties, we 
should likewise be acquainted with their state of perfection, and 
know in what their real use consists. Now truth being, as we 
have seen, the proper object of the understanding, the perfec- 
tion of this faculty is to have a distinct knowledge of truth ; at 
least of those important truths, which concern our duty and hap- 
piness. For such a purpose, this faculty should be formed to 
close attention, a just discernment, and solid reasoning. The 
understanding thus perfected, and considered as having actually 
the principles, which enable us to know and to distinguish the 
true and useful, is what is property called reason ; and hence it • 
is that we are apt to speak of reason, as of a light of the mind, 
and as of a rule, by which we ought always to be directed, in our 
judgments and actions. 

If we consider in like manner the will in its state of perfec- 
tion, we shall find it consists in the force and habit of determi- 
ning always right, that is, not to desire any thing, but what 
reason dictates, and not to make use of our liberty, but in or- 
der to choose the best. This sage direction of the will, is prop- 
erly called Virtue, and sometimes goes by the name of Reason. 
And, as the perfection of the soul depends on the mutual suc- 
cours, which the faculties, considered in their most perfect stite, 
lend to one another, we understand likewise sometimes by rea- 
son, taken in a more vague, and more extensive sense, the soul 
itself, considered with all its faculties, and as making actually 
a good use of them. Thus the term reason carries with it al- 
ways an idea of perfection, which is sometimes applied to the 
soul in general, and at other times to some of the faculties in 
particular. 
Causes of XV. 3. The faculties, of which we were treating, are com- 

the diver- mon to all mankind ; but they are not found always in the same 

sity we 

observe in degree, neither are they determined after the same manner. 

the con- Besides, they have their periods in every man; that is, their 
men. increase, perfection, infeebling, and decay, in the same manner 

almost as the organs of the body. They vary likewise exceed- 
ingly in different men. One has a brighter understanding ; an- 
other a quicker sensation ; this man has a strong imagination ; 
while another is swayed by violent passions. And all this is 






NATURAL LAW. 2?. 

combined and diversified in an infinite number of ways accord- 
ing to the difference of temperaments, education, examples, and 
occasions, that furnish opportunities for exercising certain facul- 
ties or inclinations, rather than others ; for it is the exercise, 
that strengthens them more or less. Such is the source of that 
prodigious variety of geniuses, tastes, and habits, which Consti- 
tutes what we call the characters and manners of men ; a variety, 
which, considered in general, very far from being unserviceable, 
is of great use in the views of providence. 

XVI. But, whatever strength may be attributed to the inclina- Reason 

tions, passions, and habits, still it is necessary to observe, that ™* y l s * n ' 

thev have never enough to impel man invincibly to act contrary her power 

^ . . . . ■ * l to remain 

to reason. Reason has it always in her power to preserve her mistress. 

superiority and rights. She is able, with care and application, to 
correct vicious dispositions, to prevent and even to extirpate bad 
habits ; to bridle the most unruly passions by sage precautions, 
to weaken them by degrees, and finally to destroy them intirely, 
or to reduce them within their proper bounds. This is suffi- 
ciently proved by the inward feeling, that every man has of the 
liberty, with which he determines to follow this sort of impres- 
sions ; proved by the secret reproaches, we make to ourselves, 
when we have been too much swayed by them ; proved, in fine, 
by an infinite variety of examples. True it is, that there is some 
difficulty in surmounting these obstacles ; but this is richly com- 

j pensated by the glory attending so noble a victory, and by the 

| solid advantages thence arising. 

CHAP. III. 

i That Man, thus constituted, is a Creature capable of moral di- 
rection, and accountable for his Actions, 

»• -/m.FTER having seen the nature of man, considered in Manigcaa 
respect to right, the result is r that he is a creature really suscep- pable of 
I tible of choice and direction in his conduct. For, since he is in^eard 
! capable, by means of his faculties, of knowing the nature and to his coa^ 
j state of things, and of judging from this knowledge ; since he is 
; invested with the power of determining between two or several 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

offers, made to him ; in fine, since, with the assistance of liberty, 
he is able in certain cases to suspend, or continue his actions, as 
he judges proper; it evidently follows, that he is master of his 
own actions, and that he exercises a kind of authority and 
command over them, by virtue of which he can direct and turn 
them .which way he pleases. Hence it appears how neces- 
sary it was for us to set out, as we have done, with inqui- 
ring previously into the nature and faculties of man. For 
how could we have discovered 4he rules, by which he is to 
square his conduct, unless we antecedently know in what manner 
lie acts, and what are the springs, as it were, that put him in 
motion ? 
tie is ac- U- Another remark, which is a consequence of the foregoing, 

countable js, that, since man is the immediate author of his actions, he is 

for his ac- 

tions ; accountable tor them ; and in justice and reason they can be lm- 

they can p U ted to him. This is a point, of which we think it necessary 

tedtohim. to give here a short explication. 

The term imputing is borrowed of arithmetic, and signifies 
properly to set a sum down to somebody's account. To im- 
pute an action therefore to a person is to attribute it to him, as 
to its real author ; to set it down as it were to his account and 
make him answerable for it. Now it is evidently an essential 
quality of human actions, as produced and directed by the un- . 
derstanding and will, to be susceptible of imputation ; that is, 
it is plain that man can be justly considered, as the author and 
productive cause of those actions, and that for this very reason 
it is right to make him accountable for them, and lay to his 
charge the effects, that arise from them, as natural consequen- 
ces. In fact, the true reason, why a person cannot complain of 
being made answerable for an action, is that he has produced it 
himself knowingly and willingly. Every thing almost, that is 
said and done in human society, supposes this principle generally 
received, and every body acquiesces in it from an inward convic- 
tion. 

Principle ]j[ ^r e must therefore lay down, as an incontestible and 

of imputa p J 

bility. We fundamental principle of the imputability of human actions, 

confound ^ at evei T voluntary action is susceptible of imputation ; or to 
it with express the same thing in other terms, that every action or 
imputa* 
tion, 



NATURAL LAW. £5 

omission, subject to the direction of man, can be charged to 
the account of the person, in whose power it was to do it or let 
it alone ; and on the contrary every action, whose existence 
or nonexistence does not depend on our will, cannot be imputed 
to us. Observe here, that omissions are ranked by civilians 
and moralists among the number of actions ; because they ap- 
prehend them, as the effect of a voluntary suspension of the ex- 
ercise of our faculties. 

Such is the foundation of imputability, and the true reason, 
why an action or omission is of an imputable nature. But we 
must take particular notice, that, though an action is imputable 
it does not ensue from that only, that it merits actually to be 
imputed. Imputability and imputation are two things, which 
we should carefully distinguish. The latter supposes, besides 
the imputability, some moral necessity of acting or not after a 
certain manner ; or which amounts to the same, some obligation 
that requires a thing to be done, or omitted, that can be really- 
done or omitted. 

Puffendorf* does not seem to have sufficiently distinguished 
between these two ideas. It is enough for our present purpose 
to point out the distinction, deferring to treat of actual imputation, , 

and to establish principles thereof, till we have explained the na- 
ture of obligation, and shown that man is actually obliged to con- 
form his actions to rule. 

Whut has been hitherto advanced, properly regards the nature 
of the human mind ,• or the internal faculties of man, as they 
render him capable of moral direction. But in order to com- 
plete our knowledge of human nature, we should view it like- 
wise in its extrinsic condition, in its wants and dependancies, 
and in the various relations, wherein it is placed ; in fine, in 
what we may call the different states of man. For it is our 
situation in life, that decides the use., we ought to make of our 
faculties. 

* See the law of nature and nations, book i, chap, v, § 5, and the Duties 
of man and a citizen^ book i, § 17. 



9 THE PRINCIPLES OF 



CHAP. IV. 



Further Inquiry into what relates to human Nature, by considering 
the (liferent States of Man. 

definition, I. _£_ HE different states of man are nothing more than the situ- 
ation, wherein he finds himself in regard to the beings, that sur- 
round him with relations, thence resulting. 

We shall be satisfied with taking here a cursory view of some 
of the principal states, and to render them distinguishable by 
their essential characteristics, without entering into an exact in- 
quiry, which should naturally take place, when treating in partic- 
ular of each state. 

All these different states may be ranged under two general clas- 
ses ; some are primitive and original ; others adventitious. 
Primitive ft. Primitive and original states are those, in which man finds 
nal states, himself placed by the very hand of God, independent of any hu- 
man action. 
1. State of Such is, in the first place, the state of man with regard to God; 
man 7t lh Wm ch ' s a state °f aDsolut e dependance. For let us make but 
God. never so small a use of our faculties, and enter into the study of 

ourselves, it will evidently appear, that it is from this first Being 
we hold our life, reason, and all other concomitant advantages ; 
and that in this and every other respect we experience daily, in 
the most sensible manner, the effects of the power and goodness 
of the Creator. 
% State of IH. Another primitiv e and original state is that, wherein 
SD01ety8 men find themselves in respect to one another. They are all 
inhabitants of the same globe, placed in a kind of vicinity to 
each other ; have all one common nature, the same faculties, 
same inclinations, wants, and desires. They cannot do with- 
out one another ; and it is only by mutual assistance, they are 
capable of attaining to a state of ease and tranquility. Hence 
we observe a natural inclination in mankind, that draws them 
towards each other, and establishes a commerce of services and 



NATURAL LAW. 27 

benevolence between them, whence results the common good 

of the whole, and the particular advantage of individuals. The 

natural state therefore of men among themselves is a state ot 

union and society ; society being nothing more than the union 

of several persons for their common advantage. Besides, it is 

evidentihat this must be a primitive state, because it is not the 

work of man, but established by divine institution. Natural 

society is a state of equality and liberty ; a state, in which all 

men enjoy the same prerogatives, and an intire independence 

on any other power but God. For every man is naturally 

master of himself, and equal with his fellow creatures, so long 

as he does not subject himself to another person's authority by a 

particular convention. 

IV. The opposite state to that of society is solitude ; that 3. state o£ 

is, the condition, in which we imagine man would find himself. Solitude. 

'4. Peace, 
were he to live absolutely alone, abandoned to his own thoughts, \var 4 

and destitute of all commerce with those of his own species. 
Let us suppose a man arrived at the age of maturity, without 
having had the advantage of education or any correspondence 
with the rest of mankind, and consequently without any other 
knowledge than that, which he has of himself acquired ; such 
a man would be uudoubtedly the most miserable of all animals. 
We should discover nothing in him but weakness, savageness, 
and ignorance ; scarce would he be able to satisfy the wants of 
his body, exposed, poor wretch, to perish with hunger or cold, 
or by the ravenous teeth of wild beasts. What a vast difference 
between such a state and that of society, which by the mutual 
succours, that men receive from one another, procures them all 
the knowledge, conveniency, and ease, that form the security, 
pleasure, and happiness of life ? True it is, that all these ad- 
Vantages suppose that men, far from prejudicing one another, live 
in harmony and concord, and entertain this union by mutual good 
offices. This is what we call a state of peace, whereas those who 
endeavour to do harm, and those also, who find themselves obli- 
ged to guard against it, are in a state of war ; a state of violence, 
diametrically opposite to that of society. 



28 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

State of V. Let us observe, in the next place, that man finds himself 

regard to naturally attached to the earth, from whose bosom he draws what- 
the goods ever is neccessary for the preservation and conveniences of life, 
earth, Tnis situation produces another primitive state of man, which is 

likewise deserving of our attention. 

Such in effect is the natural constitution of the human body, 
that it cannot subsist intirely of itself, and by the sole force of 
its temperament. Man, at all ages, stands in need of several 
external succours for his 5 * nourishment, as well as for repairing 
his strength, and keeping his faculties in proper order. For 
this reason our Creator has sown plentifully around us such 
things, as are necessary for our wants, and has implanted in us 
at the same time the instincts and qualifications, proper for ap- 
plying these things to our advantage. The natural state there- 
fore of man, considered in this light, and in respect to the goods 
of the earth, is a state of indigence and incessant wants, against 
which he would be incapable of providing in a suitable man- 
ner, were he not to exercise his industry by constant labor.-^ 
Such are the principal of those states, that are called primitive 
and original. 
4dventiti| VI. But man being naturally a free agent, is capable of 
^Famifys mak * n g g reat modifications in his primitive state, and of giving, 
2. Mani- by a variety of establishments, a new face to human life. — 
^ e ° Hence those adventitious states are formed, which are properly 

the work of man, wherein he finds himself placed by his own act 
and in consequence of establishments, whereof he himself is the 
author. Let us take a cursory view of the principal of these 
states. 

The first, that presents itself to us, is the state of families.— 
This is the most natural and ancient of all societies, and the 
very foundation of that, which is called national ; for a people 
or nation is only an assemblage or composition of several fami- 
lies. 

Families begin by marriage ; and it is nature itself, that in- 
vites men to this union. Hence children arise, who by perpet- 
uating the several families, prevent the extinction of human so- 
cieties, and repair the breaches, made every day by death. 

The family state is productive of various relations ; as those 
r d husband, wife, father, mother, children, brothers, sisters, and 



NATURAL LAW. 29 

| ail the other degrees of kindred, which are the first tie of hu- 

j man society. 

VI*. Man, considered in his birth, is weakness and impotency 3. Weak- 

I itself; in regard as well to the body as to the soul. It is even nesso * 

' & J man at his 

1 remarkable, that the state of weakness and infancy lasts longer birth. 

in man, than in any other animal. He is beset and pressed ** Natural 
on all sides by a thousand wants, and destitute of knowledge, anceof 
as well as strength, finds himself in an absolute incapacity of J^ 1 ^" 
relieving them ; he is therefore under a particular necessity of parents: 
recurring to external assistance. Providence tor this reason 
has inspired parents with that instinct or natural tenderness, 
which prompts them so eagerly to delight in the most troub- 
lesome cares for the preservation and good of those, whom 
they have brought into the world. It is likewise in conse- 
quence of this state of weakness and ignorance, in which chil- 
dren are born, that they are naturally subject to their parents ; 
whom nature has invested with all the authority and power ne- 
cessary for governing those, whose advantage they are to study 
and procure. 

VIII. The property of goods is another very important es- The state 

of proper- 
tablishment, which produces a new adventitious state. It modi- ty , 

fies the right, which all men had originally to earthly goods ; 
and, distinguishing carefully what belongs to individuals, ensures 
the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of what they possess ; by 
which means it contributes to the maintenance of peace and har- 
mony among mankind. But, since all men had originally a right 
to a common use of whatever the earth produces for their 
several wants, it is evident that, if this natural power is actu- 
ally restrained and limited in divers respects, this must neces- 
sarily arise from some human act ; and consequently the state of 
property, which is the cause of those limitations, ought to be 

j ranked among the adventitious states. 

, IX. But, among all the states, established by the act of man, Civil state 

j there is none more considerable, than the civil state, or that of and s ° y ' 

ernment. 

j civil society and government. The essential character of this 
! society, which distinguishes it from the forementioned society 
[ of nature, is the subordination to a supreme authority, exclusive 
of equality and independence. Mankind were originally divid- 
ed into families only, and not into nations. Those families 



3D THE PRINCIPLES OF 

lived under the paternal government of the person, who was 

their chief, as their father or grandfather. But, when they came 

afterwards to increase and unite for their common defence, they 

composed a national body, governed by the will of him, or of 

those on whom they had conferred the authority. This is the 

origin of what we call civil government, and of the distinction of 

sovereign and subjects. 

The civil X. The civil state and property of goods produced several 

property otner establishments, which form the beauty and ornament of so- 

of goods ciety, and from which many adventitious states arise ; such as the 

fjive rise . 

to several different posts or offices of those, who have any share in the gov- 

other ad- ernment ; as magistrates, judges, state officers, ministers of reli- 
ventitious . . . . n re- 

states. § lon > physicians, &c. To which may be added the polite arts, 

trades, agriculture, navigation, commerce, with their several de- 
pendences, whereby human life is so agreeably and advantage- 
ously diversified. 
True idea XL Such are the principal states, produced by human con- 

ura^state 1 " sent * And yet ' as tll€Se different modifications of the primi- 
of man. tive state of man are the effect of his natural liberty, the new 
relations and different states thence arising may be very well 
considered, as so many natural states; provided however that 
the use, which men make of their liberty, in this respect, has 
nothing in it unconformable to their natural constitution, that is, to 
reason and the state of society. 

It is therefore proper to observe, in relation to this subject, 
that when we speak of the natural state of man, we are to 
understand not only that natural and primitive state in which 
he is placed, as it were, by the hands of nature herself; but 
moreover all those, into which man enters by his own act and 
agreement, and that are conformable in the main to his nature,, 
and contain nothing, but what is agreeable to his constitution 
and the end, for which he was formed. For since man him- 
self, as a free and intelligent being, is able to see and know his 
situation, as also to discover his ultimate end, and in consequence 
thereof to take the right measures to attain it ; it is properly 
in this light we should consider his natural state, to form there- 
of a just idea. That is, the natural state of man is, generally 
speaking, that, which is conformable to his nature, constitution, 
and reason, as well as the good use of his faculties, considered 



NATURAL LAW. 31 

in their full maturity and perfection. We shall be particularly 
attentive to this remark, the importance of which will appear 
more sensibly by the application and use, that may be made there- 
of on several occasions. 

XII. Let us not forget to observe likewise, that there is this D'ffer- 

difference between the primitive and adventitious states, that the ence bei . 
! _ tween on- 

former being annexed as it were, to the nature and constitution ot gi na land 

! man, such as he has received them from God, are for this very advenuti- 

. J ous states: 
reason, common to all mankind. The same cannot be said of 

• the adventitious states ; which, supposing an human act or agree- 
\ ment, cannot of themselves be indifferently suitable to all men, 
but to those only, who contrived and procured them. 
Let us add, in fine, that several of those states may be found 
, combined and united in the same person, provided they have 
j nothing incompatible in their nature. Thus the same person 
| may be father of a family, judge, minister of state, &c. all at the 
' same time. 

Such are the ideas, we are to form of the nature and differ- 
ent state of man ; and it is of all these parts united and com- 
pacted together, that the intire system of humanity is formed. 
These are like so many wheels of the same machine, which, 
combined and managed by a dexterous hand, conspire all to the 
same end ; and, on the contrary, unskilfully directed, embarrass 
and destroy each other. But how man, in fine, is enabled to 
cenduct himself in this prudent manner, and what rule he is to 
observe in order to attain this happy end, is what we have still 
to inquire, and forms the subject of the following chapters. 



CHAP. V. 

at Man ought to square his Conduct by Rule ; the Method of find- 
ing out this Rule ; and the Foundations of Right in general 

i^ET us begin with an explication of the terms. A rule, Definitioa 
in its proper signification, is an instrument, by means of which of a rule, 
we draw the shortest line from one point to another, which fo& 
this very reason is called a straight line, 



32 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

In a figurative and moral sense, a rule imports nothing else, but 
a principle, or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and con- 
cise method of attaining to the end, he proposes. 

It is not j[ The first thing we are to inquire in regard to this sub- 

conven- m ,f t © 

ient that ject* is, whether it is really agreeable to the nature of man to 

"J 1811 ., submit his actions to a fixt and invariable rule ? Or whether, 
should m * 

live with- on the contrary, he is allowed to abandon himself indifferently 
out a rule* to a jj ^ motions of his will, and thus to enjoy, without either 
limit or impediment, the extreme facility, with which this fac- 
ulty turns itself on all sides, in consequence of its natural flex- 
ibility ? 

The reflections, we have given in the preceding chapters, are 
of themselves, and independent of any other argument, a suf- 
ficient and convincing proof, that the nature and constitution of 
man requires the establishment of some rule. Every thing in 
nature has its destination and end ; and consequently, each 
creature is conducted to its end by a proper principle of direc- 
tion. Man, who holds a considerable rank among the beings 
that surround him, participates undoubtedly of this fixt and 
universal order. And, whether we consider him in himself 
as an intelligent and rational being, or view him as a member of 
society, or whether in fine we regard him as the handy work 
of God, and deriving from this first Being his faculties, state, 
and existence ; all these circumstances evidently indicate an 
end, a destination, and consequently imply the necessity of a 
rule. Had man been created to live at random without any fixt 
and determinate view, without knowing whither he is to direct 
his course, or what road he ought to take ; it is evident that his 
noblest faculties Would be of no manner of use to him. Where- 
fore, waving all disquisitions concerning the necessity of a rule, 
let us endeavour rather to discover what this rule is which 
alone, by enlightening the understanding, and directing our actions 
to an end worthy of him, is capable of forming the order and 
beauty of human life. 
A rule ni. When we speak of a rule in relation to human actions, 

an P end! e L two thin o s are manifestly supposed ; the first, that human con- 



aim, 



* See PufTendorf, Law of nature and nations, book ii. chap. \. 




NATURAL LAvt. 33 

duct is susceptible of direction, as we have already proved ; tbfe 
second, that man in all his steps and actions proposes to himself 
a scope or end, which he is desirous to attain. 

IV. Now let man reflect but never so little on himself, he will The ulti- 
soon perceive* that every thing he does is with a view of hap- Jf^f a ^ n ^ 
piness, and that this is the ultimate end he proposes in all his happhies«. : 
actions, or the last term, to which he reduces them. This is 

a first truth, of whic h We have a continual conviction from out 
internal sense. Such in effect is the nature Of man, that he ne- 
cessarily loves himself; that he seeks in every thing and every 
where his own advantage, and can never be diverted from this 
pursuit. We naturally desire, and necessarily wish for good. 
This desire anticipates all our reflections, and is not in our own 
election ; it predominates in us, and becomes the primum mo- 
bile of all our determinations ; our hearts being never inclined 
towards any particular good, but by the natural impression, 
which determines us to good in general. It is not in our power 
to change this bent of the will, which the Creator himself has 
implanted in us. 

V. This system of providence extends to all beings, endow- ^ ; s the 

ed with sense and knowledge. Even brute animals have a like system df 

provi- 
mstmct ; for they all love themselves, endeavouring at self-pre- dence, 

servation by all sorts of means, eagerly pursuing Whatever seems 
good or useful to them, and turning on the contrary, from what- 
ever appears prejudicial, or bad. The same propensity shews 
itself in man, not only as < an instinct, but moreover as a 
rational inclination approved and strengthened by reflection. 
Hence, whatsoever presents itself to us, as an object proper 
to promote our happiness, must of necessity please us ; and 
every thing, that appears opposite to our felicity, becomes of 
course the object of our aversion. The more we study man, 
the more we are convinced, that here in reality lies the source 
of all our tastes ; here the grand spring, which sets us in mo- 
tion. 

VI. And indeed, if it be natural to every intelligent and ra- Thedesii-e 
tional being to act always with a fixt view and determinate of bappi- 
end, it is no less evident, that this view or end must be ulti- "emiaiTo 
mafely reduced to himself;, and consequently to his own ad- man, and 



3-i THE PRINCIPLES OF 

insepava vantage and happiness. The desire therefore of happiness it 
reason! ™ as essential to a man, and as inseparable from his nature, as 
reason itself; for reason, as the very etymology of the word 
implies, is nothing more than a calculation and account. To 
reason is to calculate, and to draw up an account, alter balanc- 
ing every thing, in order to see on which side the advantage lies. 
It would therefore imply a contradiction to suppose a rational 
being, that could absolutely forego its interest, or be indifferent 
with regard to its own felicity. 
Self-love is VII. We must therefore take care not to consider self-love 

a princi- ^ ^ sense or inclination which fixes us so strongly to our 

pie, that _ ° ^ 

has noth- happiness, as a principle naturally vicious, and a fruit of human- 

k^l° US depravation. This would be accusing the Author oT our exist- 
ence, and converting his noblest gifts into poison. Whatever 
comes from a Being supremely perfect is in itself good ; and 
were we to condemn the sense or inclination of self-love as 
bad in itself, under a pretence that, by a misconstruction and 
wrong use thereof, it is the source of an infinite number of 
disorders, we should for the very same motives be obliged to 
condemn reason ; because it is from the abuse of this faculty, 
that the grossest errosrs and most extravagant irregularities of 
men proceed. 

It may appear surprising to some, that we should have stopt 
here to investigate and explain the truth of a principle, which 
one would imagine is obvious to every body, to the learned as 
well as the vulgar. And yet it was absolutely necessary ; be- 
cause this is a truth of the very last importance, which gives us 
the key, as it were, of the human system. It is true, that all 
ethical writers agree, that man is made for happiness, and natur- 
ally desires it ; (for how is it possible not to hear the voice of 
nature, which rises from the very bottom of tlie heart ?) But 
a great many, after acknowledging this principle, seem to lose 
sight of it, and, not attending to the consequences, that flow 
from it, erect their systems on different, and sometimes quite op» 
posite foundations. 

Man can- VIII. But if it be true, that man does nothing but with a 

not attain Y \ ew f happiness, it is no less certain, that reason is the only 
to happi- , , . . 

ness but way he has to attain it. 



NATURAL LAW. 35 

in order to establish this second proposition or truth, we by the 
have only to attend to the very idea of happiness, and to reason, 
the notion we have of good and evil. Happiness is that 
internal satisfaction of the soul which arises from the pos- 
session of good ; good is whatever is agreeable to man, for his 
preservation, perfection, entertainment, and pleasure. Evil is 
the opposite of good. 

Man incessantly experiences, that there are some things con- 
venient, and others inconvenient to him ; that the former are not 
all equally convenient, but some more than others ; in fine, that 
| this conveniency depends, Tor the most part, on the use, he knows 
! how to make of things, and that the same thing, which may suit 
! him, using it after a certain manner and measure, becomes unsuit- 
able, when this use exceeds its limits. It is only therefore by in- 
vestigating the nature of things, as also the relations, they have 
between themselves and with us, that we are capable of discover- 
ing their fitness or disagreement with our felicity, of discerning 
I good from evil, of ranging every thing in its proper order, of set- 
ting a right value on each, and of regulating consequently our 
researches and desires. 

But is there any other method of acquiring this discernment, 
but by forming just ideas of things and their relations, and by 
deducing from these first ideas the consequences, that flow 
from them by exact and close argumentations ? Now it is rea- 
son alone, that directs all these operations. Yet this is 
not all ; for as, in order to arrive at happiness, it is not suffi- 
cient to form just ideas of the nature and state of things, but 
it is also necessary, that the will should be directed by those 
ideas and judgments in the series of our conduct ; so it is cer- 
tain, that nothing but reason can communicate and support in 
man the necessary strength for making a right use of liberty, and 
for determining in all cases according to the light of his under- 
standing, in spite of all the impressions and motions that may lead 
him to a contrary pursuit. 

IX. Reason is therefore the only mean, in every respect, 

, , • i j Reason is 

that man has left to attain to happiness, and the principal end, therefore 

for which he has received it. All the faculties of the soul, its thepnmi- 
.'.«.-. , , . , . , . tiveruleof 

instincts, inclinations, and even the passions, are relative to this man, 



36 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

end ; and consequently it is this same reason, that is capable of 
pointing out the true rule of human actions, or, if you will, she 
herself is this primitive rule. In fact, were it not for this faith 
ful guide, man would lead a random life, ignorant even of what 
regards himself, unacquainted with his own origin and destination, 
and with the use he ought to make of whatever surrounds him ; 
stumbling like a blind man, at every step ; lost in fine and bewi! 
dered in an inextricable labyrinth. 
What is X. Thus we are conducted naturally to the first idea of the 

eenera\ ? wor & Right, which in its most general sense, and that, to which 
all the particular significations bear some relation, is nothing else 
but whatever reason certainly acknowledges, as a sure and con- 
cise mean of attaining happiness, and approves as such; 

This definition is the result of the principles hitherto estab- 
lished. In order to be convinced of its exactness, we have 
only to draw these principles together, and unite them under 
one prospect. In fact, since right {droit) in its primary no- 
tion signifies whatever directs, or is well directed ; since direc- 
tion supposes a scope and an end, to which we are desirous of 
attaining ; since the ultimate end of man is happiness ; and, 
in fine, since he cannot attain to happiness but by the help of 
reason ,• does it not evidently follow, that Right in general is 
whatever reason approves, as a sure and concise mean of ac- 
quiring happiness ? It is likewise in consequence of these 
principles, that reason, giving its approbation to itself, when 
it happens to be properly cultivated, and arrived to that state of 
perfection, in which it knows how to use all its discernment, 
bears, by way of preference or excellence, the appellation of right 
reason, as being the first and surest mean of direction, whereby 
man is enabled to acquire felicity. 

That we may not forget any thing in the analysis of these 
first ideas, it is proper to observe here, that the Latins express 
what we call Right by the word jus, which properly signifies an 
order or precept.* These different denominations undoubted- 
ly proceeded from this, that reason seems to command with 
authority whatever it avows to be a right and sure mean of 

* Jus a jubendo ; jura enim veteres Jusa ve! Jussa vocabant. Festus ; 
jusa, Jura. 



NATURAL LAW. 37 

promoting our felicity.. And as we have only to seek for 
what is right, in order to know what reason commands us, 
hence the natural connection of these two ideas arose in res- 
pect to the rules of right reason. In a word, of two ideas 
naturally connected, the Latins have followed one, and we the 
other. 

CHAP. VI. 

General rules of Conduct prescribed by Reason. Of the Nature and 
Jirct Foundations of Obligation. 

I. iT is already a great point gained, to have discovered the 
primitive rule of human actions, and to know this faithful guide, R eason 
which is to direct the steps of man, and whose directions and gives us 

86V6r&l 

counsels he may follow with an intire confidence. But let us rules of 
not stop here ; and, since experience informs us, that we are con duct. 
frequently mistaken in our judgments concerning good and evil, 
and that these erroneous judgments throw us into most danger- 
ous irregularities, let us consult therefore our guide, and learn 
which are the characters of real good and evil, in order to 
know in what true felicity consists, and what road we are to take 
in order to attain it. 
II. Though the general notion of good and evil be fixed in pi r8t ru ] e 

itself, and invariable, still there are various sorts of particular To make a 

ricrht dis* 
goods and evils, or of things, that pass for such in the minds tinction of 

of men. good and 

evil. 
1. The first counsel therefore, that reason gives us, is to 

examine well into the nature of good and evil, and to observe 

carefully their several differences, in order to set upon each thing 

its proper value. 

This distinction is easily made. A very slight attention to 

what we continually experience informs us, that, man being 

composed of body and soul, there are consequently two sorts 

of goods and evils, spiritual and corporeal. The first are those, 

that proceed only from our thoughts; the second arise from 

the impressions of external objects on our senses. Thus, the 

sensible pleasure, resulting from the discovery of an impor- 



38 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

taut truth, or the self approbation, arising from a consciousness 
of having discharged our duty, &e. are goods purely spiritual ; 
as the chagrin of a geometrician for being unable to find out a 
demonstration, or the remorse a person feels for having commit- 
ted a bad action, &c. are mere spiritual pains. With regard 
to corporeal goods and evils, they are sufficiently known ; on 
one side they are health, strength, beauty ; on the other, 
sickness, weakness, pain, &c. These two sorts of goods and 
evils are interesting to man, and cannot be reckoned indiffer- 
ent, by reason that, man being composed of body and soul, it is 
plain his perfection and happiness depend on the good state of 
these two parts. 

2. We likewise observe, that appearances frequeatly deceive 
as, and what at first sight carries with it the face of good proves 
to be a real evil, whilst an apparent evil oftentimes conceals 
an extraordinary good: We should therefore make a distinction 
between real goods and evils, and those, that are false and appa- 
rent. Or, which amounts to pretty near the same thing, there 
is sometimes a pure good and a pure evil, and sometimes there 
is a mixture of both, which does not obstruct our discerning what 
part it is, that prevails, and whether the good or evil be pre- 
dominant. 

3. A third difference regards their duration. In this respect 
goods and evils have not all the same nature.; some are solid and 
durable, others transitory and inconstant. Whereto we may 
add, that there are goods and evils of which we are masters, as 
it were, and which depend in such a manner on ourselves, that we 
are able to fix the one, in order to have a constant enjoyment 
of them, and to shun or get rid of the others. But they are not 
all of this kind ; some goods there are, that escape our most 
eager pursuits, whilst some evils overtake us, notwithstanding 
our most solicitous efforts to avoid them. 

4. There are at present goods and evils, which we actually 
feel ; and future goods'" and evils, which are the objects of our 
hopes or fears. 

5. There are particular goods and evils, which affect only 
some individuals ; and others, that are common and universal, 
of which all the members of the society partake. The good 



NATURAL LAW. 39 

i>t the whole is the real good ; that of one of the parts, oppo- 
site to the good of the whole, is only an apparent good, and con- 
sequently a real evil. 

€'.. From all these remarks we may in fine conclude, that, 
goods and eyils not being all of the same species, there are con- 
sequently some differences amongst them, and that, compared to- 
gether, we find there are some goods more excellent than oth- 
ers, and evils more or less incommodious. It happens likewise, 
that a good compared with an evil, may be either equal, or 
greater, or less ; whence several differences or gradations arise, 
that are worthy of special notice. 

These particulars are sufficient to show the utility of the prin- 
cipal rule, we have given, and how essential it is to our happi- 
ness to make a just distinction of goods and evils. But this is 
not the only counsel, that reason gives us ; we are going to point 
out some others, that are not of less importance. 

III. 2. True happiness cannot consist in things, that are in- Second 

consistent with the nature and state of man. This is another £" ^\ TrUe 

happiness 
principle, which naturally flows, from the very notion of good cannot 

and evil. For whatsoever is inconsistent with the nature of a thine?"* 
being tends for this very reason to degrade or destroy it, to cor- that are ia- 
rupt or alter its constitution; which, being directly opposite to Wi?n ine 
the preservation, perfection, and good of this being, subverts nature and 
the foundation of its felicity. Wherefore, reason being the no- man , 
blest part of man, and constituting his principal essence, what- 
ever is inconsistent with reason cannot form his happiness. 
To which I add, that whatever is incompatible with the state of 
man cannot contribute to his felicity ; and this is a point as clear, 
as evidence can make it. Every being, that by its constitution 
has essential relations to other beings, which it cannot shake off, 
ought not to be considered merely as to itself, but as constituting 
a part of the whole, to which it is related. And it is sufficiently 
I manifest, that it is on its situation in regard to the beings that 
, surround it, and on the relations of agreement'or opposition it 
j has with them, that its good or bad state, its happiness or misery, 
must in a great measure depend. 

IV. 3 In order to procure for ourselves a solid happiness, it Third 

is not sufficient to be attentive to the present gced and evil, we rule * To 

compare 



4.0 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



the pres- 
ent and tbe 
future to- 
gether. 



Fourth 
rule. 

Fifth rule. 



3'xth 
Rule. 
To give 

the goods, 
that excel 
most the 
prefer- 
ence. 



must likewise examine their natural consequences, to the end 
that, comparing the present with the future, and balancing one 
with the other, we may know beforehand what must be the nat- 
ural result. 

4. It is therefore contrary to reason, to pursue a good, that 
must certainly be attended with a more considerable evil.* 

5. But, on the contrary, nothing is more reasonable than to 
resolve to bear with an evil, from which a greater good must cer- 
tainly arise. 

The truth and importance ot these maxims are self-obvious. 
Good and evil being two epposites, the effect of one destroys that 
of the other ; that is to say, the possession of a good, attended 
with a greater evil, renders us really unhappy ; and, on the con* 
trary, a slight evil, Which procures us a more considerable good, 
does not hinder us from being happy. Wherefore, every thing 
well considered, the first ought to be avoided, as a real evil, and 
the second Should be courted, as a real good. 

The nature of human things requires us to be attentive to 
these principles. Were each of our actions restrained in such 
a manner, and limited within itself, as not to be attended with 
any consequence, we should not be so often mistaken in our 
choice, but should be almost sure of grasping the good. But, in- 
formed as we are by experience, that things have frequently 
very different effects, from what they seemed to promise inso- 
much that the most pleasing objects are attended with bitter con- 
sequences, and on the contrary a real and solid good is purchased 
with labour and pains, prudence, does not allow us to fix our 
whole attention on the present. We should extend Our views to 
futurity, and equally weigh and consider the one and the other, 
in order to pass a solid judgment on them, a judgment sufficient 
to fix properly our resolutions. 

V. 6* For" the same reason, we ought to prefer a greater to a 
less good ; We ought always to aspire to the noblest goods, that s 
suit us, and proportion our desires and pursuits to the nature 
and merit of each good. This rule is so evident, that it would 
be losing time to pretend to prove it. 

* See the third note of Mons. Batbeyrac on the duties of man and a cit- 
izen* book 1, chap. l,sec. II. 



NATURAL LAW. 4} 

VI. 7. It is not necessary to have an entire certainty in re- Seventh^ 
gard to considerable goods and evils ; mere possibility, and much some ca- 
more so probability, is sufficient to induce a reasonable person s es P° s ^ 1 - 
to deprive himself of some trifling good, and even to suffer some and by a ' 
slight evil, with a design of acquiring a far greater good, and "J" ** 
avoiding a more troublesome evil. reason 

This rule is a consequence of the foregoing ones ; and we {^^J, 1 }." 
may affirm, that the ordinary conduct of men shows, they are determine 
sensibly convinced ,of the prudence and necessity thereof. In us * 
effect, what is the aim of all this tumult of business, into which 
they hurry themselves ? To what end and purpose are all the 
Jabors they undertake, all the pains and fatigues they eadure, all 
the perils, to which they constantly expose themselves ? Their 
intent is to acquire some advantages, which they imagine they 
do not purchase too dear ; though those advantages are neither 
present, nor so certain, as the sacrifices, they must make in order 
to obtain them. 

This is a- very rational manner of acting. Reason requires, 
that, in default of certainty, we should take up with probabili- 
ty, as the ruie of our judgment and determination ; for proba- 
bility in that case is the only light and guide we have. And, 
unless it is mure eligible to wander in uncertainty, than to fol- 
low a guide ; unless we are of opinion, that our lamp ought to 
be extinguished, when we are deprived of the light of the sun ; 
it is reasonable to be directed by probability, when we are inca- 
pable of coming at evidence. It is easier to attain our aim by 
help of a faint or glimmering light, than by continuing in dark- 
ness.* 

* In the ordinary course of life, we are generally obliged to be determin- 
ed by probability, for it is not always in our power to attain to a complete 
evidence. Seneca, the philosopher, has beautifully established and ex- 
I plained this maxim . !t Huic respondebimus, nunquam expectare nos cer- 
j " tissnnan rerum compi ehensionem ; quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio ; 
| *• sed ea ire, qua ducit veri similitudo. Cmke hac via. procedit offi- 
*■* cium. Sic serimus, sic navigamus, sic militamus, sic uxores ducirnus, 
" sic libcros toilimus ; quum omnium horum incertus sit eventus. Ad ea 
•• accedimus, de quibus bene s^erandum esse credimns. Qjis enim polli- 
*'• ceatur sereiui proventum, naviganti portum, militanu vicvoriam, marito 
'* pudicam uxorem, patri pios liberos ? Sequimur qua ratio, non qua veri- 
*' tas trahit. Exspecta, ut nisi bene cessura non facias, et nisi comperta 
." veritate nihil moveris ; relicto omni actu vi'a consist it. Duni v^rsi- 
" milia me in hoc aut illud impellant, non verebor beneficium dare ei 3 
f* quern versimile erit gratum esse." De Benefit, lib. 4. c. $3. 

F 



42 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Eighth VII. 8. We should be solicitous to acquire a taste for true 

have a rel- g°°d s > insomuch that goods of an excellent nature, and acknowl- 
ishfartrue edged as such, should excite our desires, and induce us to make 
all the efforts, necessary for getting them into our possession. 

This last rule is a natural consequence of the others, ascer- 
taining their execution and effects. It is not sufficient to have 
enlightened the mind in respect to the nature of these goods and 
evils, that are capable of rendering us really happy or unhap- 
py ; we should likewise give activity and efficacy to these prin- 
ciples, by forming the will so, as to determine itself by taste 
and habit, pursuant to the counsels of enlightened reason. And 
let no one think it impossible to change our inclinations, or to 
reform our tastes. It is with the taste of the mind, as with 
that of the palate. Experience shows, that we may alter both, 
so as to find pleasure at length in things, that before were dis- 
agreeable to us. We begin to do a thing with pain, and by 
an effort of reason ; afterwards we familiarize ourselves to it 
by degrees ; then a frequency of acts renders it easier to us, 
the repugnance ceases, we view the thing in a different light 
from what we did before; and use at length makes us love a 
thing, that before was the object of our averson. Such is the 
power of habit; it makes us insensibly feel so much ease and sa- 
tisfaction in what we are accustomed to, that we find it difficult 
afterwards to abstain from it. 
Our mind VIII. These are the principal counsels, we receive from rea- 

arquies- m ^ They are in some measure a system of maxims, which, 
Ces natur- J J ■ 

ally in drawn iroui the nature of things and particularly from the nature 

\ g?^nd an ^ sta * e °f man ' aC( l uamt us w ^ n wnat i s essentially suitable to 

they ought him, and include the most necessary rules for his perfection and 

to influ- . 

enceour happiness. 

conduct. These general principles are of such a nature., as to force, as 
it were, our assent ; insomuch that a clear and cool understand- 
ing, disengaged from the prejudice and tumult of passions, cannot 
help acknowledging their truth and prudence. Every one sees 
how useful it would be to man to have these principles present 
always in his mind, that by the application and use of them in 
particular cases, they may insensibly become the uniform and 
ooustant rule of his inclinations and conduct 



NATURAL LAW. h% 

Maxims in fact, like these, are not mere speculations ; they 
should naturally influence our morals, and be of service to us in 
practical life. For to what purpose would it be to listen to the 
advice of reason, unless we intended to follow it ? Of what sig- 
nification are those rules of conduct, which manifestly appear to 
us good and useful, if we refuse to conform to them ? We our- 
selves are sensible, that this light was given us to regulate our 
steps and motions. If we deviate from these maxims, we in- 
wardly disapprove and condemn ourselves, as we are apt to con- 
demn any other person in a similar case. But if we happen to 
conform to these maxims, it is a subject of internal satisfaction, 
and we commend ourselves, as we commend others, who have 
acted after this manner. These sentiments are so very natural, 
that it is not in our power to think otherwise. We are forced 
to respect these principles, as a rule agreeable to our nature, and 
on which our felicity depends. 

IX. This agreeableness sufficiently known implies a necessity Ofobl : ga- 
of squaring our conduct by it. When we mention necessity, it rTn\ g oii- 
is plain we do no* mean a physical, but moral necessity, consist- sidered. 
ing in the impression, made on us by some particular motives, 
which determine u& to act after a certain manner, and do not per- 
mit us to act rationally the opposite way. 

Finding ourselves in these circumstances, we say we are under 
an obligation of doing or omitting a certain thing ; thjt is, we are 
determined to it by solid reasons, and engaged by cogent motives, 
which, like so many ties, draw our will to that side. It is in this 
sense a person says he is obliged. For, whether we are deter- 
mined by popular opinion, or whether we are directed by civili- 
ans and ethic writers, we find that the one and the other make 
obligation properly consist in a reason, which, being well under- 
stood and approved, determine us absolutely to act alter a certain 
manner preferable to another. Hence it follows, that the whole 
force of this obligation depends on the judgment, by which we 
approve or condemn a particular manner of acting. For to ap- 
prove is acknowledging we ought to do' a thing ; and to condemn. 
is owning we ought not to do it. Now ought and to be obliged are 
synonimous terms. 



44 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

We have already hinted at the natural analogy between tbe 
proper and literal sense of the word obliged, and the figurative 
signification of this same term. Obligation properly denotes a 
tie ;* a man obliged is therefore a person, who is tied. And 
as a man, bound with cords or chains, cannot move or act with 
liberty, so it is very near the same case with a person, who is 
obliged; with this difference, that, in the first case, it is an ex- 
ternal and physical impediment, which prevents the effect of 
one's natural strength ; but in the second, it is only a moral tie ; 
that is, the subjection of liberty is produced by reason, which, 
being the primitive rule of man and his faculties, directs and 
necessarily modifies his operations in a manner suitable to the 
fend, it proposed. 

We may therefore define obligation, considered in general 
and in its first origin, a restriction of natural liberty, produced 
by reason ; inasmuch as the counsels, which reason gives us, 
are sd many motives, that determine man to act after a certain 
manner, preferable to another. 
8biiia- ^' Such is the nature of primitive and original obligation. 

Jion raaf From thi§ it follows; that this obligation may be more or less 
bemoreof - , . , . . . ,. Al ., . 

j ess strong; mofe or less rigorous ; according as the reasons, that es- 

sti-ongo {ablish it, have more or less weight, and consequently as the mo- 
tives, therice resulting, have more Or less impression on the will, 
For nianifest it is, that the more these motives are cogent and 
efficacious, the more the necessity of conforming our actions to 
thesi becomes Strong and indispensible. 
lir.Clark's ?*• I am not ignorant, that this explication of the nature 
bpinibn of ^d" origin of obligation is far from being adopted by all civil- 
knd origin tans and ethic writers. Some pretend,! that the natural fitness 
\i6n ^ ° r lir ifi tnis ^^ which we acknowledge in certain actions, is the trvc 
and original foundation of all obligation; that virtue has an in- 
trinsic beauty, which renders it amiable of itself, and that vice op. 
the contrary is attended with an intrinsic deformity, which ought to 
make lis detest it; and this antetedent to and indepe?ulent of the 
good and evil, of the rewards and punishments, which may avis: 
from the practice of either. I 

* Obligatio & ligando. 

t See ifr, Clarfe on the evidence of statural and revealed reiigiott. 



NATURAL LAV/. 45 

But this opinion methinks can be supported no farther, than 
it is reduced to that, which we have just now explained. For 
to say that virtue has of itself a natural beauty, which renders 
i it worthy of our love, and that Vice, on the contrary, merit? 
our aversion, is not this acknowledging, in fact, that we have 
reason to prefer one to the other ? Now, whatever this reason 
be, it certainly can never become a motive capable of deter- 
mining the will, but inasmuch as it presents to us some good 
to acquire, or tends to make us avoid some evil ; in short, only 
as it is able to contribute to our satisfaction, and place us in a 
state of tranquility and happiness. Thus it is ordained by the 
very constitution of man, and the nature of human will. For* 
as good in general is the object of the will, the only motive, 
capable of setting it in motion, or of determining it to one side 
preferable to another, is the hope of obtaining this good. To afb* 
stract therefore from all interest in respect to man is depriving 
him of all motive of acting, that is* reducing him to a state of 
inaction and indifference. Besides, what idea should we be able 
to form of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of human ac- 
tions, of their beauty or turpitude, of their proportion or irregu- 
larity, were not all this referred to man himself, and to what 
his destination, his perfection, his Welfare, and in short his true 
felicity requires ? 

XII; Most civilians are of a different opinion from that of . 

Dr. Clark. " *They establish, as a principle of obligation, Barbey. 
" properly so called, the will of a superior being, on whom de- raCSo P ,n 
" pendence is acknowledged. They pretend there is nothing but cernmg 
u this will, or the orders of a being; of this kind, that can bridle \ ]us „ sui ' 
u our liberty, or prescribe particular rules to our actions. They 
t4 add, that neither the relations of proportion nor disagreement, 
" which we acknowledge in the things themselves, nor the ap- 
" probation they receive from reason, lay us under an indispensi- 
" ble necessity of following those ideas, as the rules of our 
" conduct. That, our reason being in reality nothing el*e but 
w ourselves* nobody, properly speaking, can lay himself under 

*See the judgment of an anonymous wrUer, &c § 15. This is a smalt 
work of Mr. Leibnitz, on which Mr Barbeyrac has made some remarks, 
and which is inserted in the fifth edition of his translation of the duties ot 
man and citizen. 



46 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

** m obligation. Hence they conclude, that the maxims of rea- 
" son y considered; in themselves, and independent of the will 
" of a superior, have nothing obligatory in their nature;'* 

This manner of explaining the nature, and laying the founda- 
tion of obligation, appears to me insufficient, because it does not 
ascend to the original source, and real principles. True it is, 
that the will of a superior obliges those, who are his depen- 
slen-ts - T yet this will cannot have such an effect, but inasmuch 
as it meets with the approbation of our reason. For this pur- 
pose it is not only necessary, that the superior's will should 
Contain nothing in itself opposite to the nature of man ; but 
moreover it ought to be proportioned in such a manner to his 
constitution and ultimate ena> that we cannot help acknowledging 
k r as the rule of our actions ; insomuch that there is no neglect- 
ing it without falling into a dangerous error ; and, on the con- 
trary, the only means of obtaining our end is to be directed 
%• it. Otherwise it is inconceivable how man can voluntarily 
submit to the orders of a superior, or determine willingly to obey 
Mm. Own indeed 1 must, that, according to the language of 
civilians, tjhe idea of a superior, who commands, must intervene 
to establish an obligation, such as is commonly considered. 
Bat, unless we trace things higher, by grounding even the au- 
thority of this superior on the approbation, be receives from 
reason, it will produce only an external constraint, very differ- 
tut from obligation, which hath of itself a power of penetrating 
the will, and moving it by an inward sense • insomuch that man 
is of his own accord, and without any restraint or violence, in- 
clined to obey. 
Two torts XIII. From all these remarks we may conclude, that the dif* 

tBfaAhgs- | erences between the principal systems, concerning: the nature 

tifcms, m- ■ 

tern si and and origin of obligation, are not so great, as they appear at first 

tMiemaL sight. Were we to make a closer inquiry into these opinions, by 
ascending to their primitive sources, we should find, that these 
different ideas, reduced to their exact value, far from being op- 
posite, agree very well together, and ought even toconcur, in 
order to form a system, connected properly with all its essential 
partSj in relation to the nature and state o^ man. This is 



NATURAL LAW. If 

what we intend more particularly to perform hereafter.* It is 
proper at present to observe, that there are two sorts of obliga- 
tions, one internal, and the other external. By internal obliga- 
tion I understand that, which is produced only by our own rea- 
son, considered as the primitive rule of conduct, and in -conse- 
quence of the good or evil the action in itself contains. 3y ex- 
ternal obligation, we mean that, whch arises from the will of a 
being, on whom we allow ourselves dependent, and who com- 
mands or prohibits some particular things, under a comminatioa of 
punishment. Whereto we must add, that these two obligations, 
far from being opposite to each other, have, on the contrary, a 
perfect agreement. For as the external obligation is capable of 
giving a new force to the internal, so the whole force of the ex- 
ternal obligation ultimately depends on the internal ; and it is 
from the agreement and concurrence of these two obligations, 
that the highest degree of moral necessity arises, as also the 
strongest tie, or the properest motive to make impression ©a 
man, in order to determine him to pursue steadily and never to 
deviate from some fixt rules of conduct ; in a word, by this it i* 9 
that the most perfect obligation is formed. 

CHAP. VII. 

Vf Right, considered as a Faculty, and of the Obligation tkereU 



corresponding. 



,B 



ESIDES the general idea of right, such as has been The 

now explained, considering it as the primitive rule of human r Js Ia *•*** 

,. . . . keninsciF- 

actions, this term is taken in several particular significations, eral part*- 

which we must here point out. cuiar sc . 13 : 

r ses, wfo»s>fc 

But, previous to everything else, we should not forget the are &H€o- 

primitive and general notion, we have given of right. For, Jived fro® 
since it is from this notion, as from its principle, that the sub- ralnetiisff, 
ject of this and the following chapters is deduced, if our reason- 
ings are exact in themselves, and have a necessary connexion 
with the principle, this will furnish us with a new argument ia 
its favor. But if unexpectedly it should turn out otherwise. 

*See the second part, chap, \\, 



AH THE PRINCIPLES OF 

we shall have at least the advantage of detecting the error ip 
its very source, and of being better able to correct it. Such jg 
the effect of a just method ; we are convinced, that a general 
idea is exact, when the particular ideas are reducible to it, as 
different branches to their trunk. 

S-ri n ht° n U ' In the first P Iace » R, S ht is frequently taken from a per- 
consider- sonal quality, for a power of acting or faculty. It is thus we 
5: j t a say, that every man has a right to attend to his own preserva- 
tion ; that a parent has a right to bring up his children ; that a 
sovereign has a right tP levy troops for the defence of the 
state ; &c. 

In this sense we must define Right a power, that man hath 
to make use of his liberty and strength in a particular manner, 
either in regard to himself, or in respect to other men, so far 
as this exercise of his strength and liberty is approved by rear 
son. 

Thus, when we say, that a father has a right to bring up his 
chijdren, all that is meant hereby is, that reason allows a father 
to make use of his liberty and natural force in a manner suita- 
ble to the preservation of his children, and proper to cultivate 
their understandings, and to train them up in the principles of 
virtue. In like manner, as reason gives its approbation to the 
sovereign in whatever is necessary for the preservation and wejr 
fare of the state, it particularly authorises him to raise troops 
and bring armies into the field, in order to oppose an enemy ; 
and in consequence hereof we say he has a right to do it. But, 
on the contrary, we affirm, that a prince has no right, without 
a particular necessity, to drag the peasant from the plough, or 
to force poor tradesmen from their families ; that a father has 
no right to expose his children, or to put them to death, &c. 
because these things, far from being approved, are expressly 
condemned by reason. 

We must HI. We must not therefore confound simple power with 

tile cure 

to distin- r »ght. A simple power is a physical quality ; it is a power of 

guibh be- acting in the full extent of our natural strength and liberty ; 
simple ^ut tne idea °f r ight is more confined. This includes a re- 
power and lalion of agreeableness to a rule, which modifies the physical 
right. . 

power, and directs its operations in a manner proper to con- 



NATURAL LAW, 49 

tluct man to a certain end. It is for this reason we say that right 

is a moral quality. It is true there are some, who rank power as 

well as right among the number of moral qualities ;* but there 

is nothing in this essentially opposite to our distinction. Those, 

who rank these two ideas among moral entities, understand by 

power pretty near the same thing, as we understand by right; and 

custom seems to authorise this confusion; for we equally use, for 

! instance, paternal power, and paternal right, &c. Be this as it 

i will, we are not to dispute about words. The main point is to 

distinguish between physical and moral; and it seems that the 

, word right, as PufFendorf himself insinuates,! is fitter of itself 

than power to express the moral idea. In short, the use of our 

• faculties becomes a right only so far, as it is approved by reason, 

; and is found agreeable to this primitive rule of human actions. 

And whatever a man can reasonably perform becomes in regard 

! to him a right, because reason is the only mean, that can conduct 

! him in a short and sure manner to the end he proposes. There 

! is nothing therefore arbitrary in these ideas ; they are borrowed 

! from the very nature of things, and, if we compare them with 

the foregoing principles, we shall find they flow from them as 

necessary consequences. 

IV. If any one should afterwards inquire, on what foundation General 

it is that reason approves a particular exercise of our strength * 0,ind *- 

i ii . . tion of the 

and liberty, in preference to another, the answer is obvious, rights of 

The difference of those judgments arises from the very nature man * 

of things and their effects. Every exercise of our faculties, that 

tends of itself to the perfection and happiness of man, meets with 

the approbation of reason, which condemns whatever leads to a 

contrary end. 

V. Obligation answers to right, taken in a manner above ex- Rj^ht pro- 
plained, and considered in its effects with regard to another due s ob- 
person. ligation. 



* See Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. i. § 19. 

j- There seems to be this difference between the terms power and right , 
that the first does more expressly import the presence oi the said quality, 
and does but obscurely denote the manner how any one acquired it.— 
Whereas the word right does properly and clearly show, thai the quality 
was fairly got, and is now fairly possessed. Puffendorf on the Law of 
Nature and Nations, book i. chap. 1 . § 20. 

G 



60 THE PRINCIPLES OP 

What we have already said, in the preceding chapter, concern 
ning obligation, is sufficient to convey a general notion of the 
nature of this moral quality. But in order to form a just idea of 
that, which comes under our present examination, we are to ob- 
serve, that when reason allows a man to make a particular use 
of his strength and liberty, or, which is the same thing, wb£n it 
acknowledges he has a particular right, it is requisite, by a very 
natural consequence, that in order to ensure this right to man, 
he should acknowledge at the same time, that other people ought 
not to employ their strength and liberty in resisting him in this 
point; but on the contrary, that they should respect his right, 
and assist him in the exercise of it, rathea than do him any 
prejudice. From this the idea of obligation naturally arises ; 
which is nothing more than a restriction of natural liberty pro- 
duced by reason ; inasmuch as reason does not permit an oppo- 
sition to be made to those, who use their right, but on the con- 
trary it obliges every body to favor and abet such, as do nothing 
but what it authorises, rather than oppose or traverse them in 
the execution of their lawful design®. 
Right and VL Right therefore and obligation are, as logicians express 
are'two' 011 *'» correlative terms; one of these ideas necessarily supposes the 
relative other; and we cannot conceive a right without a corresponding 
obligation. How, for example, could we attribute to a father 
the right of forming his children to wisdom and virtue by a per- 
fect education, without acknowledging at the same time, that 
children ought to submit to paternal direction, and that they 
are not only obliged not to make any resistance in this respect, 
but moreover to concur, by their docility and obedience, to the 
execution of their parent's views ? Were it otherwise, reason 
would be no longer the rule of human actions; it would contra- 
dict itself, and all the rights it grants to man would become 
useless and of no effect; which is taking from him with one 
hand what it gives him with the other. 
At what VII. Such is the nature of right, taken for a faculty, and of 

time man t^ e obligation thereto corresponding. It may be generally af- 
libie of firmed, that man is susceptible of these two qualities, as soon 

right and as he begins to enjoy life and sense. Yet we must make some 
obligation. 

ditterence here, between nght and obligation, in respect to th* 5 



NATURAL LAW. £1 

time, in which these qualities begin to unfold themselves in man, 
The obligations a person contracts as man, do not actually dis- 
play their virtue till he is arrived to the age of reason and dis- 
cretion. For, in order to discharge an obligation, we must be 
first acquainted with it; we must know what we do, and be able 
to square our actions by a certain rule. But as for those rights, 
that are capable of procuring the advantage of a person without 
his knowing any thing of the matter, they date their origin, and 
are in full force from the very first moment of his existence, and 
lay the rest of mankind under an obligation of respecting them. 
For example, the right, which requires, that nobody should in- 
jure or offend us, belongs as well to children, and even to infants, 
that are still in their mothers' wombs, as to adult persons. This 
is the foundation of that equitable rule of the Roman law, which 
declares,* That infants, who are as yet in their mothers'* wombs, 
are considered as already brought into the world, whenever the 
question relates to any thing, that may turn to their advantage, 
But we cannot with any exactness affirm, that an infant, whether 
already come or coming into the world, is actually subject to any 
obligation with respect to other men. This state does not prop- 
erly commence, with respect to man, till he has attained the age 
of knowledge and discretion. 

VIII. Various are the distinctions of rights and obligations; Several 

but it will be sufficient for us to point out those only, that are sor , ts of , 

J rights and 

most worthy of notice.]" obti.^a^ 

In the first place, rights are natural, or acquired. The for- tl0Ba * 
mer are such as appertain originally and essentially to man, such, 
as are inherent in his nature, and which he enjoys as man, in- 
dependent of any particular act on his side. Acquired rights, 
on the contrary, are those, which he does not naturally enjoy, 
but are owing to his own procurement. Thus the right of pro- 
viding for our preservation is a right natural to man; but sov- 

*Qji in utero est, p; rinde ac si in rebus Immanis esset, custoditur, quo 
ties de commode ipsais paitus quaeritur. L 7 «ie statu hbmin, lib. 1. tit 3-. 
Another ctV'liane '.a /lishes this rule. It aqua pali quis injuria m ; eiiams'. 
nou sentu , potest ; faoere ns- mo, nisi qui scit , se injuriam jacere,, etiamsi 
nesciat cui taciat. L. 3 § 2. D de injuriis lib. 47, tit. 10, 

| See Puffendorf on the Law o< Nature and Nations, book i. cfnp.t. § 19. 
and Grotius of the Rights of War and Peace, bo; k i. chap. i. <S 4,-5, 6, T, 
with B^rbeyrac's notes. 



52 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

ereignty, or the right of commanding a society of men, is a right 
acquired. . 

Secondly, rights are perfect, or imperfect. Perfect rights are 
those, which may be asserted in rigour, even by employing force 
to obtain the execution, or to secure the exercise thereof in 
opposition to all those, who should attempt to resist or disturb 
us. Thus reason would empower us to use force against any 
one, who would make an unjust attack on our lives, our goods, 
or our liberty* But, when reason does not allow us to use forci- 
ble methods, in order to secure the enjoyment of the rights, it 
grants us, then these rights are called imperfect. Thus, not- 
withstanding reason authorises those, who of themselves are des- 
titute of means of living to apply for succour to other men ; yet 
they cannot, in case of refusal, insist upon it by force, or pro- 
cure it by open violence. It is obvious, without our having any 
occasion to mention it here, that obligation answers exactly to 
right, and is more or less strong, perfect, or imperfect, according 
as right itself is perfect or imperfect. 

Thirdly, another distinction, worthy of our attention, is, that 
there are rights, which may be lawfully renounced, and others, 
that cannot. A creditor for example may forgive a sum due to 
him, if he pleases, either in the whole or part; but a father can- 
not renounce the right, he has over his children, nor leave them 
in an intire independence. The reason of this difference is, that 
there are rights, which of themselves have a natural connection 
with our duties, and are given to man only, as means to perform 
them. To renounce this sort of right would, be therefore re- 
nouncing our duty, which is never allowed. But with respect to 
rights, that no way concern our duties, the renunciation of them 
is licit, and only a matter of prudence. Let us illustrate this 
with another example. Man cannot absolutely, and without any 
manner of reserve, renounce his liberty; for this would be man- 
ifestly throwing himself into a necessity of doing wrong, were he 
so commanded by the person, to whom he has made this subjec- 
tion. But it is lawful for us to renounce a part of our liberty, if 
we find ourselves better enabled thereby to discharge our duties, 
Jind to acquire some certain and reasonable advantage. It is with 



NATURAL LAW. 53 

these modifications we must understand the common maxim, 
That it is allowable for every one to renounce his right. 

Fourthly, Right in fine considered in respect to its different ob- 
jects, may be reduced to four principal species. 1. The right 
we have over our own persons and actions, which is called Lib- 
erty. 2. The right we have over things or goods, that belong to 
us, which is called Property. 3. The right we have over the 
persons and actions of other men, which is distinguished by 
the name of Empire or Authority. 4. And in fine the right one 
may have over other mens' things, of which there are several 
sorts. It suffices, at present, to have given a general notion of 
these different species of right. Their nature and effects will be 
explained, when we come to a particular inquiry into these mat- 
tars. 

Such are the ideas we ought to have of right, considered as a 
faculty. But there is likewise another particular signification of 
I this word, by which it is taken for law ; as when we say, that 
| natural right is the foundation of morality and politics ; that it 
forbids us to break our word ; that it commands the reparation of 
damage, &c. In all these cases, right is taken for law. And as 
this kind of right agrees in a particular manner with man, it is 
therefore a matter of importance to clear and explain it well, 
which we shall endeavour to perform in the following chapters. 



CHAP. VIII.* 

Of Law in general. 

I. JlN the researches hitherto made concerning the rule of 
human actions, we have consulted only the nature of man, his 
essence, and what belongs to his eternal part. This inquiry 
has shewn us, that man finds within himself, and in his own 
Reason, the rule he ought to follow ; and since the counsels, 
which reason gives him, point out the shortest and safest road 

* See Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, book i, chap. iv. 



54 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

to his perfection and happiness, from thence arises a principle 
of obligation, or a cogent motive to square his actions by his 
primitive rule. But, in order to have an exact knowledge of 
the human system, we must not stop at these first considera- 
tions ; we should likewise, pursuant to the method already point- 
ed out in this work,* transfer our attention to the different states 
of man, and to the relations, thence arising, which must abso- 
lutely produce some particular modifications in the rules he is to 
follow. For, as we have already observed, these rules ought not 
only to be conformable to the nature of man, but they should be 
proportionable moreover to his state and situation. 

As man by H< Now amon g tne primitive states of man, dependence is 

nature is a one f those, which merits the most attention, and ought to have 

being, the the greatest influence on the rule he is to observe. In fact, a 

law ought being independent of every bodv else has no other rule to pur- 

to be the , . 

rule of his sue, but the counsels of his own reason ; and in consequence of 

actions. t hj s independence he is freed from all subjection to another's 
will ; in short, he is absolute master of himself and his actions. 
But the case is not the same with a being, who is supposed to 
be dependent on another, as on his superior and master. The 
sense of this dependence ought naturally to engage the inferior i 
to take the will of him, on whom he depends, for the rule of 
his conduct ; since the subjection, in which he finds himself, 
does not permit him to entertain the least reasonable hopes of 
acquiring any solid happiness, independent of the will of his 
superior, and of the views he may propose in relation to him.j 
Besides, this has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as 1 
the superiority of the one, and the dependence of the other, 
greater or less, absolute or limited. It is obvious that all these 
remarks are in a particular manner applicable to man ; so that, as 
soon as he acknowledges a superior, to whose power and author- 
ity he is naturally subject, in consequence of this state, be must 
acknowledge likewise the will of this superior to be the rule of 
his actions. This is the Right we call Lazv. 

* See chap. iii. of this part, sec. 3. 
f See chap. vi. sec. 3, 



NATURAL LAW. 55 

It is to be understood however, that this will of the superior 
has nothing in it contrary to reason, the primitive rule of man* 
For, were this the case, it would be impossible for us to obey 
him. In order to render a law the rule of human actions, it 
should be absolutely agreeable to the nature and constitution of 
man, and be ultimately designed for his happiness, which reason 
makes him necessarily pursue. These remarks, though clear 
enough of themselves, will receive a greater light, when we 
have more particularly explained the nature of law. 

III. Law I define a rule, prescribed by the sovereign of a Definition 
society to his subjects, either in order to lay an obligation upon 

them of doing or omitting certain things, under the commina- 
tion of punishment, or to leave them at liberty to act or not in 
other things just as they think proper, and to secure to them, in 
this respect, the full enjoyment of their rights. 

By thus defining law, we deviate a little from the definitions, 
given by Grotius and Puffendorf. But the definitions of these 
authors are, methinks, somewhat too vague, and besides do not 
seem to agree with law, considered in its full extent. This opin- 
ion of mine will be justified by the particular explication, I am 
going to enter upon, provided it be compared with the passages 
here refered to.* 

IV. I say that larv is a rule, to signify, in the first place, what wb y law 
law has in common with counsel ; which is, that they are both a rule pre 
rules of conduct ; and secondly, to distinguish law from the tran- scribed, 
sient orders, which may be given by a superior, and, not being 
permanent rules of the subject's conduct, are not properly laws. 

The idea of rule includes principally these two things univer- 
sality and perpetuity ; and both these characters being essential 
to rule, generally considered, help to discriminate law from any 
other particular will of the sovereign. 

I add, that law is a rule prescribed, because a simple resolu- 
tion, confined within the sovereign's mind, without manifesting 
itself by some external sign, can never be a law. It is requisite, 
that this will be notified in a proper manner to the subjects ; 

♦See Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace, book i. chap. i. sec. 9. 
And Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. cbap.vi. sec» 
4. To which we may add Mons. Barbeyrae's notes, 



66 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

so that they be acquainted with what the sovereign requires of 
them, and with the necessity of squaring thereby their conduct. 
But in what manner this notification is to be made, whether viva 
voce, by writing, or otherwise, is a matter of mere indifference. 
Sufficient it is, that the subjects be properly instructed concern- 
ing the will of the legislator. 
What is V. Let us finish the explication of the principal ideas, that 

Unf iTh' enter mto tne definition of law. Law is prescribed by the sove- 
sovereign, reign; this is what distinguishes it from counsel, which comes 
sovereign- f rom a f r j enc j or e q Ufl i ; w ho, as such, has no power over us, 
right of and whose advices consequently neither have the same force, 
nor produce the same obligation as law, which, coming from a 



ing. 



sovereign, has for its support the command and authority of a 
superior.* Counsels are followed by reasons, drawn from the 
nature of the thing ;'laws are obeyed, not only on account of 
the reason, on which they are established, but likewise because 
of the authority of the sovereign, who prescribes them. The 
obligation arising from counsel is merely internal ; that of law is 
both internal and external.! 

Society, as we have already observed, is the union of several 
persons for a particular end, from which some common advan- 
tage arises. The end is the effect or advantage, which intelli- 
gent beings propose to themselves, and are willing to procure. 
The union of several persons is the concurrence of their will 
to procure the end, they aim at in common. But, though we 
make the idea of society enter into the definition of law, it must 
not thence be inferred, that society is a condition absolutely es- 
sential and necessary to the enacting of laws. Considering the 
thing exactly, we may very well form a conception of law, when 
the sovereign has only a single person subject to his authority ; 
and it is only in order to enter into the actual state of things, I 
that we suppose a sovereign commanding a society of men. We 
must nevertheless observe, that the relation, there is between 
the sovereign and the subjects, forms a society between them, 
but of a particular kind, which we may call a society of inequal- 
ity, were the sovereign commands, and the subjects obey. 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book i, chap. vi. sec. 2. 
| See above, chap. vi. sec. 13. 



NATURAL LAW. 57 

The sovereign is therefore he, who has a right to command 
in the last resort. To command is directing the actions of those, 
who are subject to us, according to our own will, and with au- 
thority or the power of constraint. I say, that the sovereign com- 
mands in the last resort, to show that, as he has the first rank 
in society, his will is superior to any other, and holds all the 
members of the society in subjection. In fine the right of com- 
manding is nothing more, than the power of directing the actions 
of others with authority. And, as the power of exercising one's 
force and liberty is no farthe r a right, than as it is approved 
and authorised by reason, it is on this approbation of reason, 
as the last resort, that the right of command is established. 

VI. This leads us to inquire more particularly into the nat- 
ural foundation of empire or sovereignty; or, which amm nts 
to the same thing, what is it, that confers or constitutes a right 
of laying an obligation on another person, and of requiring his 
submission and obedience. This is a very important question 
in itself ; important also in its effects. For, the more we are 
convinced of the reasons, which establish on the one hand autho- 
rity, and dependence on the other, the more we are inclined to 
make a real and voluntary submission to those, or whom we de- 
pend. Besides, the diversity of sentiments, in relation to the 
manner of laying the foundation of sovereignty, is a sufficient 
proof, that this subject requires to be treated with care and 
attention. 

CHAP. IX. 

Of the Foundation of Sovereignty, or the Right of Commanding. 

I. JlNQIJIRING here into the foundation of the right of First re- 
command, we consider the thing only in a general and metapby- mark. The 
sical manner. The question is to know the foundation of a is in re 

necessary sovereignty and dependence : that is, such as is foun- & ard to a 

J ° J r ' necessary 

ded o» the very nature of things, and is a natural consequence sovereign^ 
of the constitution of those beings, to whom it is attributed. ty * 
Let us therefore wave whatever relates to a particular species 

H 



58 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

of sovereignty, in order to ascend to the general ideas, front 
which the first principles are derived. But, as general prin- 
ciples, when just and Well founded, are easily applied to par- . 
ticular cases, it follows, therefore, that the first foundation of 
sovereignty, or the reasons, on which it is established, ought to 
be laid in such a manner, as to be easily applicable to the sev- 
eral species, that fall within our knowledge. By this mean, as 
we observed before, we can be fully satisfied with regard to the 
justness of the principles, or distinguish, whether they are de- 
fective. 
Second re- H> Another general and preliminary remark is, that there ! 
mark. can b e ne ither sovereignty nor natural and necessary depend- I 

neither ence between beings, which by their nature, faculties, and state, I 
sovereign- jj ave g0 p er f ec fc an equality, that nothing can be attributed to I 
cessaryde- one, which is not alike applicable to the other. In fact, in such I 
pendence a SU pp 0S jtien, there could be no reason, why one should arro- I 
beings gate an authority over the rest, and subject them to a state of I 
eausU y dependence, of which the latter could not equally avail them- I 
selves against the former. But as this reduces the thing to an I 
absurdity, it follows, that such an equality between several be- 1 
ings excludes all subordination, all empire and necessary depen- I 
dence of one on the other; just as the equality of two weights I 
keeps the scale in a perfect equilibrium. There must be there- I 
fore in the very nature of those beings, who are supposed to be I 
subordinate one to the other, an essential difference of qualities, I 
on which the relation of superior and inferior may be founded. I 
But the sentiments of writers are divided in the determination of I 
those qualities. 
Different HI. 1. Some pretend, that the sole superiority of strength, or, I 

opinions as they express it, an irresistible power is the true and first foun- J 

on the on- . . . 

gin and dation of the right of imposing an obligation, and prescribing I 

tonof'so- laWS * " This su P eriorit y of power gives, according to them, 
vereignty. " a right of reigning, by the impossibility, in which it places I 
" others, of resisting him, who has so great an advantage over :| 
" them."* 

2. Others there are, who derive the origin and foundation j 
of sovereignty from the eminency or superior excellence of na^ | 
* See Hobbes de Give, chap, 15 sec. 5- 



NATURAL LAW. * 59 

tare ; " which not only renders a being independent of all those, 

" who are of an inferior nature ; but moreover causes the lat- 

" ter to be regarded, as made for the former. And of this, 

x< say they, we have a proof in the very constitution of man, 

** where the soul governs, as being the noblest part ; and it is 

" likewise on this foundation, that the empire of man over brutes 

M is grounded."* 

3. A third opinion, which deserves also our notice, is that 

of Barbeyrac.f According to this judicious author, " there is 

" properly speaking, only one general foundation of obligation, 

" to which all others may be reduced, and that is our natural 

" dependence on God, inasmuch as he has given us being, and 

" has consequently a right to require we should apply our fae- 

" ulties to the use, for which he has manifestly designed them. 

" An artist, he continues, as such, is master of his own work, 

" and can dispose of it as he pleases. Were a sculpture capa- 

" ble of making animated statutes, this alone would entitle him 

" to insist, that the marble, shaped bv his own hands, and en- 

<{ dowed by him with understanding, should be subject to his 

" will. But God is the author of the matter and form of the 

" parts, of which our being is composed, and he has given them 

" all the faculties, with which they are invested. To these 

" faculties therefore he has a right to prescribe what limits he 

" pleases, and to require, that men use them in such or such a 

*' manner," &c. 

IV. Such are the principal systems, on the origin and founda- Examen 

tion of sovereignty and dependence. Let us examine them ot those 
, iii- W | -i i , opinions, 

thoroughly, and, in order to pass a right judgment, let us take i.The sole 

care not to forget the distinction of physical and moral necessity, superiori- 

nor the primitive notions of right and obligation, such as have cms insuf- 

been above explained.! ficient. to 

. ' + found a 

1. This being premised, I affirm, that those, who found the right of 

right of prescribing laws on the sole superiority of strength, or ? omrai4,jC * - 

on an irresistible power, establish an insufficient principle, and 

* See Puffiendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, book i, ch. vi $11. 

f It is found in the second note on section 12 of Puff'endorf on ihe Law 
of Nature and Nations, book i. chip,6; and in the third note on § 5 of the 
Duties ot Man and a Citizen, book i. chap. 2. 

t Chap. vi. and vii. 



CO THE PRINCIPLES OF 

which, rigorously considered, is absolutely false. In fact it 
does not follow, that because I am incapable of resisting a per- 
son, he has therefore a right to command me, that is, that I am 
bound to submit to him by virtue of a principle of obligation, 
and to acknowledge his will, as the universal rule of my con- 
duct. Right being nothing else but that, which reason ap- 
proves, it is this approbation only, which reason gives to him, 
who commands, that is capable of founding his right, and, by 
necessary consequence, produces that inward sense, which we 
distinguish by the name of Obligation, and incli-nes us to a spon- 
taneous submission. Every obligation therefore supposes some 
particular reasons, that influence the conscience and bend the 
will, insomuch, that pursuant to the light of our own reason, we 
should think it criminal to resist, were it even in our power, 
x and should conclude, that we have therefore no right to do 
it. Now a person, who alleges no other reason, but a superi- 
ority of force, does not propose a motive sufficient to oblige the 
will. For instance, the power, which may chance to reside in 
a malignant being, neither invests him with any right to com- 
mand, nor imposes any obligation on us to obey ; because this 
is evidently repugnant to the very idea of right and obligation. 
On the contrary, the first counsel, which reason gives us in re- 
gard to a malignant power, is to resist, and, if possible, to de- 
stroy him. Now, if we have a right to resist, this right is con- 
sistent with the obligation of obeying, which is evidently there- 
by excluded. True it is, that, if we clearly see that all our 
efforts will be useless, and that our resistance must only subject 
us to a greater evil, we should choose to submit, though with 
reluctance, for a while, rather than expose ourselves to the at- 
tacks and violence of a malignant power. But in this case we 
should be constrained, though not under an obligation. We en- 
dure, in spite, of us, the effects of a superior force, and, whilst 
we make an external submission, we inwardly feel our nature 
rise and protest against it. This leaves us always a full right to 
attempt all sorts of ways to shake off the unjust and oppressive 
yoke. There is therefore, properly speaking, no obligation in 
that case ; now the default of obligation implies the default of 
right.* We have omitted making mention here of the danger- 
* Sae chap. viii. sec. 6. 



NATURAL LAW. SI 

uus consequences of this system ; it is sufficient at present to 
have refuted it by principles ; and perhaps we shall have oc- 
casion to take notice of these consequences another time. 

V. The other two opinions have something in them, that is 2. Nar'the 

plausible and even true, yet they do not seem to me intirely Suf- sole excel- 

ficient. The principles they establish are too vague, and have superior;. 

need to be reduced to a more determinate point. o plt y of 

i , r nature. 

2. And indeed I do not see, that the sole excellency of nature 

is sufficient to found a right of sovereignty. I will acknowledge, 
if you please, this excellency, and agree to it as a truth, that I 
am well convinced of. This is the whole effect, that must natu- 
rally arise from this hypothesis. But here I make a halt ; and 
the knowledge I have of the excellency of a superior being does 
not alone afford me a motive sufficient to subject myself to him, 
and to induce me to abandon my own will, in order to take his 
for my rule. So long as I am confined to these general heads, 
and am informed of nothing more, I do not feel myself inclin- 
ed by an internal motion to submit ; and, without any reproach 
of conscience, I may sincerely judge, that the intelligent princi- 
ple within me is sufficient to direct my conduct. So far we con- 
fine ourselves to mere speculation. But, if you should attempt 
to require any thing more of me, the question would then be 
reduced to this point ; how and in what manner does this be- 
ing, whom you suppose to surpass me in excellence, intend to 
conduct himself with regard to me ; and by what effects will 
this superiority or excellence be displayed ? Is he willing to 
do me good, or harm, or is he, in respect to me, in a state of 
indifference ? To these interrogations there must be absolutely 
some answer given ; and according to the side, that is chosen, 
I shall agree perhaps, that this being has a right to command 
me, and that I am under an obligation of obeying. But these 
reflections are, if I am not mistaken, a demonstrative proof, 
that it is not sufficient to allege merely and simply the excel- 
lency of a superior being, in order to establish the foundation of 
sovereignty. 

VI. Perhaps there is something more exact in the third hy- ^ Nor ttle 
pothesis. " God, say they, is the Creator of man ; it is from sole quali- 
" him he has received and holds his life, his reason, and all his a ^ or . 



6* THE PRINCIPLES OF 

" faculties ; he is therefore master of his work, and can of 
" course prescribe what rules he pleases. Hence our depend- 
" ence, hence the absolute empire of God over us naturally 
** arises ; and this is the very foundation of all authority." 

The sum of what is here alleged to found the empire of God 
over man is reduced to his supreme power. But does it fol- 
low from this only, and by an immediate and necessary conse- 
quence, that he has a right to prescribe laws to us ? That is 
the question. The sovereign power of God enables him to 
dispose of man, as he has a mind, to require of him whatever 
he pleases, and to lay him under an absolute necessity of com- 
plying ; for the creature cannot resist the Creator; and by its 
nature and state it finds itself in so absolute a dependence, that 
the Creator, may, if he please, even annihilate and destroy it. 
This, we own, is certain ; and yet it does not seem sufficient to 
establish the right of the Creator. There is something more 
than this requisite to form a moral quality of a simple power, 
and to convert it into right.* In a word, it is necessary, as 
we have more than once observed, that the power be such, as 
will be approved by reason ; to the end, that man may submit 
to it willingly, and by that inward sense, which produces obli- 
gation. 

Here I beg leave to make a supposition, that will set the thing 
in a much clearer light. Had the Creator given existence to 
the creature only to render it unhappy, the relation of Creator 
and creature would still subsist, and yet we could not possibly 
conceive, in this supposition, either right or obligation. The 
irresistible power of the Creator might indeed constrain the 
creature ; but this constraint would never form a reasonable ob- 
ligation, a moral tie ; because an obligation of this nature always 
supposes the concurrence of the will, and an approbation or an 
acquiescence on the part of man, from which voluntary submis- 
sion arises. Now this acquiescence could never be given to a 
being, that would exert his supreme power only to oppress his 
creature, and render it unhappy. 

The quality therefore of Creator is not alone and of itself 
sufficient to establish the right of command, and the obligation of 

obeying. 

* See chap* vii. sec, 3, 



NATURAL LAW. 63 

VII. But if to the idea of the Creator we join (which Bar- True 

beyrac probably supposed though he has not distinctly express- ^ %££**■ 

ed it) the idea of being perfectly wise and sovereignly good, reignty; 

who has no desire of exercising his power, but for the good and w i s d m. 

advantage of his creatures ; then we have every thing necessary and good* 
, . ... .1. vl " ness join- 

to found a legitimate authority. ed toget h- 

Let us only consult ourselves, and suppose that we not only er» 
derive our existence, life, and all our faculties^ from a Being in- 
finitely superior to us in power ; but moreover, that we are 
perfectly convined, that this Being, no less wise than powerful, 
had no other aim in creating us, than to render us happy, and 
that with this view he is willing to subject us to laws ; certain 
it is, that under these circumstances, we could not avoid approv- 
ing of such a power, and the exercise thereof in respect to us. 
Now this approbation is acknowledging the right of the superior ; 
and consequently the first counsel, that reason gives us, is to 
resign ourselves to the direction of such a master, to subject our- 
selves to him, and to conform all our actions to what we know in 
relation to his will. And why so ? Because it is evident to us, 
from the very nature of things that this is the surest and short- 
esfc^vay to arrive at happiness, the end, to which all mankind as- 
pire. And from the manner we are formed, this knowledge will 
be necessarily attended with the concurrence of our will, with 
our acquiescence, and submission ; insomuch that if we should 
act contrary to those principles, and any misfortune should af- 
terwards befal us, we could not avoid condemning ourselves, and 
acknowledging, that we have justly drawn upon ourselves the 
evil we suffer. Now this is what constitutes the true character 
of obligation, properly so called.. 

VIII. If we have therefore a mind to embrace and take in the Explics- 

whole, in order to form a complete definition, we must say, that tionof o«r 

. > /. opinion, 

the right of sovereignty arises from superiority of power^ ac- 
companied with wisdom and goodness. 

I say, in the first place a superiority of power t because an 
equality of power, as we have observed in the very beginning, 
excludes all empire, all natural and necessary subordination ; 
and besides sovereignty and command would become useless 
and of no manner of effect, were they not supported by a suffi- 
cient power. Wbat would it avail a person to be a sovereign; 



M THE PRINCIPLES OF 

unless he were possessed of effectual methods to enforce his or- 
ders and make himself obeyed ? 

But this is not yet sufficient ; wherefore I say, in the second 
place, that this power ought to be wise and benevolent ; wise to 
know and to choose the properest means to make us happy ; and 
benevolent, to be generally inclinable to use those means, that 
tend to promote our felicity. 

In order to be convinced of this, it will be sufficient to re- 
mark three cases, which are the only ones, that can be here 
supposed. Either he is, with respect to us, an indifferent pow- 
er, that is, a power willing to do us neither good nor harm, as 
no ways interesting himself in what concerns us ; or he is a ma- 
lignant power; or, in fine, he is a propitious and benevolent 
power. 

In the first case our question cannot take place. How supe- 
rior soever a being is in regard to me, so long as he does not con- 
cern himself about me, but leaves me intirely to myself; I re- 
main in as complete a liberty, in respect to him, as if he were 
not known to me, or as if be did not at all exist.* Wherefore 
there is no authority on his side, nor obligation on mine. 

But if we suppose a malignant power; reason, far from ap- 
proving, revolts against him, as against an enemy so much the 
more dangerous, as he is invested with great power. Man can- 
not acknowledge such a power has a right ; on the contrary, he 
finds himself authorised to leave no measure untried to get rid of 
so formidable a master, in order to be sheltered from the evils, 
with which he might otherwise be unjustly afflicted. 

But let us suppose a being equally wise and beneficent. Man, 
instead of being able to refuse him his approbation, will feel 
himself inwardly and naturally inclined to submit and acquiesce 
intirely in the will of such a being, who is possessed of all the 
qualities necessary to conduct him to his ultimate end. By his 
power he is perfectly able to procure the good of those, who are [ 

* And therefore, though that notion of the Epicureans was most sense- 
less and impious, in which they described the gods as enjoying their own 
happiness with the highest peace and tranquillity, far removed from the 
troublesome care of human business, and neither smiling at the good, nor 
frowning at the wicked deeds of men ; yet they lightly enough inferred, 
that upon this supposition, all religion, and all fear of divine powers, was 
vain and useless. PufTendorf Law of Nature aud Nations, book i. chap. vi* 
§ 11. See Cicero de Nat. Deor, lib, i. chap. 2. 






NATURAL LAW. 65 

subject to him, and to remove whatever may possibly injure 
them. By his wisdom he is thoroughly acquainted with the na- 
ture and constitution of those, on whom he imposes laws ; and 
knows their faculties and strength, and in what their real inter- 
ests consist. He cannot therefore be mistaken, either in the de- 
signs, he proposes for their benefit, or in the means, he employs, 
in order to attain them. In fine, goodness inclines such a sove- 
reign to be really willing to render his subjects happy, and con- 
stantly to direct to this end the operations of his wisdom and 
power. Thus the assemblage of these qualities, by uniting in 
ihe very highest degree all, that is capable of deserving the ap- 
probation of reason, comprises whatsoever can determine man 
and lay him under an internal, as well as external obligation of 
submission and obedience. Here therefore lies the true founda- 
tion of the right of sovereignty. 

IX. in order to bind and subject free and rational creatures, We mint 
, , • r i not sepa* 

there is no necessity, properly speaking, for more than an em- rate the 

pire or authority, whose wisdom and lenity would forcibly en- quah* ies ' 
gage the approbation of reason, independent of the motives, ex- form the 
cited by the apprehension of power. But, as it easily happens, n & ht ° 
from the manner, that men are formed, that either through y. 
levity and neglect, or passion and malice, they are not so much 
struck, as they ought, with the wisdom of the Legislator, and 
with the excellency of his laws; it was therefore proper there 
should be an efficacious motive, such as the apprehension of 
punishment, in order to have a stronger influence over the will. 
For which reason it is necessary that the sovereign should be 
armed with power and force, to be better able to maintain his 
authority. Let us not separate therefore these different qualities, 
which form, by their concurrence, the right of the sovereign, 
as power alone, unaccompanied with benevolence, cannot con- 
stitute any right ; so benevolence, destitute of power and wis- 
dom, is likewise insufficient for this effect. For, from this on- 
ly, that a person wishes another well, it does not follow, that 
he is his master; neither are a few particular acts of benevo- 
lence sufficient for that purpose. A benefit requires no more, 
than gratitude and acknowledgment ; for, in order to testify 

our gratitude, it is not necessary we should subject ourselves to 

1 



6t> THE PRINCIPLES OF 

the power of our benefactor. But let us join these ideas, and ,< 
suppose, at one and the same time a sovereign power on which , 
every one actually and really depends ; a sovereign wisdom, that i 
directs this power ; and a supreme goodness, by which it is ani- i 
mated. What can we desire more to establish, on the one side, 
the most eminent authority, and, on the other, the greatest sub- \ 
ordination ? We are compelled then, as it were, by our own rea- 
son, which will not so much as suffer us to deny, that such a su- 
perior i* invested with a true right to command, and that we are I 
un!er a real obligation to obey.* 

Definition X. The notions of sovereign and sovereignty being once set- 

of subiec 

tion. ^ e( ^» it ls easv t0 ^ x those of subjection and independence. 

Founda- Subjects therefore are persons, who are under an obligation 

tionofde- P . ■/■■•• 

pendence. of obeying. And as it is power, wisdom, and benevolence, that ; 

constitute sovereignty ; we must suppose, on the contrary, in j 
subjects, the weakness and wants, from which dependence 
arises. 

It is therefore right in Puffendorf to remark,! that what ren- 
ders man susceptible of an obligation, produced by an external 
principle, is that he naturally depends on a superior, and that I 
moreover, as a free and intelligent being, he is capable of know-< 
ing the rules given him, and of choosing to conform his actions 
to them. But these are rather conditions necessarily supposed 
and of themselves understood, than the exact and immediate 
causes of subjection. More important it is to observe, that as 
the power of obliging a rational creature is founded on the abil- 
ity and will of making him happy, if he obeys ; unhappy, if 
he disobeys ; this supposes, that this creature is capable of good 
and evil, sensible of pleasure and pain, and besides, that his 

* It may indeed be said, that the foundation of external obligation is 
the will of a superior (see above, chap. vi. sec. xii. provided this general 
proposition be afterwards explained by the particulars into which we have 
entered. But when some add, that force has nothing to do vvith the foun- 
da' ion of this obligation, and that it only serves to enable the superior 
to exert his right (See Barbeyrac's 1st note on the 9rti section of Puffen- 
dorf's large work, book i. chap, 6.) this notion does not 'appear to me to be 
exact ; and methinks that this abstract manner of considering the thing 
subverts the very foundation of the obligation here in question. There 
can be no external obligation without a superior, nor a superior without 
force, or, which is the same thing, without power ; force therefore or 
power is a necessary part of the foundation of obligation. 

| See the Duties of Man and a Citizen, book i, chap. 2. sec, 4. and the 
Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. vi. sec. 6, 8. 



NATURAL LAW. 67 

j state of happiness or misery may be either increased or dimin- 
j ished. Otherwise, he might be forced indeed, by a superior 
| power, to act after a certain manner, but he could not be prop- 
| erly obliged. 

XI. Such is the true foundation of sovereignty and depend- The obli- 
! ence ; a foundation, that might be still better established by ap- j^Xwd 
I plying these general principles to the particular species of known by >aw^is 
sovereignty or empire, such as that of God over man, that perfect# 

! of a prince over his subjects, and the power of fathers over that can be 

* . - i Hi niiL imagined, 
their children. We should be convinced thereby, that all these 

species of authority are originally founded on the principles above 
established ; which would serve for a new proof of the truth 
of those principles.* But it is sufficient to have hinted here in 
general at this remark ; the particulars we reserve for another 
place. 

An authority, established on such a foundation, and which 
comprises whatever can be imagined most efficacious and ca- 
pable of binding man, and of inclining him to be steadily direct- 
ed by certain rules of conduct, undoubtedly forms the com- 
pletest and strongest obligation. For there is no obligation 
more perfect than that, which is produced by the strongest 
motives to determine the will, and the most able, by their 
preponderancy, to prevail over all other contrary reasons.! 
Now every thing concurs here to this effect ; the nature 
of the rules prescribed by the sovereign, which of themselves 
are the fittest to promote our perfection and felicity ; the 
power and authority, with which he is invested, whereby he 
is enabled to decide our happiness or misery ; and, in fine, the 
intire confidence we have in him, because of his power, wis- 
dom, and goodness. What can we imagine more to captivate 
the will, to gain the heart, to oblige man, and to produce within 
him the highest degree of moral necessity, which constitutes 
the mos£ perfect obligation? I say, moral necessity; for we 
are not to destroy the nature of man ; he remains always what 
he is, a free and intelligent being ; and as such, the sovereign 
undertakes to direct him by his laws. Hence it is that even 
the strictest obligations never force the will ; but, rigorously 
* See Section 1. f Se chan. vi. sec. 10, 



68 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

speaking man is always at liberty to comply or not, though, as 
we commonly say, at his risk and peril. But, if he consults 
reason, and is willing to follow its dictates, he will take particu- 
lar care to avoid exercising this metaphysical power in opposi- 
tion to the views of his sovereign ; an opposition, that must ter- 
minate in his own misery and ruin. 
tionfTin- ^** ^ e nave already observed, that there are two sorts of 
ternal and obligation ;* the one internal, which is the work of reason on- 
at the ly, and founded on the good or evil, we perceive in the very 

same time- nature of things ; the other external, which is produced by the 
will of him, whom we acknowledge our superior and master. 
Now the obligation, produced by law, unites these two sorts of 
ties, which by their concurrence strengthen each other, and 
thus form the completest obligation that can possibly be imagin- 
ed. It is probably for this reason, that most civilians acknowl- 
edge no other obligation, properly so called, but that, which is 
the effect of law, and imposed by a superior. This is true, if 
we mean only an external obligation, which indeed is the strong- 
est tie of man. But it must not be thence inferred, that we 
ought to admit no other sort of obligation. The principles we 
established, when inquiring into the first origin and the nature 
of obligation generally considered, and the particular remarks, 
We have just now made on the obligation arising from law, are 
sufficient, if I mistake not, to evince, that there is a primitive, 
original, and internal obligation, which is inseparable from rea- 
son, and ought necessarily to concur with the external obligation, 
in order to communicate to the latter all the necessary force for 
determining and bending the will, and for influencing effectually 
the human heart. 

By distinguishing rightly these ideas, we shall find, perhaps, 
that this is one way of reconciling opinions, which seem to be 
wide from each other, only because they are misunderstood. t 
Sure it is at least, that the manner, in which we have explained 
the foundation of sovereignty and dependence, coincides, in the 
main, with Puffendorfs system, as will easily appear by com- 

* See chap. vi. sec. 13. 

f See the second part, chap, vi. 



NATURAL LAW. 69 

paring-It with what this author says, whether in his large work, 
or in his abridgment.* 

CHAP. X. 

Of the End of Laws ; of their Characters ; Differences , fyc. 

I. k-70ME perhaps will complain, that we have dwelt too Of the end 

long on the nature and foundation of sovereignty. But the im- °. f } aw * 

a J either in 

portance of the subject required us to treat it with care, and to regard to 

unravel properly its principles. Besides we apprehend, that no- ? he s . ub - . 
, . ii jects, or m 

thing could contribute better to a right knowledge of the nature respect to 

of law ; and we shall presently see, that whatever in fact re- ^1°^' 

m ains for us still to say concerning this subject is deduced from 

the principles just now established. 

In the first place, it may be asked, what is the end and design 
of laws ? 

This question presents itself in two different lights ; namely, 
with respect to the subject, and with regard to the sovereign ; a 
distinction that must be carefully observed. 

The relation of the sovereign to his subjects forms a kind of 
society between them which the sovereign direc by the laws 
he establishes.! But as the society naturally requires there 
should be some provision made for the good of all those, who 
are the constituent parts thereof, it is by this principle we must 
judge of the end of laws ; and this end, considered with res- 
pect to the sovereign, ought to include nothing in it opposite 
to the end of these very laws considered with regard to the sub- 
ject. 

II. The end of the law in regard to the subject is, that he 
should conform his actions to it, and by this means acquire 
happiness. As for what concerns the sovereignty, the end he 
aims at for himself, by giving laws to his subjects, is the satis* 
faction and glory arising from the execution of the wise de- 
signs he proposes, for the preservation of those, who are sub- 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. vi. sec. 5, 6, 8, and 
9. And the Duties ot Man and a Citizer, book i. chap. ii. sec. 3, 4,' 5* 
f See chap. viii, sec. 5, 



70 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

ject to his authority. These two ends of the law should never 

be separated, one being naturally connected with the other ; 

for it is the happiness of the subject, that forms the satisfaction 

and glory of the sovereign. 
The end of III. We should therefore take care not to imagine, that laws 
tolly a"e- are properly made in order to bring men under a yoke. So 
strain up- idle an end would be quite unworthy of a sovereign, whose good- 
but to di-* ness ought to be equal to his power and wisdom, and who should 

rectitina always act up to these perfections. Let us say rather, that 
proper 

manner laws are made to oblige the subject to pursue his real inter- 
est, and to choose the surest and best way to attain the end he 
is designed for, which is happiness. With this view the sover- 
eign is willing to direct his people better, than they could them* 
selves, and gives a check to their liberty, lest they should make ? 
a bad use of it contrary to their own and the public good. In 
short, the sovereign commands rational beings ; it is on this foot- f 
ing he treats with them; all his ordinances have the stamp of f 
reason ; he is willing to reign over our hearts ; and if at any | 
time he employs force, it is in order to bring back to reason :l 
those who have unhappily strayed from it, contrary to their own j 
good and that of society. n 

Exaroenof IV. Wherefore Puffendorf, methinks, speaks somewhat loosely 
fendorf U " * n * ne comparison he draws between law and counsel, where he 4 
says con- says, " That counsel tends to the ends proposed by those, to i 
th1"sub- " wnom it is given, and that they themselves can judge of those 1 

ject. « ends, in order to prove or disapprove them. Whereas law i 

" aims only at the end of the person, who establishes it, and, if;'| 
." sometimes it has views in regard to those, for whom it was 

" made, it is not their business to examine them- this de-1 

" pends intirely on the determination of the legislator. 5 '* Iti 
would be a much juster way, methinks, of expressing the thing c | 
to say, that laws have a double end, relative to the sovereign 
and the subject ; that the intent of the sovereign, in establish- 
ing them, is to consult his own satisfaction and gloiy, by 
rendering his subjects happy; that these two things are insep- 
arable ; and that it would be doing injustice to the sovereign 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book 1, chap, vi. § 1, 



NATURAL LAW. 71 

! to imagine he thinks only of himself, without any regard to 

the good of those, who are his dependants. Puffendorf seems 

j here, as well as in some other places, to give a little too much 

I into Hobbes' principles. 

V. We defined law, a rule, which lays an obligation on sub- Ofthedis- 
n -. . • • : m • •, i , ,., tinction of 

I jects of doing or omitting certain things, and leaves them at lib- i aw into 

1 erty to act or not to act in other matters, according as they OD,] g a to- 
| judge proper, &c. This is what we must explain here in a more that of 
particular manner. simple 

A sovereign has undoubtedly a right to direct the actions of sion. 
! those, who are subject to him, according to the ends be has in 
i view. In consequence of this right, he imposes a necessity on 
j them of acting or not acting after a particular manner in certain 
; cases ; and this obligation is the first effect of the law. Thence it 
follows, that all actions, not positively commanded or forbidden, 
are left within the sphere of our natural liberty; and that the 
sovereign is hereby supposed to grant every body a permission 
to act in this respect, as they think proper; and this permission 
is a second effect of the law. We may therefore distinguish 
the law, taken in its full extent, into an obligatory law, and a 
law of simple permission. 

It is true Grotius,* and after him Puffendorf, are of opinion, Theopin- 
that permission is not properly, and of itself, an effect or con- ipnofGro- 
sequence of the law, but a mere inaction of the legislator-! Puffen- 
Whatever things, says Puffendorf, the law permits, those it neither |~ orf on , 
commands nor forbids, and therefore it really doth nothing con- ject. 
cerning them. 

But though this different manner of considering the thing 
be not perhaps of any great consequence, yet Barbeyrac's opin- 
ion, such as he has explained it in his notes on the forecited 
passages, appears to be much more exact. A permission, aris- 
ing from the legislator's silence, cannot be considered as a sim- 
ple inaction. The legislator does nothing but with deliberation 
and wisdom. If he is satisfied with imposing, only in some 



* See the Rights of War and Peace, book i. chap. i. sec. 9. 

t See the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap, vi. sec, 15. 



72 THE PRINCIPLES Of 

cases, an indispensable necessity of acting after a certain man- 
ner, and does not extend this necessity further^ it is because he 
thinks it agreeable to the end, he proposes, to leave his subjects 
at liberty in some cases to do as they please. Wherefore the 
silence of the legislator imports a positive though tacit permis- 
sion of whatsoever he has not forbidden or commanded, though 
he might have done it, and would certainly have done it, had 
he thought proper. Insomuch that as the forbidden or comman- 
ded actions are positively regulated by the law, actions permit- 
ted are likewise positively determined by the same law, though 
after their manner and according to the nature of the thing. In 
fine, whoever determines certain limits, which he declares we 
ought not to exoeed, does hereby point out bow far he permits 
and consents we should go. Permission therefore is as positive 
an effect of the law, as obligation. 
The VII. This will appear still more evident, if we consider, that, 

ri h h* having once supposed that we all depend on a superior, whose 
men enjoy will ought to be the universal rule of our conduct, the rights at- 
are S found- touted to man in this state, by virtue of which he may act 
ed on this safely and with impunity, are founded on the express or tacit 
permission, received from the sovereign or the law. Besides, ev- 
ery body agrees that the permission, granted by the law, and the 
right thence resulting, lay other men under an obligation not to 
resist the person who uses his right, bat rather to assist him in 
this respect, than do him any prejudice. Obligation therefore 
and permission, are naturally connected with each other ; and 
this is the effect of the law, which likewise authorises those, who 
are disturbed in the exercise of their rights, to employ force, or 
to have recourse to the sovereign, in order to remove these im- 
pediments. Hence it is, that, after having mentioned in the 
definition of law, that it leaves us in certain cases at liberty to 
act or not to act, we added, that it secures the subjects in the 
full enjoyment of their rights.* 
The mat- VIII. The nature and end of laws show as their matter or 
laws. object. The matter of laws in general are all human actions ; 

internal and external ; thoughts and words, as well as deeds ? 
those which relate to another, and those which terminate in the 

* See chap, via. sec, 3. 



permis 
sion 



NATURAL LAW, 73 

person himself ; so far at least as the direction of those actions 
may essentially contribute to the particular good of each person, 
i to that of society in general, and to the glory of the sovereign. 

IX. This supposes naturally the three following conditions. 
I 1. That the things, ordained by the law, be possible to fulfil; 
i for it would be folly, and even cruelty to require of any person, 

under the least commination of punishment, whatever is and al- 

ways has been above his strength. 2. The law must be of some 

utility ; for reason will never allow any restraint to be laid on i 

the liberty of the subject, merely for the sake of the restraint, 

and without any benefit or advantage arising to him 3. In fine, 

the law must be in itself just ; that is conformable to the order 

and nature of things, as well as the constitution of man ; this is 

what the very idea of rule requires, which, as we have already 

observed, is the same, as that of law. 

X. To these three conditions, which we may call the internal External 

characteristics of law, namely, that it be possible, just, and use- conditions 

ful, we may add two other conditions, which in some measure that ii be 

are external : one, that the law be made sufficiently known : ™*& e 

J ' known; 

the other, that it be attended with a proper sanction^ sad ac- 

1. It is necessary, that the laws be sufficiently notified to the ^ n h ' a 
subject ; for how could he regulate his actions and motions by sanction, 
those laws, if he had never any knowledge of them ? The sov- 
ereign ought therefore to publish his laws in a solemn, clear, and 
distinct manner. But after that it is the subject's business to be 
acquainted with the will of the sovereign ; and the ignorance or 
error, he may lie under in this respect, cannot generally speak- 
ing, be a legitimate excuse in his favor. This is what the 
civilians mean, when they lay down as a maxim,| that ignorance 
or error in regard to the law is blameablc and hurtful. Were 
it not so, the laws would be of no effect, but might always, 
under a pretext of ignorance, be eluded with impunity. 

XI. 2. The next thing requisite is that the law be attended 
With a proper sanction. 

* See chap. viii. sec. 4. 

•j- Rfcgula est, juris quidem krnorantiaro cuique f»o cere. Digest, lib, 
22, tit. 6. kg. 9.pr. 

K 



74 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Sanction is that part of the law, which includes the penalty en- 
acted against those, who transgress it. With regard to the pen- 
alty, it is an evil, with which the sovereign menaces those sub- 
jects, who should presume to violate his laws, and which he ac- 
tually inflicts, whenever they violate them ; and this with a de- 
sign of procuring some good ; such as to correct the culpable, 
and to admonish the rest ; but ultimately, that, his laws being 
respected and observed, society should enjo'y a state of security, 
quiet, and happiness. 

All laws have therefore two essential parts ; the first is the 
disposition of the law, which expresseth the command or prohi- 
bition ;^the second is the sanction, which pronounces the pen- 
alty, and it is the sanction, that gives it the proper and particular 
force of law. For, were the sovereign contented with merely 
ordaintng or forbidding certain things, without adding any kind of 
menace, this would be no longer a law, prescribed by authority, 
but merely a prudent counsel. 

It is not however absolutely necessary, that the nature or qual- 
ity of the punishment be formally specified in the law ; it is suf- 
ficient, that the sovereign declares he wilt punish, reserving to 
himself the species and degree of chastisement according to his 
prudence.* We must also observe, that the evil, which consti- 
tutes the punishment properly so called, ought not to be a natu- 
ral production or a necessary consequence of the action, inten- 
ded to be punished. It should be, as it were,, an occasional evil, 
and inflicted by the will of the sovereign. For whatever the 
action may have bad of itself and dangerous in its effects and in- 
evitable consequences, cannot be reckoned, as proceeding from 
the law, since it would equally happen without it. The mena- 
ces therefore of the sovereign must, in order to have some 
weight, be inflictive of such punishments, as differ from the evil, 
that necessarily arises from the nature of the thing. t 

* Ex quo etiam intelligitur orani kgr civili annexam esse poenam, vel 
explicite, vel implicite; nam ubi poena ntque seripta, neque exemplo ali- 
cujus, qui pcenas legis jam transgressse dedit definitur, ibi subintelligitur 
poenam arbitrariam esse, nimirum ex arbitrio pendere legislaioris. Hob* 
]bes de Cive, cap. 14, sec. 8. 

| See Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, book ii» chap- 23, sec 6, 



NATURAL LAW. 75 

XII, It may be asked in fine, whether the sanction of laws Whether 

'! may not as well consist in the promise of a recompense, as in the is/of ^ec] 

j| commination of punishment ? I answer, that this depends in ompense 

I general on the will of the sovereign, who may use either of capable as 

these ways ; or even employ them both, according as his pru- the ; co p- 

i dence directs. But, since the question is to know which is the f pun^ 

most effectual method, the sovereign can use, in order to enforce nient, to 

the observance of his laws ; and since it is certain, that man is the san(> 

naturally more sensibly affected by evil than good, it seems more tion of 

. law. 

proper to establish the sanction of law in the commination of 

punishment, than in the promise of recompense. People are 
seldom induced to violate the law, unless it be with the hope of 
procuring at least some apparent good. The best way there- 
fore to prevent this deception is to remove the bait, that allures 
them, and to annex, on the contrary, a real and inevitable evil 
to disobedience. Suppose, for instance, two legislators, willing 
to establish the same law, proposed, one of them great rewards, 
and the other severe punishments, the latter would undoubtedly 
dispose men more effectually to compliance, than the former. 
The most specious promises do not always determine the will; 
but the view of a rigorous punishment staggers and intimidates- 
it.'* But if the sovereign, by a particular effect of his bounty 
and wisdom, is willing to join these two means, and to enforce 
the law by a double motive of observance; there is then nothing 
wanting to complete its force, since in every respect it is a per- 
fect sanction. 

XIII. The obligation, which the laws impose, have as great an Whoihose 
extent, as the right of the sovereign ; and consequently it mny the'llw° m 
be said in general, that all those, who are dependent on the leg- obliges, 
islator, are subject to this obligation. But each law in partic- '• ' s P cn * 
ular obliges those subjects only, to whom the subject matter 

may be applied ; and this is easily known from the very nature 
of each law, by which the intention of the legislator is suffi- 
ciently expressed. 

Nevertheless it sometimes happens, that particular persons 
are exempted from the obligation of observing the law ; and 

* See Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations', book i. cbap y\+ 
sec. 14, with Barbeyrac's notss. 



76 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

this is what we call dispensation, on which we have a few re- 
marks to make. 

1. If the legislator can entirely abrogate a law, by a much ( 
stronger reason he can suspend the effect thereof, with regard to 
any particular person. 

2. But we must likewise acknowledge, that none but the leg- 
islator himself is invested with this power. 

3. He never ought to use it without very good reasons, and 
then he should act with moderation, and according to the rules 
of equity and prudence. For, were he without discretion or • 
choice, to favor too great a number of people with dispensations, I 
he would enervate the authority of the law; or, were he to re- 
fuse it in cases perfectly alike, so unreasonable a partiality would I 
certainly be attended with jealousy and discontent. 

Of the du, XIV. As for what concerns the duration of laws, and the man- f 

laws and ner > m vvn » c h tne y are abolished, we are to observe the follow- i 

how they j™ principles. 1 
are abol-j 

ished. 1. In general the duration of law, as well as its first establish- < 

ment, depends on the free will and pleasure of the sovereign, f 
who cannot reasonably tie up his own hands in this respect. 

2. And yet every law, of itself and by its nature, is supposed 
perpetual when it contains nothing in its disposition, or in the 
circumstances attending it, that evidently denotes a contrary in- 
tention of the legislator, or that may induce us reasonably to pre- j 
sume that it was only a temporary ordinance. The law is a rule; 
now every rule is of itself perpetual ; and, generally speaking, 
when the sovereign establishes a law, it is not with a design to ; 
repeal it, 

3. But as the state of things may happen to alter in such a 
manner, that the law, grown useless or hurtful, can no longer 
be put into execution; the sovereign can, and ought, in that case, 
to repeal and abolish it. ft would be absurd and pernicious to 
society to pretend, that laws once enacted ought to subsist for- 
ever, let what inconveniency soever arise. 

4. This repeal may be made in two different manners, either 
expressly or tacitly, For when the sovereign, well acquainted 
with the state of things, neglects for a long time to enforce the 
observance of the laws, or formally permits, that affairs relating 



NATURAL LAW. «r» 

thereto be regulated in a manner contrary to hi* disposition ; a 
strong presumption arises of the abrogation of this law, which 
falls thus of itself, though the legislator has not expressly abol- 
ished it. 

It is plain, we have only glanced here upon the general princi- 
ples. As for the application, that ought to be made of them, to 
each species of laws, it requires some modification, pursuant to 
their different nature. But it is not our business to enter here 
into those particulars. 

XV. Law may be divided, 1. into divine or human, according Howmany 

as it has God or man for its author. sorts °f 

laws. 

2. Divine law may be subdivided into two sorts, namely, nat- 
ural, and positive or revealed. 

Natural law is that, which so necessarily agrees with the na- 
ture and state of man, that without observing its maxims, the 
peace and happiness of society can never be preserved. As this 
law has an essential agreeableness with the constitution of human 
nature, the knowledge thereof may be attained merely by the 
light of reason ; and hence it is called natural. 

Positive or revealed law is that, which is not founded on the 
general constitution of human nature, but only on the will of 
God; though in other respects this law is established on very 
good reasons, and procures the advantages of those, Who re- 
ceive it. 

We meet with examples of these two sorts of laws in the ordi- 
nances, which God gave formerly to the Jews. It is easy to dis- 
tinguish such, as were natural, from those that, being merely 
ceremonial or political, had no other foundation, than the partic- 
ular will of God, accommodated to the actual state of that peo- 
ple. 

With regard to human laws, considered strictly as such, viz. 
as originally proceeding from a sovereign, who presides over so- 
ciety, they are all positive. For, though some natural laws are 
made the subject of human laws, they do not derive their obli- 
gatory force from the human legislator ; since they would oblige 
all the same without any intervention on his part, because they 
come from God. 

Before we leave these definitions, we must not forget to ob- 



•78 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



serve, that the science or art of making and explaining laws,^ 
and of applying them to haman actions, goes by the general name 
o f Jurisp ru dence . 



CHAP. XL 

Of the Morality of Human Actions. 



In what 
the moral- 
ity of ac- 
tions con- 
sists. 



Actions 
are, 1. Ei- 
ther com- 
manded, 
or forbid- 
den, or 
permitted. 






I. JL^AW being the rule of human actions, in a comparative 
view, we observe, that the latter are either conformable or op- 
posite to the former ; and this sort of qualification of our actions . 
in respect to law is called morality. 

The term of morality comes from mores or manners. Man 
ners, as we have already observed, are the free actions of man, 
considered as susceptible of direction and rule. Thus we call 
morality the relation of human actions to the law, by which they 
are directed ; and we give the name of moral philosophy to 
the collection of those rules, by which we are to square our ac- 
tions. 

II. The morality of actions may be considered in two different 
lights*, I. in regard to the manner, in which the law disposes of 
them ; and 2. in relation to the conformity or opposition of those 
same actions to the law. 

In the first consideration, human actions are either command- 
ed, or forbidden, or permitted. 

As we are indispensably obliged to do what is commanded, and 
to abstain from what is forbidden by a lawful superior, civilians 
consider commanded actions as necessary, and forbidden actions 
as impossible. Not that man is deprived of a physical power of 
acting contrary to law, and incapable, if he has a mind, of ex- 
ercising this power. But, since his acting after this manner 
would be opposite to right reason, and inconsistent with his 1 
actual stale of dependence, it is to be presumed, that a reasona- I 
ble and virtuous man, continuing and acting as such, could not I 
make so bad a use of his liberty ; and this presumption is in it- I 
self too reasonable, and honorable to humanity, not to meet I 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. vii. and the Duties 
of Man and a Citlien, book i. chap. 2. sec. 11, &c. 



,; 



I . 



NATURAL LAW. 79 

■i with approbation. Whatever (say the Roman lawyers*) is ift* 
I jurious to piety, reputation, or modesty, and in general to good 
| manners, ought to be presumed impossible. 

III. With regard to permitted actions, they are such,' as the Remarks 
law leaves us at liberty to do* if we think proper.! Upon which ^j^. 1 * 11 
we must make two or three remarks. tious, 

1. We may distinguish two sorts of permission; one full and 
absolute, which not only gives us a right to do certain things with 
impunity, but moreover is attended with a positive approbation 
of the legislator. The other is an imperfect permission, or a 

! kind of toleration ,. which impbes no approbation but a simple im- 
I punity. 

2. The permission of natural laws always denotes a positive 
approbation of the legislator ; and whatever happens in conse- 
quence thereof is innocently done,, and without any violation of 
our duty. For it is evident that God could not positively permit 
the least thing, that is bad in its nature. 

3. It is otherwise in respect to the permission of human laws. 
We may indeed justly and with certainty infer, that a sovereign 
has not thought proper to forbid or punish some particular things; 
but it does not always thence follow, that he really approves 
those things, and much less, that they may be innocently done, 
and without any breach of duty. 

IV. The other manner, in which we may view the morality of 2 . Actions- 

human actions, is with regard to their conformity or opposition are.good 

to the law. In this respect actions are divided into good or just, bad or un- 

bad or unjust, and indifferent. just, and 

. .... indiffer- 

An action morally good or just, is that, which in itself is ex- ent 

actly conformable to some obligatory law, and moreover is atten- 
ded with the circumstances and conditions, required by the legis- 
lator. 

I said I. a good or just action; for thera is properly no differ- 
ence between the goodness and justice of actions; and there is 
no necessity to deviate here from the common language which 
confounds these two ideas. The distinction, which Puffendorf 

* Nam quae facta liedunt pietatero, existimationem, vereeundiam nos- 
| tram, et (ut generaliter dixerim) contra bonos mores fiunt, nee facere nog 
! posse credendum est. L. 15. de condit. lastkut. f See chap. x. sec. 5, 



30 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

makes between these two qualities is quite arbitrary, and ever* 
he himself afterwards confounds them.* 

2. I said an action morally good; because we do not consider 
here the intrinsic and natural goodness of actions, by virtue of, 
which they redound to the physical good of man ; but only the 
relation of agreeableness they have to the law, which constitutes 
their moral goodness. And, though these two sorts of goodness 
are always found inseparably united in things, ordained by nattf-; 
ral law, yet we must not confound these two different rela- 
tions. 

Condi- V. In fine, to distinguish the general conditions, whose con^ 

lions re- . - . , . .;'.-'■•- 

quisite to currence is necessary in order to render an action morally good 

render an with respect to the agent ; I have added, that this action ought 

action mo- . . . . _ . ■_ . , 

rally good. to oe ln ^selj exactly conformable to the law, and accompanied more- 
over with the circumstances and conditions required by the legislator. 
And first it is necessary, that this action should comply exactly, 
and through all its parts, with the tenor of what the law ordains. 
For as a right line is that, whose points correspond to the rule 
without the least deviation ; in like manner, an action rigorously 
speaking, cannot be just, good, or right, unless it agrees exactly, 
and in every respect with the law. But even this is not suffi- 1 
cient ; the action must be performed also pursuant to the man- 1 
ner, required and intended by the legislator. And in the first I 
place it is necessary, it be done with a competent knowledge,] 
that is, we must know, that what we do is conformable to the j 
law ; otherwise the legislator would have no regard for the ac- j 
tion, and our labour would be entirely lost. In the next place, I 
we must act with an upright intention, and for a good end, namely I 
to fulfil the views of the legislator, and to pay a due obedience I 
to the law ; for, if the agent's intention be bad, the actios, in- I 
stead of being deemed good may be imputed to him as vicious, j 
In fine, we should act through a good motive ; I mean a princi- j 
pie of respect for the sovereign, of submission to the law, and j 
from a love of our duty ; for plain it is, that all these conditions 
are required by the legislator. 



* Compare what he sa}S in the Law of Nature and Nations, book i 
shap. vii. sec. 7. in the beginning, with sec. 4. of the same chapter. 



NATURAL LAW, 81 

VI. What has been above affirmed concerning good actions Of the na- 
il sufficiently shows us the nature of those, which are bad or un- or un j ust 

li just. These are in general such, as of themselves, or by their actions. 
1 concomitant circumstances, are contrary to the disposition of an 
i 1 obligatory law, or to the intention of the legislator. 
j There are therefore two general springs of injustice in hu- * , 

1 man actions ; one proceeds from the action, considered in itself, 
! and from its manifest opposition to what is commanded or pro- 
;| hibited by the law. Such as, for example, the murder of an 
I innocent person. And all these kinds of actions intrinsically 
bad can never become good, whatever may be in other respects 
the intention or motive of the agent. We cannot employ a 
criminal action, as a lawful mean to attain an end in itself good ; 
and thus we are to understand the common maxim evil must not be 
done, that good may come of it. But an action, intrinsically and 
as to its substance good, my become bad, if it be accompanied 
with circumstances directly contrary to the legislator's intention ; 
as for instance if it be done with a bad view, and through a vi- 
cious motive. To be liberal and generous towards our fellow 5 
citizens is a good and commendable thing in itself ; but if this 
generosity is practised merely with ambitious views, in order to 
become insensibly master of the commonwealth, and to oppress 
the public liberty, the perversity of the motive, and the injus- 
tice of the design, render this action criminal. 

VII. All just actions are, properly speaking, equally just ; by A'l just 
reason that they have all an exact conformity to the law. It is eojiallv" 1,6 
not the same with unjust or bad actions ; which, according as just; but 
^i , -..li » Ui.iusi ac- 
tney are more or less opposite to the law, are more or less vi a lu ; ns are 

cious ; similar in this respect to curve lines, which are more or mote op 
less so, in proportion as they deviate from the rule. We may 
therefore be in several ways wanting in our duty. Sometimes 
people violate the few deliberatefy, and nith malice prepense ; 
which is undoubtedly the very highest degree of iniquity, be- 
cause this kind of conduct manifestly indicates a formal and re- 
flective contempt of the legislator and his orders ; but sometimes 
we are apt to sin through neglect and inadvertency, which is 
rather a fault than a crime. Besides, it is plain that this neglect 
has its degrees, and may be greater or less, and deserving of 

L 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

more or less censure. And, as in every thing, unsusceptible of 
an exact and mathematical measure, we may always distinguish 
at least three degrees, namely two extremes and a middle ; so 
civilians distinguish three degrees of fault or negligence ; a gross 
fault, a slight one, and a very slight one. It is sufficient to have 
mentioned these principles, the explication and distinct account 
whereof will naturally take place, when we come to the particu- 
lar questions, relating to them. 



Essential 
character 
of unjust 

actions. 



Of indif- 
ferent ac- 
tions. 



VIII. But we must carefully observe, that what essentially 
constitutes the nature of an unjust action is its direct opposition 
or contrariety to the disposition of the law, or to the intention 
of the legislator ; which produces an intrinsic defect in the mat- 
ter or form of that action. For, though in order to render an 
action morally good it is necessary, as we have already obser- 
ved, that it be entirely conformable to the law, with respect as 
well to the substance, as to the manner and circumstances ; yet 
we must not thence conclude, that the defect of some of those 
conditions always renders an action positively bad or criminal. 
To produce this effect, there must be a direct opposition, or 
formal contrariety between the action and the law ; a simple 
defect of conformity being insufficient for that purpose. This 
defect is indeed sufficient to render an action not positively good 
or just ; however it does not become therefore bad, but only 
indifferent. For example, if we perform an action good in 
itself, without knowing for what reason, or even that it is com- 
manded by the law ; or if we act through a different motive 
from that, prescribed by the law, but in itself innocent and not 
vicious; the action is reputed neither good nor bad, but merely 
indifferent. 

IX. There is therefore such a thing, as indifferent actions, 
which hold a middle rank, as it were, between just and unjust. 
These are such, as are neither commanded nor prohibited, but 
which the law leaves us at liberty to do or to omit, according as 
we think proper. That is, those actions are referred to a law of 
simple permission, and not to an obligatory law. 

Now that such actions there are is what no one can reasonably 
question. For what a number of things are there, which, be- 
;ng neither sommanded nor forbidden by any law, whether di« 



NATURAL LAW. S3 

vine or human, have consequently nothing obligatory in their na* 
;| ture, but are left to our liberty to do or to omit, just as we think 
| proper ? It is therefore an idle subtlety in schoolmen to pretend 3 

that an action cannot be indifferent, unless it be in an abstract 

consideration, as stript of all the particular circumstances, of per- 
I son, time, place, intention, and manner. An action, divested of 
' all these circumstances, is a mere Ens rationis; and, if there be 
I really any indifferent actions, as undoubtedly there are, they 
I must be relative to particular circumstances of person, time, and 

place, &c. 

X. Good or bad actions may be ranged under different classes. Division 

. ofgood 

according to the object, to which they relate. Good actions, re- and bad 

,; ferred to God, are comprised under the name of Piety. Those, actions, 
which relate to ourselves, are distinguished by the words Wis- 
dom, Temperance, Moderation. Those which concern other 
men, are included under the terms of Justice and Benevolence^ 
We only anticipate here the mentioning of this distinction, be- 
cause we must return to it again, when we come to treat of natural 
law. The same distinction is applicable to bad actions, which 
belong either to Impiety, Intemperance, or Injustice. 

XI. It is common to propose several divisions of justice. Of justice 
That we may, not be silent on this article, we shall observe, difFerem 

1. That. justice may, in general, be divided into perfect or kin( * s 
rigorous. The former is that, by which we perform towards 
our neighbour whatever is due to him in virtue of a perfect or 
rigorous right, that is, the execution of which he may demand 
by forcible means, unless we satisfy him freely, and with a good 
will ; and it is in this strict sense, that the word Justice is gen- 
erally understood. The second is that, by which we perform 
towards another the duties owing to him only in virtue of 
an imperfect and non-rigorous obligation, which cannot be insist- 
ed on by violent methods ; but the fulfilling of them is left to 
each person's honour and conscience.* These kinds of duties- 
are generally comprehended under the appellations of humanity, 
charity, or benevolence, in opposition to rigorous justice., or 



* See chap. vii. $ 8. 



m THE PRINCIPLES OF 

justice properly so called. This division of justice coincides 
with that of Grotius into expletive and attributive. 

2. We might subdivide rigorous justice into that, which is ex- 
ercised between equals, and that, which takes place between 
superior and inferior.* The former contains as many different \\ 
species, as there are duties, which one man may in rigour re- ' 
quire of every other man, considered as such, and one citizen of 
every fellow citizen. The latter includes as many species, as - 
there are different societies, where some command and others 
obey.t 1 

3. There are other divisions of justice, but such, as seem • 
useless, and far from being exact. For example, that of uni- 
versal and particular justice, taken in the manner as Puffendorf 
explains it, appears incorrect, inasmuch as one of the members 
of the division is included in the other.J The subdivision of 
particular justice into distributive and commutative is incom- 
plete ; because it includes only what is due to another by vir- : 
tue of some pact or engagement, notwithstanding there are 
many things, which our neighbour may require of us in rigour, 1 
without any regard to pact or convention. And we may ob- 1 
serve in general, by reading what Grotius and Puffendorf have ] \ 
written concerning this subject, that they are at a loss them- 
selves to give a clear and exact idea of these different kinds of '] 
justice. Hence it is manifest, that we had better wave all these 1 
scholastic divisions, contrived in imitation of those of Aristotle, ] 
and abide by our first division. And indeed it is only out of res- j 
pect to the common opinion, that we have taken any notice 11 
thereof. || 

•Of there- XII. Besides what we may call the quality of moral actions, 

lative ests- they have likewise a kind of quantity, which, by comparing the 1 

roations of • J . ^ , . , 

moral ac- g°od actions to one another, as also the bad in the same manner* ! 

tions. leads us to a sort of relative estimation, in order to mark the ^j 

* This amounts to the same thing very near, as the Jus rectorium and s^wcs- \ 
torium of Grotius. B>ok i. chap 1. stc. 3. num. 3. 

-f St-e Baddseus. Elementa phdos. pr.ict. part ii. cap. ii. sec 46. 

4 Law ot Nauire and Natio.ns, book i. chap, via sec 8. And the Duties I 
of Man and a Citizen, book i. chap. ii. sec. 14. with Barbeyrac's notes. I 

Ii See Grotius' Rights of War and Peace, b- ok i chap, i § 8. Puffendorf, 
Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. vii. § 9, 10, 11, 12, with Barbey- 
i&ic's notes* 



NATURAL LAW. 8& 

greater or less degree of evil to he found in each. We shall 
give here the principles necessary for this estimation. 

1. These actions may be considered with regard to their ob- 
ject. The nobler the object the higher the excellence of the 
good action, done towards this object ; and a bad action, on the 
contrary, becomes more criminal. 

2. In respect to the quality and state of the agent. Thus a 
favor or benefit, received of an enemy, excels that, which is con- 
ferred upon us by a friend. And, on ttie contrary, an injury 
done us by a friend, is more sensible, and more attrocious, than 
that, which is committed by an enemy. 

3. In reference to the very nature of the action, according as 
there is more or less trouble to perform. The more a good ac- 
tion is difficult, supposing every thing else equal, the more wor- 
thy it is of praise and admiration. But the easier it is to abstain 
from a bad action, the more it is blameable and enormous in 
comparison to another of the same species. 

4. In relation to the effects and consequences of the action. 
An action is so much the better or worse, in proportion, as we 
foresee, that its consequences must be more or less advantageous 
or hurtful. 

5. We may add the circumstances of time, place, &c. which 
are also capable of making the good or bad actions surpass one 
another in excellence or badness. We have borrowed these re- 
marks from one of Barbeyrac's notes on Fufferulorf.* 

XIII. Let us observe in fine, that morality is attributed to Morality 

persons as well as actions ; and, as actions are *ood or bad, just !* app! ca " 

J oh to per- 
or unjust, we say likewise of men, that they are good or bad, sons a* 

virtuous or vicious. well as ac- 

tions. 
A virtuous man is he, who has a habit of acting conformably 

to the laws of his duty. A vicious man is one, who has the op- 
posite habit. 

Virtue therefore consists in a habit of acting according to the 
laws ; and vice in the contrary habit. 

I said that virtue and vice are habits. Hence to judge prop- 
erly of these two characters, we should not stop at some partic- 
ular action ; we ought to consider the whole series of the life 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap, viii, $ 5. note 1. 



36 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

and ordinary conduct of man. We should not therefore rank 
among the number of vicious men those, who through weakness, 
or otherwise, have been sometimes induced to commit a bad 
action ; as on the other hand those, who have done a few acts of 
virtue, do not merit the title of honest men. There is no such 
thing to be found in this world, as virtue in every respect com- 
plete ; and the weakness inseparable from man require we should 
not judge him with full rigour. Since it is allowed, that a virtu- 
ous man may, through weakness and surprise, commit some un- 
just action ; so it is but right we should likewise allow, that a 
man, who has contracted several vicious habits, may notwith- 
standing, in particular cases, do some good action, acknowledged 
and performed as such. Let us not suppose men worse than they 
really are, but take care to distinguish the several degrees of ini- 
quity and vice, as well as those of probity and virtue. 



END OF THE FIRST PART. 



OF 

NATURAL LAW- 
PART IL 
OF THE LAW OF NATURE. 

CHAP. L 

In what the Law of Nature consists, and that there is such a Thing. 
First Considerations, drawn from the Existence of God and his 

Authority over us. 



,A 



FTER having settled the general principles of law, Subject of 
•ur business is now to apply them to natural law in particular. this sec - 
The question?, we have to examine in this second part, are of no 
less importance, than to know whether man, by his nature and 
constitution, is really subject to laws properly so called ? What 
are these laws ? Who is the superior, that imposes them ? By 
what method or means is it possible to know them ? Whence 
results the obligation of observing them ? What consequence 

! may follow from our negligence in this respect ? And, in fine, 

! what advantage on the contrary may arise from the observance 

| of these laws ? 

11. Let us begin with a proper definition of the terms. By 

j natural law, we understand a law, that Qod imposes on all men, 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



"Whether 
there are 
any natur- 
al laws. 



Of the ex- 
istence of 
God. 



First 
proof. 
Theneees* 
sity of a 
self-exist- 
ent and in- 
telligent 
keing. 



and which they are able to discover and know by the sole light 
of reason, and by attentively considering their state and nature. 

Natural law is likewise taken for the system, assemblage, or 
body of the laws of nature. 

Natural jurisprudence is the art of attaining to the knowledge 
of the laws of nature, of explaining and applying them to human 
actions. 

III. But whether there be really any natural laws is the first i 
question, that presents itself here to our inquiry. In order to 
make a proper answer, we must ascend to the principles of nat- 
ural theology, as being the first and true foundation of the law 
of nature. For, when we are asked whether there are any nat- \ 
ural laws, this question cannot be resolved, but by examining , 
the three following articles. 1. Whether there is a God 1 2. , 
If there is a God, whether he has a right to impose laws on man ? > 
3. Whether God actually exercises his right in this respect, 
by really giving us laws, and requiring we should square thereby • 
our actions ? These three points will furnish the subject of this 
and the following chapters. 

IV. The existence of God, that is of a first intelligent, and 
self-existent being, on whom all things depend, as on their first 
cause, and who depends himself on no one ; the existence, I 
say, of such a being is one of those truths, that show themselves 
to us at the first glance. We have only to attend to the evident 
and sensible proofs, that present themselves to us, as it were,i 
from all parts. 

The chain and subordination of causes among themselves, 
which necessarily requires we should fix on a first cause, the 
necessity of acknowledging a first mover, the admirable struc- 
ture and order of the universe, are all so many demonstrations of 
the existence of God, within the reach of every capacity. Let; 
us unfold them in a few word*. 

V. 1. We behold an infinite number of objects, which, being 
united, from the assemblage, we call the universe. Somethin; 
therefore must have always existed. For, were we to suppose 
a time, in which there was absolutely nothing, it is evident that 
nothing could have ever existed ; because, whatsoever has a be- 
ginning must have a cause of its existence ; since nothing can 



NATURAL LAW. %$ 

produce nothing. It must be therefore acknowledged, that there 
is some eternal being, who exists necessarily and of himself; 
for he can be indebted to no one else for his origin ; and it im- 
plies a contradiction, that such a being does not exist. 

Moreover this eternal being, who necessarily and of himself 
subsists, is endued with reason and understanding. For, to pur- 
sue the same manner of arguing, were we to suppose a time, in 
which there was nothing but inanimate beings, it would have 
been impossible for intelligent beings, such as we now behold^ 
ever to exist. Intellection can no more proceed from a blind 
and unintelligent cause, than a being of any kind whatsoever, 
can come from nothing. There must therefore have always ex- 
isted a father of spiritual beings, an eternal mind, the source, 
whence all others derive their existence. Let what system so- 
ever be adopted concerning the nature and origin of the soul, 
our proof subsists still in its full force. Were it even to be sup- 
posed, that the cogitative part of man is no more, than the effect 
of a certain motion or modification of matter, yet we should still 
want to know how matter acquired this activity, which is not es- 
sential to it, and this particular and so much admired organiza- 
tion, which it cannot impart to itself. We should inquire, who 
is it, that has modified the body in such a manner proper to 
produce such wonderful operations, as those of intellection, 
which reflects, which acts on the very body itself with com- 
mand, which surveys the earth, and measures the heavens, re- 
collects past transactions, and extends its views to futurity. Such 
a masterpiece must come from the hands of an intelligent cause ; 
wherefore it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge a first, eter- 
nal, and intelligent Being. 

VI. An eternal Spirit, who has within himself the principle We -, 
of his own existence, and of all his faculties, can be neither not sef.k 
changed nor destroyed ; neither dependant nor limited ; he jjS^^ 
should even be invested with infinite perfection, sufficient to ren- universe, 
der him the sole and first cause of all, so that we may have no 
occasion to seek for any other. 

But does not (some will ask) this quality of an eternal and in- 
telligent being belong to matter itself, to the viable world, or to 
some of the parts thereof? 

M 



90 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

I answer that this supposition is absolutely contrary to all our 
ideas. Matter is not essentially and of itself intelligent; nor can 
it be supposed to acquire intellection but by a particular mo- 
dification, received from a cause supremely intelligent. Now 
this first cause cannot have such a modification from any other 
being; for he thinks essentially and of himself; wherefore he 
cannot be a material being. Besides, as all the parts of the uni- 
verse are variable and dependant, how is it possible to recon- 
cile this with the idea of an infinite and all-perfect being 1 

As for what relates to man, his dependance and weakness are 
much more sensible, than those of other creatures. Since he 
has no life of himself, he cannot be the efficient cause of the 
existence of others. He is unacquainted with the structure of 
his own body, and with the principle of life; incapable of dis- 
covering in what manner motions are connected with ideas, and 
which is the proper spring of the empire of the will. We must 
- therefore look out for an efficient, primitive, and original cause of 
mankind, beyond the human chain, be it supposed ever so long; 
we must trace the cause of each part of the world beyond this 
material and visible world- 
Second VII. 2. After this first proof, drawn from the necessity of a 

proof. The fi rs t eternal, and intelligent being, distinct from matter : we nro- 
necessity & . ' r 

ot a first ceed to a second, which shows us the Deity in a more sensible 
mover. manner; and more within the reach of common capacities. The 
proof I mean is the contemplation of this visible world, wherein 
we perceive a motion and order, which matter has not of itself, , 
and must therefore receive from some other being. 

Motion or active force is not an essential quality of body. 
Extension is of itself rather a passive being ; it is easily con- 
ceived at rest ; and, if it has any motion, we may well conceive 
it may lose it without being stript of its existence; it is a qual- 
ity or state, that passes and is accidentally communicated from 
one body to another. The first impression must therefore pro- 
ceed from an intrinsic cause ; and, as Aristotle has well ex- 
pressed it,* The first mover of bodies must not be moveable kim~ 

* A?istot. Metapbys? 



NATURAL LAW. 91 

self, must not be a body. This has been also agreed to by Hob- 
bes.* But the acknowledging, says he, of one God eternal, infin- 
ite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire 
men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several 
virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befa\ 
them in time to come. For he, who, from any effect he seeth come to 
pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and 
thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly 
in the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this, that there must 
be (as even the heathen philosophers confessed) one first mover; that 
is, a first and eternal cause of all things ; which is that, which 
men mean by the name of God. 

VIII. 3. Butr if matter has not been able to move of itself, Third 

much less was it able to move to the exact degree, and with all gtiocture 

the determinations necessary to form such a world, as we behold, order, and 

>u *u c , i baautyof 

rather than a contused chaos. t j, e nn [. 

In fact, let us only cast our eyes on this universe, and we shall verse, 
every where discover, even at the first glance, an admirable 
beauty, regularity, and order; and this admiration will' increase 
in proportion as, in searching more closely into nature, we en- 
ter into the particulars of the structure, proportion, and use of 
each part. For then we shall clearly see, that every thing is rel- 
ative to a certain end, and that these particular ends, though in- 
finitely varied among themselves, are so dexterously managed 
and combined, as to conspire all to a general design. Notwith- 
standing thi§ amazing diversity of creatures, there is no confu- 
sion; we behold several thousand different species, which pre- 
serve their distinct form and qualities. The parts of the uni- 
verse are proportioned and balanced, in order to preserve a gen- 
eral harmony; and each of those parts has exactly its proper fig- 
ure, proportions, situation, and motion, either to produce its par- 
ticular effect, or to form a beautiful whole. 

It is evident, therefore, that there is a design, a choice, a vis- 
ible reason in all the works of nature; and consequently there 
are marks of wisdom and understanding, obvious, as it were,, 
even to our very senses. 

* Leviathan, chap. vii. p, 53. edit. l€5i~ 



\ 
92 

The world 
is not the 
effect of 
chance. 



It is not 
eternal. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

IX. Though there have been some philosophers, who have- 
attributed all these phenomena to chance, yet this is so ridicu- 
lous a thought, that I question whether a more extravagant chim- 
era ever entered into the mind of man. Is it possible for any 
one to persuade himself seriously, that the different parts of mat- 
ter, having been set in some unaccountable manner in motion, 
produced of themselves the heavens, the stars, the earth, the 
plants, and even animals and men, and whatever is most regular 
in the organization ? A man, that would pass the like judgment 
on the least edifice, on a book or picture, would be looked upon 
as a mad, extravagant person. How much more shocking is it to 
common sense to attribute to chance so vast a work, and so won- 
derful a composition, as this universe ? 

X. It would be equally frivolous to allege the eternity of the 
world, in order to exclude a first intelligent cause. For, besides 
the marks of novelty, we meet with in the history of mankind, as 
the origin of nations and empires, and the invention of arts and 
sciences, kc. besides the assurance we have from the most gene- 
ral and most antient tradition, that the world has had a beginning, 
(a tradition, which is of great weight in regard to a matter of fact, 
like this), beside I say all this, the very nature of the thing does 
not allow us to admit of this hypothesis any more than that of 
chance. For the question is still, whence comes this beautiful 
order, this regular structure and design; in a word, whence pro- 
ceed those marks of reason and wisdom, that are so visibly dis- 
played in all parts of the universe ? To say that it has been al- 
ways so, without the intervention of an intelligent cause, does 
not explain the thing, but leaves us in the same embarrassment, 
and advances the same absurdity, as those, who awhile ago were 
speaking to us of chance. For this is in reality telling us, that 
whatever we behold throughout the universe is blindly ranged, 
without design, choice, cause, reason, or understanding. Hence 
the principal absurdity of the hypothesis of chance occurs like- 
wise in this system; with this difference only, that by establish- 
ing the eternity of the world, they suppose a chance, that from 
all eternity hit upon order; whereas those, who attribute the 
formation of the world to the fortuitous junction of its parts, sup- 



: 









NATURAL LAW. 93 

pose that chance did not succeed till a certain time, when it fell 
in at length with order, after an infinite number of trials and fruit- 
less combinations. Both acknowledge, therefore, no other cause 
than chance, or properly speaking they acknowledge none at all; 
for chan. e is no real cause; it is a word, that cannot account for 
a real etfeci, such as the arrangement of the universe. 

L would not »e a difficult matter to carry these proofs to a 
much greater iength, and even to increase them with an addi- 
tional Dumber. But this may suffice for a work of this kind ; 
and the little we have said intitles us methinks to establish the 
existence of a First Cause, or of a Creator, as an incontestable 
truth, that may serve henceforward for the basis of all our rea- 
sonings. 

XI. As soon as we have acknowledged a Creator, it is evi- God bas 

dent, that he has a supreme right to lav his commands on man, a right to 
... prescribe 

to prescribe rules ot conduct to him, and to subject him to laws ; | UW s to 

and it is no less evident, that man on his side finds himself, by man - 
his natural constitution, under an obligation of subjecting his ac- 
tions to the will of this supreme Being. 

We have already shown,* that the true foundation of sove- 
reignty, in the person of the sovereign, is power united with 
wisdom and goodness; and that, on the other hand, weakness and 
wants in the subjects are the natural cause of dependance. We 
have only therefore to see, whether all these qualities of sove- 
reign are to be found in God ; and whether men, on their side 
are in a state of infirmity and wants, so as to depend necessarily 
on him for their happiness. 

XII. It is beyond doubt, that he, who exists necessarily and This 

on himself, and has created the universe, must be invested with 1S acon3e " 
. c quence of 

innmte power. As he has given existence to ail things by his his power, 

own will, he may likewise preserve, annihilate, or change them ^j d °™d- 

as he pleases. ness. 

But his wisdom is equal to his power. Having made every 

[ thing, he must know every thing, as well the causes, as the 

J effects thence resulting. We see besides in all his works the 



* See part i. chap. ix. 



n THE PRINCIPLES OF 

mast excellent ends, and a choice of the most proper means to 
attain them; in short, they all bear, as it were, the stamp of 
wisdom. 

XIII. Reason informs us, that God is a being essentially good; n 
a perfection, which seems to flow naturally from his wisdom and 
power. For how is it possibla for a being, who of his nature is 1 
infinitely wise and powerful, to have any inclination to hurt? 
Surely no sort of reason can ever determine him to it. Malice, 1 
cruelty, and injustice, are always a consequence of ignorance or 1 
weakness. Let man therefore consider but never so little the ,1 
things, which surround him, and reflect on his own constitution, 1 
lie will discover, both within and without himself, the benevo- ] 
lent hand of his Creator, who treats him like a father. It is 1 
from God we hold our life and reason; it is he, that supplies 
most abundantly our wants, adding the useful to the necessary, I 
and the agreeable to the useful. Philosophers observe, that ? j 
whatever contributes to our preservation, has been arrayed with I 
some agreeable quality. ^Nourishment, repose, action, heat, 1 
cold, in short whatever is useful to us, pleases us in its turn, and I 
so long as it is useful. Should it cease to be so, because things [ j 
are carried to a dangerous excess, we have notice therefore by 'M 
an opposite sensation. The allurement of pleasure invites us | 
to use them, when they are necessary for our wants; disrelish I 
and lassitude induce us to abstain from them, when they are like- I 
ly to hurt us. Such is the happy and sweet economy of nature, 1 
which annexes a pleasure to the moderate exercise of our sen- 
ses and faculties, insomuch that whatever surrounds us becomes jjl 
a source of satisfaction, when we know how to use it with dis- 
cretion. What can be more magnificent, for example, than this 
great theatre of the world, in which we live, and this glittering 
decoration of heaven and earth, exhibiting a thousand agreeable 
objects to our view ? What satisfaction does nottfhe mind receive 
from the sciences, by which it is exercised, enlarged, and impro- 

] 
* See an excellent treatise lately published at Geneva, for Barillot and 
Son, in 12mo. 1747, entitled the Theorj of agreeable Sensations; where, after 
pointing out the rules, that nature follows in the distribution of pleasure* \ 
the principles of natural theology and ethics are established, 



NATURAL LAW. 9S 

red ? What conveniences do not we draw from human Indus- 
try ? What advantage do not we derive from an intercourse with 
our equals; what charms in their conversation ! what sweetness * 
in friendship, and the other connexions of the heart! When 
we avoid the excess and abuse of things, the greatest part of life 
abounds with agreeable sensations. And if to this we add, that 
the laws, which God gives us, tend, as hereafter we shall see, to 
perfect our nature, to prevent all kind of abuse, and to confine 
us to a moderate use of the good things of life, on which the 
preservation, excellence, and happiness, as well public as pri- 
vate, of man depend, what more is there wanting to convince us, 
.1 that the goodness of God is not inferior either to his wisdom or 
I power ? 

We have therefore a superior undoubtedly invested with all 
the qualities necessary to found the most legitimate and most ex* 
j tensive authority. And since on our side experience shows us, 
j that we are weak, and subject to divers wants; and since every 
I thing we have, we have from him, and he is able either to aug- 
I ment or diminish our enjoyments; it is evident, that nothing is 
wanting here to establish on the one side the absolute sovereign- 
ty of God, and on the other hand our unlimited dependence. 



CHAP. II. 

That God, in consequence of his Authority over us, has actually 
thought proper to prescribe to us Laws or Rules of Conduct. 



I. io prove the existence of God, and our dependance in Go(J exe 
respect to him, is establishing the right he has of prescribing cises hi»* % 
laws to man. But this is not sufficient; the question is, whether over us 1>V 
he has actually thought proper to exercise this right ? He can pros crib- 
undoubtedly impose laws on us ; but has he really done it ? And us , awS '* 
though we depend on him for our life, and for our physical fac- 
ulties, has he not left us in a state of independence iu respect to 



36 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



I! 



Frst proof 
drawn 
from the 
very rela- 
tions, of 
which we 
have been 
speaki.g. 



Second 
proof 
drawn 
from the 
end, which 
God pro- 
posed to 
himself 
with res- 
pect to 
man, and 
from the 
necessity 
of moral 
laws, to 
accom- 
plish this 
end. 



the moral use, to which we are to apply them ? This k a third 
and capital point, we have still left to examine. 

II. 1. We have made some progress already in this research, 
by discovering all the circumstances, necessary to establish an 1 
actual legislature. On the one side we find'a superior, who by \ 
his nature is possessed in the very highest degree of all the con- 
ditions requisite to establish a legitimate authority; and on the I 
other we behold man, who is God's creature, endowed with un- 
derstanding and liberty, capable of acting with knowledge and! 
choice, sensible of pleasure and pain, susceptible of good andj 
evil, of rewards and punishments. Such an aptitude of giving 
and receiving laws cannot be useless;. This concurrence of, 
relations and circumstances undoubtedly denotes an end, and' 
must have some effect ; just as the particular organization of the' 
eye shows we are destined to see the light. Why should God 
have made us exactly fit to receive laws, if hi intended nonej 
for us ? This would be creating so many idle and useless facul- 
ties. It is therefore not only possible, but very probable, that p 
our destination in general is such, unless the contrary should 
appear from much stronger reasons. Now instead of their be 
ing any reason to destroy this first presumption, we shall see, that 
every thing tends to confirm it. 

III. 2. When we consider the beautiful order, which the su- 
preme wisdom has established in the physical world, it is im- 
possible to persuade ourselves, that he has abandoned the spir- 
itual or moral world to chance and disorder. Reason, on the 
contrary, tells us, that a wise being proposes to himself a rea- 
sonable end in every thing he does, and that he uses all the ne- 
cessary means to attain it. The end, which God had in view 
with regard to his creatures, and particularly with respect to 
man, cannot be any other, on the one side, than his glory; andf 
on the other, the perfection and happiness of his creatures, so 
far as their nature or constitution will admit. These two views, 
so worthy of the Creator, are perfectly combined. For the 
glory of God consists in manifesting his perfections, his power, 
his goodness, wisdom, and justice; and these virtues are noth- 
ing else but the love of order and of the good of the whole. 
Thus a being absolutely perfect and supremely happy, willing to 



i 



" 






NATURAL LAW. 97 

conduct man to that state of order and happiness, which suits his 
nature, cannot but be willing at the same time to employ what- 
ever is necessary for such an end; and consequently he must ap* 
prove of those means, that are proper, and disapprove of such, 
as are improper for attaining it Had the constitution of man 
been merely physical or mechanical, God himself would have ^ ^ 
done whatever is expedient for his work; but man being a free 
and intelligent creature, capable of discernment and choice, the 
means, which the Deity uses to conduct him to his end, ought to 
be proportioned to his nature, that is, such as man may engage 
in, and concur with by his own actions. 

Now, as all means are not equally fit to conduct us to a certain 
end, all human actions cannot therefore be indifferent. Plain 
it is, that every action, contrary to the ends, which God has pro- 
posed, is not agreeable to the divine Majesty; and that he ap- 
proves, on the contrary, those, which of themselves are proper 
to promote his ends, Since there is a choice to be made, who 
can question but ouf Creator is willing we should take the right 
road; and that, instead-, of acting fortuitously and rashly, we 
should behave like rational creatures, by exercising our liberty 
and the other faculties be has given us, in the manner most 
agreeable to our state and destination, in order to promote his 
views, and to advance our own happiness, together with that of 
our fell d w creatures ? 

IV. These considerations assume a new force, when we at- Confirms- 
tend to the natural consequences of the opposite system. What p^^ine* 
would become of man and society, were every one to be so far proof, 
master of his actions, as to do every thing he listed, without hav- 
ing any other principle of conduct than caprice or passion ? Let 
us suppose, that God, abandoning us to ourselves, had not ac- 
tually prescribed any rules of life, or subjected us to laws; most 
of our talents and faculties would be of no manner of use to us. 
To what purpose would it be for man to have the light of rea- 
son, were he to follow only the impulse of instinct, without 
watching over his conduct ? What would it avail him to have 
the power of suspending his judgment, were he to yield stupidly 
to the first impressions ? And of what service would reflection 
te& were he neither , to choose nor deliberate; and were he, in-, 

N 



J 



Third 
proof 
drawn 
from the 
goodness 
cf God. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

stead of listening to the counsels of prudence, to be hurried 
away by blind inclinations ? These faculties, which form the ex- 
cellence and dignity of our nature, would not only be rendered 
hereby entirely frivolous, but moreover would become prejudi- 
cial even by their excellence; for the higher and nobler the fac- 
ulty is, the more the abuse of it proves dangerous. 

This would not only be a great misfortune for man, consid- 
ered alone, and in respect to himself; but would still prove a 
greater evil to him, when viewed in the state of society. For 
this more than any other state requires laws, to the end, that 
each person may set limits to his pretensions, without invading 
another man's right. 

Were it otherwise, licentiousness must be the consequence 
of independence. To leave men abandoned to themselves h 
leaving an open field to the passions, and paving the way for in- 
justice, violence, perfidy, and cruelty. Take away natural laws, 
and that moral tie, which supports justice and honesty in a 
whole nation, and establishes also particular duties either in fam- 
ilies, or in the other relations of life; man would be then the 
most savage and ferocious of all animals. The more dexterous 
and artful he is, the more dangerous he would prove to his 
equals; his dexterity would degenerate into craft, and his art into 
malice. Then we should be divested of all the advantages and 
sweets of society; and thrown into a state of war and libertin- 
ism. 

V. 3. Were any one to say, that man himself would not fail 
to remedy these disorders, by establishing laws in society; (be- 
side that human laws would have very little force were they not 
founded on the principles of conscience;) this remark shows 
there is a necessity for laws in general, whereby we gain our 
cause. For, if it be agreeable to the order of reason, that men 
should establish a rule of life among themselves, in order to be 
screened from the evils, they might apprehend from one anoth- 
er, and to procure those advantages, that are capable of forming 
their private and public happiness; this alone ought to convince 
us, that the Creator, infinitely wiser and better than ourselves, 
must have undoubtedly pursued the same method. A good 
parent, who takes care to direct his children by his authority 



NATURAL LAW. 99 

and counsels, is able to preserve peace and order in his family. 
Is it then to be imagined, that the common father of mankind 
should neglect to give us the like assistance ? And if a wise sov- 
ereign has nothing so much at heart, as to prevent licentiousness 
by salutary regulations; how can any one believe, that God, who 
is a much greater friend to man, than man is to his equals, has 
left all mankind without direction and guide, even on the most im- 
portant matters, on which our whole happiness depends ? Such 
a system would be no less contrary to the goodness, than to the 
wisdom of God. We must therefore have recourse to other ideas, 
and conclude, that the Creator having, through a pure effect of 
his bounty, created man for happiness, and having implanted in 
him an insuperable inclination to felicity, subjecting him at the 
same time to live in society, he must have given him also such 
principles, as are capable of inspiring him with a love of order, 
and rules to point out the means of procuring and attaining 
it. 

VI. 4. But let us enter into ourselves, and we shall actually Fourth 
find, that what we ought to expect in this respect from the divine 5rawn 

wisdom and goodness, is dictated by right reason, and by the prin- fr® m tu ® 

. . , . . , principles 

ciples engraved in our hearts. of conduct 

If there be any speculative truths; that are evident, or if there which wej 
. . actually 

be any certain axioms, that serve as a basis to the sciences; there find within 

is no less certainty in some principles, that are laid down in or- ourse » ves * 
der to direct our conduct, and to serve as the foundation of mo- 
rality. For example; that the all-wise and all-bountiful Creator 
merits the respects of the creature; that man ought to seek his own 
happiness; that we should prefer the less to the greater evil; that a 
benefit deserves a grateful achnozvledgment; that the state of order 
excels that of disorder, $c. Those maxims, and others of the same 
sort, differ very little in evidence from these, The whole is greater 
than its part; or the cause precedes the effect, fyc. Both are dicta- 
ted by pure reason; and hence we feel ourselves forced, as it 
were, to give our assent to them. These general principles are 
seldom contested; if there be any dispute, it relates only to their 
application and consequences. But so soon as the truth of these 
principles is discovered, their consequences, whether immediate 



1Q0 



These 
principles 
are obliga- 
tory ot" 
them- 
selves. 



They are 
obligatory 
by the di- 
vine will, 
and thus 
become 
r.eal laws. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

or remote, are entirely as certain, provided they be well conneo 
ted; the whole business being to deduce them by a train of close 
and conclusive argumentations. 

VII. In order to be sensible of the influence, which such prin- jj 
ciples, with their legitimate consequences, ought to have over 
our conduct, we have only to recollect what has been already- 
said, in the first part of this work,* concerning the obligation we 
are under of following the dictates of reason. As it would be ab- 
surd in speculative matters to speak and judge otherwise, than i 
according to that light, which makes us discern truth from false- i 
hood; so it would be no less preposterous to deviate in our con- 
duct from those certain maxims, which enable us to distinguish 
good from evil. When once it is manifest, that a particular man- ) 
ner of acting is suitable to our nature, and to the great end we li 
have in view; and that another, on the contrary, does not suit £ 
our constitution or happiness; it follows, that man, as a free and 
rational creature, ought to be very attentive to this difference, > 
and to take his resolutions accordingly. He is obliged to it by the s 
very nature of the thing; because it is absolutely necessary, when 
a person is desirous of the end, to be desirous also of the means; 
and he is obliged for it moreover because he cannot mistake the 
intention and will of his superior in this respect 

VIII. In fact, God being the author of the nature of things ' 
and of our constitution, if, in consequence of this nature and 
constitution, we are reasonably determined to judge after a cer- 
tain manner, and to act according to our judgment, the Creator 
sufficiently manifests his intention, so that we can no longer be 
ignorant of his will. The language therefore of reason is that 
of God himself. When our reason tells so clearty, that zue 
must not return evil for good, it is God himself, who by this in- 
ternal oracle gives us to understand what is good and just, what 
is agreeable to him and suitable to ourselves. We said that it 
is not at all provable, that the good and wise Creator should have 
abandoned man to himself, without a guide and direction for his 
conduct. We have here a direction, that comes from him; and 
since he is invested in the very highest degree, as we have already 



,: 



; 



* Chap, vl 



NATURAL LAW. 10) 

I 

I observed, with the perfections, on which a legitimate superiority 

I is founded, who can pretend to question, that the will of such a 

j superior is law to us ? The reader I suppose has not forgot the 

! conditions requisite to constitute a law; conditions, that are all 

i to be met with in the present case. 1. There is a rule. 2. This 

! rule is just and useful. 3. It comes from a superior, on whom 

| we entirely depend. 4. In fine, it is sufficiently made known to 

us by principles, engraved in our hearts, and even by our own 

reason. It is therefore a law properly so called, which we are 

really obliged to observe. But let us inquire a little further, by 

what means this natural law is discovered, or, which amounts to 

the same thing, from what source we must derive it. What we 

have hitherto proved only in a general manner will be further 

illustrated and confirmed by the particulars, on which we are now 

going to enlarge. For nothing can be a stronger proof of our 

having hit upon the true principles, than, when unfolding and 

considering them in their different branches, we find they are 

always conformable to the nature of things. 



CHAP. III. 

Of the Means, by which we discern what is Just and Uunjust, or 
what is dictated by Natural Law; namely, 1. Moral Instinct^ 
and 2. Reason. 

I. T? HAT has been said in the preceding chapter already pj rgt 

shows, that God has invested us with two means of perceiv- means of 

ing or discerning moral good and evil; the first is only a kind moral 

of instinct; the second is reason or judgment. good and 

,_•',...'. , ,, , , , ,. , «. , evil,,name- 

Moral instinct I call that natural bent or inclination, which iy t instinct 

prompts us to approve of certain things as good and commenda- °*"inward 

ble, and to condemn others as bad and blameable, independent o^ 

reflection. Or if any one has a mind to distinguish this instinct 

by the name of moral sense, as Mr. Hutchinson has done, I shall 

then say, that it is a faculty of the mind, which instantly discerns, 

in certain cases, moral good and evil, by a kind of sensation and 

taste independent of reason and reflection. 



i02 
Examples. 



Whence 
these sen- 
sations 
proceed, 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

II. Thus, at the sight of a man in misery or pain, we feel im- 
mediately a sense of compassion, which prompts us to relieve 
him. The first emotion, that strikes us, after receiving a benefit, 
is to acknowledge the favor, and to thank our benefactor. The 
first disposition of one man towards another, abstracting from any 
particular reason he may have of hatred or fear, is a sense of 
benevolence, as towards his fellow creature, with whom he finds 
himself connected by a conformity of nature and wants. We 
likewise observe, that, without any great thought or reasoning, a 
child, or untutored peasant,* is sensible that ingratitude is a vice, 
and exclaims against perfidy, as a black and unjust action, which 
highly shocks him, and is absolutely repugnant to his nature. On 
the contrary, to keep one's word, to be grateful for a benefit, to 
pay every body their due, to honor our parents, to comfort those, 
who are in distress or misery, are all so many actions, which we 
cannot but approve and esteem as just, good, honest, beneficent, 
and useful to mankind. Hence the mind is pleased to see or hear 
such acts of equity, sincerity, humanity and beneficence; the 
heart is touched and moved; and reading them in history we are 
seized with admiration, and extol the happiness of the age, na- 
tion, or family, distinguished by such noble examples. As for 
criminal instances, we cannot see or hear them mentioned with- 
out contempt or indignation, 

III If any one should ask, whence comes this emotion of 
the heart, which prompts us, almost without any reasoning or 
inquiry, to love some actions, and to detest others ? The only 
answer, I am able to give, is, that it proceeds from the author 
of our being, who has formed us after this manner, and whom 
it has pleased that our nature or constitution should be such, 
that the difference of moral good and evil should, in some ca- 
ses, affect us exactly in the same manner, as physical good and 
evil. It is therefore a kind of instinct, like several others, which 
nature has given us, in order to determine us with more expe- 
dition and vigour, where reflection would be too slow. It is 
thus we are informed of our corporeal wants by our inward 
sense; while our outward senses acquaint us with the quality of 
the objects, that may be useful or prejudicial to us, in order to 



NATURAL LAW. 103 

lead us, as it were, mechanically to whatever is requisite for our 
preservation. Such is also the instinct, that attaches us to life. 
:| and the desire of happiness, the primuin mobile of all our ac- 
tions. Such is likewise the almost blind, but necessary tender- 
ness of parents towards their children. The pressing and indis- 
pensable wants of man required that he should be directed by 
the way of sense, which is always quicker and readier, than that 
of reason. 

IV. God has therefore thought proper to use this method in Of what 
respect to the moral conduct of man,, by imprinting within us a U9e the X 
sense or taste of virtue and justice, which anticipates, in some 

! measure, our reason, decides our first motions, and happily sup- 
plies, in most men, the want of attention or reflection. For what 
numbers of people would never trouble their heads with reflect- 
ing ? What multitudes there are of stupid wretches, who lead a 
mere animal life, and arc scarce able to distinguish three or four 
ideas, in order to form what is called ratiocination ? It was there- 
fore our particular advantage, that the Creator should give us a 
discernment of good and evil, with a love for the one, and an 
aversion for the other, by means of a quick and lively kind of 
faculty, which has no necessity to wait for the speculations of 
the mind. 

V. If any one should dispute the reality of these sensations, Objection. 

by saying they are not to be found in all men, because there are ^f^/ 6 ™" 

savage people-, who seem to have none at all; and even among not found 

civilized nations we meet with such perverse and stubborn minds, Answer. " 

as do not appear to have any notion or sense of virtue; I answer, 1 - We find 

some tra- 
1. that the most savage people have nevertheless the first ideas C es of 

above mentioned; and, if there are some, who seem to give no tliem a " 

i • , r i • ■ mong the 

outward signs or demonstrations thereof, this is owing to our not most sar- 

being sufficiently acquainted with their manners; or because they a p P 60 " 
are intirely stupified, and have stifled almost all sentiments of 
humanity; or in fine by reason, that in some respects they fall 
into an abuse contrary to those principles, not by rejecting them 
positively, but through some prejudice, that has prevailed over 
their good sense and natural rectitude, and inclines them to make 
a bad application of these principles. For example, we see sav- 
ages, who devour their enemies r whom they have made priso 



104 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



2. We 
must dis- 
tinguish 
between 
the natural 
state of 
man, and 
tli at of his 
deprava 
tion. 



3. If there 
be any 
monsters 
in the 
moral or- 
der, they 
are very 
rare, and 
no conse- 
quence 
can be 
drawn 
iromthem. 



ners, imagining it to be the right of war, and, since they hate I 
liberty to kill them, nothing ought to hinder them from benefitting I 
by their flesh, as their proper spoils. But those very savages' * j 
would not treat in that manner their friends or countrymen. ■ 
They have laws and rules among themselves; sincerity and a 
plain dealing are esteemed there, as in other places, and a grate- I 
ful heart meets with as much commendation among them, as I J 
with us. 

VI. With regard to those, who, in the most enlightened and l 
civilized countries, seem to be void of all shame, humanity, or H 
justice, we must take care to distinguish between the natural ! 
state of man, and the depravation, into which he may fall by H 
abuse, and in consequence of irregularity and debauch. For ex- '- 
ample, what can be more natural, than paternal tenderness ! And 
yet we have seen men, who seemed to have stifled it, through ; 
violence of passion, or by force of a present temptation, which " 
suspended for a while this natural affection. What can be i 
stronger than th£ love of ourselves and of our own preservation ? j 
It happens nevertheless, that whether through anger, or some H 
other motion, which throws the soul out of its natural position, a 
man tears his own limbs, squanders his substance, or does him- 
self some great prejudice, as if he were bent on his own misery 
and destruction. 

VII. 3. In fine, if there are people, who coolly and without 
any agitation of mind seem to have divested themselves of all 
affection and esteem for virtue, (besides that monsters like these 
are as rare, I hope, in the moral, as in the physical world,} we 
only see thereby the effects of an exquisite and inveterate depra- 
vation. For man is not born thus corrupted; but the interest he 
has in excusing and palliating his vices, the habit he has con- 
tracted, and the sophistical arguments, to which he has recourse, 
may stifle in fine, or corrupt the moral sense, of which we have 
been speaking; as we see that every other faculty of the soul 
or body may, by long abuse, be altered or corrupted. The prin- 
ciple is almost always preserved; it is a fire, that, when it seems 
to be even extinct, may kindle again and throw out some glim- 
merings of light, as we have seen examples in very profligate- 
men, 'under particular conjunctures* 



NATURAL LAW, 10* 

VIII. But notwithstanding God has implanted, in us this in- Second 
stinct of sense, as the first means of discerning moral good and discerning 
evil, yet he has not stopt here; he has also thought proper, that moral 
the same light, which serves to direct us in every thing else, that evil; which 
is reason, should come to our assistance, in order to enable us ** reason, 
the better to discern and comprehend the true rules of conduct. 

Reason I call the faculty of comparing ideas, of investigating 
the mutual relations of things, and thence inferring just conse- 
quences. This noble faculty, which is the directress of the 
mind, serves to illustrate, to prove, to extend, and apply what 
our natural sense already gave us to understand, in relation to 
justice and injustice. As reflection, instead of diminishing pa- 
ternal tenderness, tends to strengthen it, by making us observe- 
how agreeable it is to the relation of father and son, to the ad- 
vantage not only of a family, but of the whole species; in like 
manner the natural sense, we have of the beauty and excellence 
of virtue, is considerably improved by the reflections, we are 
taught by reason, in regard to the foundations, motives, relations, 
and the general as well as particular uses of this same virtue, 
which seemed so beautiful to us at first sight. 

IX. We may even affirm, that the light of reason has three ad- First ad- 
vantages in respect to this instinct or sense. reasonTin 

1. It contributes to prove its truth and exactness; in the same respect to 
manner as we observe in other things, that study and rules serve ltsepvest ' 
to verify the exactness of taste, by showing us it is neither blind verity it. 
nor arbitrary, but founded on reason, and directed by principles; 
or as those, who are quick sighted, judge with greater certainty 
of the distance or figure of an object, after having compared, ex- 
amined, and measured it quite at their leisure, than if they had 
depended intirely on the first sight. We find likewise, that 
there are opinions and customs, which make so strong and so 
general an impression on our minds, that to judge of them only 
by the sentiment, they excite, we should be in danger of mista* 
king prejudice for truth. It is reason's province to rectify this 
erroneous judgment, and to counterbalance this effect of educa- 
tion, by setting before us the true principles, on which we ought 

to judge of things. 

O 



106 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Second X. 2. A second advantage, which reason has in respect to 

it unfolos simple instinct, is, that it unfolds the ideas better, by considering I 

theprinci- them irt all their relations and consequences. For we frequently I 

thence m- see tnat those, who have had only the first notion, find them- 1 

fers prop- selves embarrassed and mistaken, when they are to applv it to a I 
ercor.se- J rrj I 

quences. case °i tne least delicate or complicated nature. They are sen- I 

sible indeed of the general principles, but they do not know how J 
to follow them through their different branches, to make the ne- J 
cessary distinctions or exceptions, or to modify them according J 
to time and place. This is the business of reason, which it dis- J 
charges so much the better, in proportion as there is care taken J 
to exercise and improve it* I 

Third ad- XI. 3. Reason not only carries its views farther than instinct, J 
vantage: ^[^ respect to the unfolding and application of principles, but 1 
an univer- has also a more extensive sphere, in regard to the very princi- I 
and^pH- pleS P* discovers > and the objects it embraces. For instinct has J 
cablet j all been given us only for a small number of simple cases, relative J 
to our natural state, and which require a quick determination. I 
But besides those simple cases, where it is proper, that man j 
should be drawn and determined by a first motion; there are ca- I 
ses of a more composite nature, which arise from the different ,1 
states of man, from the combination of certain circumstances, and 
from the particular situation of each person; on all which it is 1 
impossible to form any rules but by reflection, and by an atten- 
tive observation of the relations and agreements of each thing. J 
Such are the two faculties, with which God has invested us, I 
in order to enable us to discern between good and evil. These \ 4 
faculties happily joined, and subordinate one to the other, con- 
cur to the same effect. One gives the first notice, the other [j 
verifies and proves it; one acquaints us with the principles, the ; J3 
other applies and unfolds them; one serves for a guide in the 
jnost pressing and necessary cases, the other distinguishes all 
sorts of affinity or relation, and lays down rules for the most par- 
• . t-icular cases. J I 

It is thus we are enabled to discern what is good and just, 
or, which amounts to the same thing, to know what is the divine i 
will, in respect to the moral conduct we are to observe. Let us 
iQnite at present these two means, in order to find the principles 
ef the law of n at ore! 



NATURAL LAW. 10* 



CHAP. IV. 



Of the Principles t f torn which Reason may deduce the Law of Na- 
ture.* 



I 



F we should be afterwards asked, what principles ought Whence 

reason to make use of, in order to judge of what relates to the deduce 

law of nature, and to deduce and unfold it ? Our answer is in the princi- 
ples of the 
general, that we have only to attend to the nature of man, and to i aw of na- 

his states or relations; and, as these relations are different, there ture ■ 
may be likewise different principles, that lead us to the knowl- 
edge of our duties. 

But before we enter upon this point, it will be proper to make 
some preliminary remarks on what we call principles of natural 
law; in order to prevent the ambiguity or equivocation, that has 
often entangled this subject. 

II. I. When we inquire here which are the first principles of p re lircii. 
natural law, the question is, which are those truths or primitive nar y r ** 
rules, whereby we may effectually know the divine will in re- What we 
g;ird to man; and thus arrive, by just consequences, to the knowl- under- 
age of the particular laws and duties, which God imposes on us principles 

by right reason? of natural 

J ° ... law. 

2. We must not therefore confound the principles here in 

question, with the efficient and productive cause of natural laws, 
or with their obligatory principle. It is unquestionable, that the 
will of the Supreme Being is the efficient cause of the law of na- 
ture, and the source of the obligation, thence arising. But, this 
being taken for granted, we have still to enquire how man may 
attain to the knowledge of this will, and to the discovery of those 
principles, which, acquainting us with the divine intention, ena- 
ble us to reduce from it all our particular duties, so far as they 
are discoverable by reason only. A person asks, for example, 
whether the law of nature requires us to Tepair injuries, or to 
be faithful to our engagements? If we are satisfied with answer- 
ing him, that the thing is incontestable, because so it is ordered 
by the divine will; it is plain, that this is not a sufficient answer 

* See on this, and the following chapter, Puffendorf 's Law of Nature 
and Nations, book li. chap. iii. 






m THE PRINCIPLES bf 

to his question; and that he may reasonably insist to have* a 
principle pointed out, which should really convince him, that} 
such in the fact is the willof the Deity; for this is the point- 
he is in search of. 

Character HI. Let us afterwards observe, that the first principles of, 
of those t , , , , ... . . ' 

principles, natural laws, Ought to be not only true, but likewise simple,, 

clear* sufficient, and proper for those laws. 

They ought to be true; that is, they should be taken from the:j 
Very nature and state of the thing. False or hypocritical prin 
ciples must produce consequences of the same nature; for a solid! 
edifice can never be raised on a rotten foundation. They ought| t j 
to be simple and clear of their own nature, or at least easy to ap 
prehend and unfold. For, the laws of nature being obligatory, 
for all mmkindj their first principles should be within every, 
body's reach, so that whatsoever has common sense may be ea-j 
sily acquainted with them. It would be very reasonable there* 
fore to mistrust principles, that are farfetchedj or of too subtle 
and metaphysical a nature. 

I add, that these principles ought to be sufficient and universal.^ 
They should be such, that one may deduce from them, by imme- 
diate and natural consequences, all the laws of nature, and the 
several duties thence resulting; insomuch that the exposition of, 
particulars be properly only an explication of the principles; in; 
the same manner, very nearly as the production or increase of a 
plant is only an unfolding of the seed. 

And, as most natural laws are subject to divers exceptions, it 
is likewise necessary, that the principles be such, as include the^ 
reasons of the very exceptions; and that we may not only draw' 
from them all the common rules of morality, but that they also 
serve to restrain these rules, according as place, time, and occa-j 
sion require. k 

In fine, those first principles ought to be established in such a 
manner, as to be really the proper and direct foundation of all 
the duties of natural law; insomuch that whether we descend) 
from the principle to deduce the consequences, or whether we 
ascend from the consequences to the principle, our reasoning? 1- 
require always to be immediately connected, and their thread as 
though never interrupted. 



NATURAL LAW. 109 

IV. But, generally speaking, it is a matter of mere indifference Whether 
j whether we reduce the whole to one single principle, or estab- ^ r °dncc 
jlish a variety of them. We must consult and follow in this re- the whole 

1 spect a judicious and exact method. All that can be said on this ^"rinct 
! head is, that it is not at all necessary to the solidity or perfection P l «- 
i of the system, that all natural laws be deduced from one single 
I and fundamental maxim; nay, perhaps the thing is impossible. 
Be that as it may, it is idle to endeavour to reduce the whole to 
this unity. 

Such are the general remarks we had to propose. If they 
prove just we shall reap this double advantage from them, that 
they will instruct us in the method we are to follow, in order' 
to establish the true principles of natural law; and at the same 
time they will enable us to pass a solid judgment on the different 
systems concerning this subject. But it is time now to come to 
the point. 

V. The only way to attain to the knowledge of natural law is Man can- 

to consider attentively the nature and constitution of man, the notattam 

. to the 

relations he has to the beings, that surround him, and the states knowl- 

thence resulting. In fact the very term natural law, and the edg " e °f 
# * natural 

notion we have given of it, show, that the principles of this sci- laws, bat 

ence must be taken from the very nature and constitution of man. - e * aml " 

mng nis 

We shall therefore lay down two general propositions, as the "attire, 
foundation of the whole system of the law of nature. 



First Proposition. 

Whatever is in the nature and original constitution of man, 
and appears a necessary consequence of this nature and consti- 
tution, certainly indicates the intention or will of God with re- 
spect to man, and consequently acquaints us with the law of 
nature. 

Second Proposition. 

But, in order to have a complete system of the law of na- 
ture, we must not only consider the nature of man, such as it 
is in itself; it is also necessary to attend to the relations he has 
to other beings, and to different states thence arising. Otherwise 
it is evident we should have only an imperfect and defective 
system. 



tion ari'cl 
state. 



110 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

We may therefore affirm, that the general foundation of the 
system of natural law is the nature of man, considered un-i 
der the several circumstances, that attend it, and in which God « 
himself has placed him for particular ends; inasmuch as by this 
means we may be acquainted with the will of God. In short 
since man holds from the hand of God himself whatever he 
possesses, as well with regard to his existence, as to his man- 
ner of existing, it is the study of human nature only, that can 
fully instruct us concerning the views, which, God proposed to 
himself in giving us our being ; and consequently with the rules 
we ought to follow, in order to accomplish the designs of the 
Creator. 
Three VI. For this purpose we mus,t recollect what has been already 

raan said of the manner, in which man be considered under three 

different respects or states, which embrace all his particular - 
relations. In the first place we may consider him as God's 
creature, from whom he has received his life, his reason, and 
all the advantages he enjoys. Secondly man may be consider- 
ed in himself as a being, composed of body and soul, and en- 
dowed with many different faculties; as a being, that naturally 
loves himself, and necessarily desires his own felicity. In 
fine we may consider him, as forming a part of the species, as- 
placed on the earth near several other beings of a similar nature, 
and with whom he is inclined, nay, by his natural condition obli- 
ged to live in society. Such in fact is the system of humanity, |* 
from which results the most common and natural distinction of iJ 
our duties, taken from the three different states here mentioned; 
duties towards God, towards ourselves, and towards the rest of ^ 
mankind.* 
SieiiRiort; VII. In the first place, since reason brings us acquainted 

pr nciple w j tn Q $ as a self-existent being, and sovereign Lord of all 

of the nat- . ° 

ural Jaws, things, and in particular as our creator, preserver, and benefac- 

that have ^ QJ , | t f ij OW s, that we ought necessarilv to acknowledge the 
God for ' , . s J ° 

their ob- sovereign perfection of this supreme Being, and our absolute 
ject. 

* We meet -with this division in Cicero. Philosophy, says he, teaches 
us in the first place the worship of the Deijy; secondly, tlie mutual duties. 
of men, founded on human society; and in fine moderation and greatness 
of soul. " Usee (philosophia) nos primutn ad illorum (deorum) cpltum, 
»'• deinde ad jus hominum,quod. itum est in generis humani sv.cietaie. turn 
" ad modestiam magmtudinemque a»imi erudivit." Olc. Tusc. quse*fc 1 
lib, 1 cap. 26. 



NATURAL LAW. Ill 

dependance on him; which by a natural consequence inspires 
us with sentiments of respect, love, and fear, and with an entire 
submission to his will. For why should God have thus man- 
ifested himself to mankind, were it not that their reason 
should teach them to entertain sentiments, proportioned to the 
excellence of his nature, that is, they should honor, love, adore 
and obey him ? 

VIII. Infinite respect is the natural consequence of the im- Conse- 
I pression, we receive from a prospect of all the divine perfec- ^ s n ^f 
I tions. We cannot refuse love and gratitude to a being supremely pie. 
' beneficent. The fear of displeasing or offending him is a natural 
1 effect of the idea we entertain of his justice and power, and obe- 
dience cannot but follow from the knowledge of his legitimate 
authority over us, of his bounty and supreme wisdom, which are 
sure to conduct us by the road most agreeable to our nature and 
happiness. The asssemblage of these sentiments, deeply engra- 
ved in the heart, is called Piety. 

Piety if it be real, will show itself externally two different 
ways; by our morals, and by outward worship. I say, 1. by 
our morals, because a pious man, sincerely penetrated with the 
abovementioned sentiments, will find himself naturally inclin- 
ed to speak and act after the manner, he knows to be most con- 
formable to the divine wiU and perfections. This is his rule 
and model; from which the practice of the most excellent vir- 
tues arises. 

2. But besides this manner of honouring God, which is un- 
doubtedly the most necessary and most real, a religious man will 
consider it as a pleasure and duty to strengthen himself in these 
sentiments of piety, and to excite them in others. Hence ex- 
ternal worship, as well public as private, is derived. For, 
whether We consider this worship, as the first and almost only 
means of exciting, entertaining, and improving religious and pious 
sentiments in the mind; or whether we look upon it as an 
homage, which men, united by particular or privite societies, 
pay in common to the Deity; or whether in fine both these views 
are joined, reason represents it 4o us., as a duty of indispensable 
necessity. 






J12 THE PRINCIPLES OP 



This worship may vary indeed in regard to its form; yet 
there is a natural principle, which determines its essence, and 
preserves it from all frivolous and superstitious practices; viz. 
that it consists in instructing mankind, in rendering them pious 
and virtuous, and in giving them just ideas of the nature of God,. 
as also what he requires from his creatures. 

The different duties, here pointed out, constitute what we dis- 
tinguish by the name of Religion. We may define it a connex- 
ion, which attaches man to God, and to the observance of his 
laws, by those sentiments of respect, love, submission, and fear 
which the perfections of a supreme Being, and our intire depen- 
dance on him, as an all-wise and all-bountiful Creator, are apt to 
excite in the human mind. 

Thus by studying our nature and state, we find, in the relation 
we have to the Deity, the proper principle, from which those 
duties of natural law, that have God for their object, are imme- 
diately derived. 
Self-love, IX. If we search afterwards for the principle of those 
thepnnci- duties, th a £ regard ourselves, it will be easy to discover them, 
those nat- by examining the internal constitution of man, and inquiring into 
which * ^ ie C reator ' s views in regard to him, in order to know for what 
concern end he has endowed him with those faculties of mind and body, 
ourselves. (.".'.. t . , 

that constitute his nature. 

Now it is evident, that God, by creating us proposed our pre- 
servation, perfection, and happiness. This is what manifestly 
appears, as well by the faculties, with which man is invested, 
which all tend to the same end; as by the strong inclination, that 
prompts us to pursue good, and shun evil. God is therefore wil- 
ling, that every one should labour for his own preservation and 
perfection, in order to acquire all the happiness, of which he is 
capable according to his nature and state. 

This being premised, we may affirm, that self-love (I mean an 
enlightened and rational love of ourselves) may serve for the first 
principle with regard to the duties, which concern man himself; 
inasmuch as this sensation bejng inseparable from human nature, 
and having God for its author, gives us clearly to understand in 
this respect the will of the supreme Being. 

Yet we should take particular notice that the love of our- 



NATURAL LAW. 113 

1 selves cannot serve us as a principle and rule, but inasmuch as it is 
I directed by right reason, according to the exigencies or neces- 
] sities of our nature and state. 

For thus it only becomes an interpreter of the Creator's will 
I in respect to us; that is, it ought to be managed in such a man- 
i tier, as not to offend the laws of religion or society. Otherwise 
j this self-love would become the source of a thousand iniqui- 
ties; and, so far from being of any service, would prove a snare 
to us, by the prejudice we should certainly receive from those 
very iniquities. 

X. From this principle, thus established, it is easy to deduce Natural 
the natural laws and duties, that directly concern us. The de- lax J h f en * 
.sire of happiness is attended, in the first place, with the care this prin- 
of our preservation. It requires next, that (every thing else C, P e * 
being equal) the care of the soul should be preferred to that of 
the body. We ought not to neglect to improve our reason, by 
learning to discern truth from falsehood, the useful from the 
hurtful, in order to acquire a just knowledge of things, that con- 
cern us, and to form a right judgment of them. It is in this that 
the perfection of the understanding, or wisdom, consists. We 
should afterwards be determined, and act constantly according to 
this light, in spite of all contrary suggestion and passion. For it 
is properly this vigour or perseverance of the soul, in following 
the counsels of wisdom, that constitutes virtue, and forms the 
perfection of the will, without which the light of the understand- 
ing would be of no manner of use. 

From this principle all the particular rules arise. You ask 
for example, whether the moderation of the passions be a duty, 
imposed upon us by the law of nature ? In order to give you an 
answer, I inquire, in my turn, whether it is necessary to our 
preservation, perfection and happiness ? If ft be, as undoubtedly 
it is, the question is decided. You have a mind to know whether 
the love of occupation, the discerning between permitted and 
forbidden pleasures, and moderation in the use of such, as are 
permitted, whether, in fine, patience, constancy, resolution, &c. 
are natural duties; I shall always answer, by making use of the 
same principle; and, provided I apply it well, my answer cannot 

P 



114 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

but be right and exact; because the principle conducts me cer- 
tainly to the end, by acquainting me with the will of God. 
Man is XI. There remains still another point to investigate, namely, 

sTcM; ° r ^ ie P r ' nc 'P^ e 5 fr° m which we are to deduce those natural laws, 
that regard our mutual duties, and have society for their object. 
Let us see whether we cannot discover this principle, by pur- 
suing the same method. We ought always to consult the actual 
state of things, in order to take their result. 

I am not the only person upon earth; I find myself in the mid- 
dle of an infinite number of other men, who resemble me in ev- 
ery respect; and I am subject to this state, even from my nativ- 
ity, by the very act of providence. This induces me naturally 
to think, it was not the intention of God, that each man should 
live single and separate from the rest; but that, on the contrary, 
it was his will they should live together, and be joined in society. 
The Creator might certainly have formed all men at the same 
time, though separated from one another, by investing each of 
them with the proper and sufficient qualities for this kind of sol- 
itary life. If he has not followed this plan, it is probably be- 
cause it was his will, that the ties of consanguinity and birth 
should begin to form a more extensive union, which he was 
pleased to establish amongst men. 

The more I examine, the more I am confirmed in this thought. 
Most of the faculties of man, his natural inclinations, his weak- 
ness, and wants, are all so many indubitable proofs of this inten- 
tion of the Creator. 
1. Society XII. Such in effect is the nature and constitution of man, that 
is abso- out f soc i e ty he could neither preserve his life, nor display and 
cessarj for perfect his faculties and talents, nor attain any real and solid 
man ' happiness. What would become of an infant, were there not 

some benevolent and assisting hand to provide for his wants ? 
He must perish, if no one takes care of him; and this state of 
weakness and ignorance requires even a long and continued as- 
sistance. View him when grown up to manhood, you find 
nothing but rudeness, ignorance, and confused ideas, which 
he is scarcely able to convey ; abandon him to himself, and ; 
you behold a savage, and perhaps a ferocious animal ; igno- , 
rant of all the conveniences of life, sunk in idleness, a prey to 



ifcpl 



NATURAL LAW. 115 

spleen and melancholy, and almost incapable of providing against 
the first wants of nature. If he attains to old age, behold him 
relapsed into infirmities, that render him almost as dependant on 
external aid, as he was in his infancy. This dependance shows 
itself in a more sensible manner in accidents and maladies. 
What would then become of man, were he to be in a state of 
solitude ? There is nothing but the assistance of our fellow-crea- 
tures, that is able to preserve us from the divers evils, or to 
redress them and render us easy and happy, in whatsoever stage 
or situation of life. 

We have an excellent picture of the use of society, drawn 
by Seneca.* On what, says he, does our security depend, but on 
the services we render one another? It is this commerce of bene- 
fits, that makes life easy, and enables us to defend ourselves against 
any sudden insults or attacks. What would be the fate of mankind 
were every one to live apart ? so many men, so many victims to 
other animals, an easy prey, in short, feebleness itself. In fact, other 
animals have strength enough sufficient to defend themselves. Those 
that are wild and wandering, and zvhose ferocity does not permit 
them to herd together, are born, as it were, with arms; whereas 
man is on all sides encompassed with zveakness, having neither arms, 
nor teeth, nor claws to render him formidable. But the strength 
he wants by himself, he finds zvhen united with his equals. 

Nature, to make amends, has endowed him with two things, 
which give him a considerable force and superiority, where other- 
wise he would be much inferior; I mean reason and sociability, 
whereby, he who alone could make no resistance, becomes master of 
the whole. Society gives him an empire over other animals; society 
is. the cause, that not satisfied with the element on which he was born, 

* Quo alio tuti summus, quarn quod mutuis juvamur officas ? Hoc uno 
instructior vita contr&que incursiones subitas munitior est, beneficiorum 
commercio. Fac nos singulos, quid sumus ? Prxda animalium et victi- 
ms ac bellissimus et facillimus sanguis. Quoniam ceteris animalibus in 
tutelam sui satis virium est. qusecunque vaga nascuntur, et actura vitam 
segregem, armata sunt. Hominem imbecilitas cingit; non unguium vis, 
non dentium, tenibilem caeteris fecit. Nudum et infirmum societas rau- 
nit. Duas res dedit quae ilium, obnoxium caeteris, validissimum facerent» 
rationem et societatem. Itaque, qui par esse nulli poterat, si seduceretur, 
rerum potitur. Societas illi dominium omnium animalium dedit. Socie- 
tas terres genitum in aiienze nature transmisit impeiium, et dominari 
etiam in man jussit. Haec motborum impetus arr.uit, senectuti adminicula 
prospcxit, solatia contra dolores dedit. Hxc fortes nos facit quod licet 
contra fortunam advocare. Hanc societatem tolle, et unitatem generis hu- 
niani, qua vita sus f inetur, scindes. Senec. de Benef. lib. 4. cap. 18. 



116 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

he extends his command over the sea. It is this same union , that 
supplies him with remedies in his diseases, assistance in his old age, 
and comfort in his pains and anxieties; it is this, that enables him, 
as it were, to bid defiance to fortune. Take away society and you 
destroy the union of mankind, on which the preservation and the 
whole happiness of life depends, 

2. Man by XIII. As society is so necessary to man, God has therefore 
his consti- . . , . 1 . . 

tution is given him a constitution, faculties, and talents, that render him 

veryfitfor ver y p r0 p e r for this state. Such is, for example, the faculty of 
speech, which enables us to convey our thoughts with facility 
and readiness, and would be of no manner of use out of society. 
The same may be said with regard to our propensity to imita- 
tion, and of that surprising mechanism, which renders all the 
passions and impressions of the soul so easy to be communicated- 
It is sufficient a man appears to be moved, in order to move and 
soften others.* If a person accosts us with joy painted on his 
countenance, he excites in us the like sentiment of joy. The 
tears of a stranger affect us, even before we know the cause 
thereof;! and the cries of a man related to us only by the com- 
mon tie of humanity, make us fly to-his succour by a mechanical 
movement previous to all deliberation. 

This is not all. We see that nature has thought proper to dis- 
tribute differently her talents among men, by giving to some an 
aptitude to perform certain things, which to others are impossi- 
ble; while the latter have received, in their turn, an industry de- 
nied to the former. Wherefore if the natural wants of men ren- 
der them dependant on one another, the diversity of talents, 
which qualifies them for mutual aid, connects and unites them. 
These are so many evident signs of man's being designed for so- 
ciety. 

3. Our na- XIV. But, if we consult our own inclinations, we shall like- 
tural incli- _ . . , „ , . . _ 

nations wise nn " * na * our hearts are naturally bent to wish for the corn- 
prompts p an y f our € q Ua i s a nd to dread an intire solitude, as an irksome 
us to look J 
out for and forlorn state. And though there have been instances of peo- 

society. pi e? wno have thrown themselves into a solitary life, yet we can- i 
not consider this in any other light, but as the effect of super- 

* Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto. Ter Heauton, 
f Ut ndentibis adrident, ita flentibus adsunt 
Huoiani vultus.. .....Hor. de arte poet. v. 151, 



NATURAL LAW. 117 

jstition, or melancholy, or of a singularity «xtremely remote from 
the state of nature. Were we to investigate the cause of this so- 
'cial inclination, we should findit is wisely bestowed on us by the 
! Author of our being; by reason that it is in society man finds a 
; remedy for the greatest part of his wants, and an occasion for ex- 
jercising most of his faculties; it is in society he is capable of 
feeling and displaying those sensations, on which nature has en- 
tailed so much satisfaction and pleasure; I mean the sensations 
of benevolence, friendship, compassion, and generosity. For such 
are the charms of social affections, that from them our purest 
enjoyments arise. Nothing in fact is so satisfactory and flatter- 
ing to man, as to think he merits the esteem and friendship of 
others. Seience acquires an additional value, when it can dis- 
play itself abroad; and our joy becomes more sensible, when we 
have an opportunity of testifying it in public, or of pouring it 
into the bosom of a friend. It is redoubled by being communica- 
ted; for our own satisfaction is increased by the agreeable idea 
we have of giving pleasure to our friends, and of fixing them 
more steadily in our interest. Anxiety, on the contrary, is alle- 
viated and softened by sharing it with our neighbour; just as a 
burden is eased, when a good natured person helps us to bear 
it. 

Thus every thing invites us to the state of society; want ren- 
ders it necessary to us, inclination makes it a pleasure, and the 
dispositions we naturally have for it, are a sufficient indication of 
its being really intended by our Creator. 

XV. But, as human society can neither subsist, nor produce Sociabili- 
the happy effects, for which God has established it, unless man- l v- Princi- 
kind have sentiments of affection and benevolence for one another; ura i i a w S " 
it follows that our Creator and common Father is willing, that re 'ative to 
every body should be animated with these sentiments, and do 
whatever lies in their power to maintain this society in an agree- 
able and advantageous state, and to tie the knot still closer by re- 
ciprocal services and benefits. 

This is the true principle of the duties, which the law of na- 
ture prescribes to us in respect to other men. Ethical writers 
have given it the name of Sociability, by which they understand 



H8 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

that disposition, which inclines us to benevolence to our fellow- k 
creatures, to do them all the good that lies in our power, to rec-. 
oncile our own happiness ^to that of others, and to render our ; 
particular advantage subordinate to the common and general 
good. 

The more we study our own nature, the more we are convin-,, 
ced, that this sociability is really agreeable to the will of God. 7 
For, beside the necessity of this principle, we find it engraved in ; 
our heart; where if the Creator has implanted on one side the? 
love of ourselves, the same hand has imprinted on the other a, 
sentiment of benevolence for our fellow-creatures. These two 
inclinations, though distinct from one another, have nothing op- 
posite in their nature; and God, who has bestowed them upon - 
us, designed they should act in concert, in order to help, and not; 
to destroy each other. Hence good natured and generous hearts jj 
feel a most sensible satisfaction in doing good to mankind, be- 
cause in this they follow the inclination, they received from 
nature. 
Natural XVI * From tne principle of sociability, as from their real : 

^Z\n source > all the laws of society, and all our general and particular 
whicbfiow , . r 

from soci- duties toward other men, are derived. 

ability. i. This union, which God has established among men, re- 

quires that, in every thing relating to society, the public good , 



i. The 



pUDUC 



good should be the supreme rule of their conduct, and that, guided 

wa|^tobe by the counseIs of Prudence, they should never pursue their pri- 
thesu- vate advantage to the prejudice of the public; for this is what 
?ulT e their state dema nds, and is consequently the will of their com- 
mon Father. 

2,Thespi- 2 - The ^"^it of sociability ought to be universal. Human 
abiUt f y 0Ci * SOdety embraces a11 th °se with whom we can have possibly any 
ought tobs communication; because it is founded. on the relations, they 
universal. ali bear to 0Qe anotherj in con sequence of their nature and 

state. 4 ' 
S. To ob- 3 ' Reason afterwards informs us, that creatures of the same 
serve ana- rank and species, born with the same faculties to live in society. 
equity. and to P artake of ths same advantages, have in general an equal 

* See Puffendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. iii. sect. 15. 



t 



NATURAL LAW. 31 9 

| and common right. We are therefore obliged to consider our- 
[i selves as naturally equal, and to behave as such; and it would be 

bidding defiance to nature not to acknowledge this principle of 
I equity (which by the civilians is called nqwbilitas juris) as one 

of the first foundations of society. It is on this the lex talionis is 

! founded, as also that simple but universal and useful rule, that 

| we ought to have the same dispositions in regard to other men, 

: as we desire they should have toward us, and to behave in the 

( same manner towards them, as we are willing they should be- 

j have to us in the like circumstances. 

4. Sociability being a reciprocal obligation among men, such, 4. To pre- 

I as through malice or injustice break the band of society, cannot serv( ~ abe - 
J J ' nevolence 

reasonably complain, if those, they have injured, do not treat even to- 

| them as friends, or even if they proceed against them by forcible ^emies^ 

methods. Self de- 

But, though we have a right to suspend the acts of benevo- p^mi" 

! lence in regard to an enemy, yet we are never allowed to stifle te d> re- 
its principle. As nothing but necessity can authorise u? to have nota 

, recourse to force against an unjust aggressor, so this same ne- 
cessity should be the rule and measure of the harm we do him; 
and we ought to be always disposed to reconcilement so soon, as 
he has done us justice, and we have nothing farther to appre- 
hend. 

We must therefore distinguish carefully between a just de- 
fence of one's own person, and revenge. The first does but sus- 
pend, through necessity and for a while, the exercise of benevo- 
lence, and has nothing in it opposite to sociability. But the other 
stifling the very principle of benevolence, introduces in its stead 
a sentiment of hatred and animosity, a sentiment vicious in itself, 
contrary to the public good, and expressly condemned by the 
law of nature. 



quences. 



XVII. These general rules are very fertile of consequences. Particular 
We should do no wrong to any one, either in word or action; conse- 

J 7 , niifinr.p 

and we ought to repair all damages by us committed; for society 
could not subsist, were acts of injustice tolerated. 

We ought to be sincere in our discourse, and steady in our 



** 



120 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

engagements; for what trust could mean repose in one another, 
and what security could they have in commercial life, were it 
lawful to violate their plighted faith ? 

We not only ought to do every man the good he properly de- 
serves, but moreover we should pay him the degree of esteem 
and honour, due to him, according to his estate and rank; because 
subordination is the link of society, without which there can be 
no order either in families, or in civil governments. 

But if the public good requires, that inferiors should obey, it 
demands also, that superiors should preserve the rights of those, 
who are subject to them, and should govern their people only in! 
order to render them happy. 

Again; men are captivated by the heart and by favours; 
now nothing is more agreeable to humanity, or more useful to ; 
society, than compassion, lenity, beneficence, and generosit}-. 
This is what induced Cicero to say,* there is nothing truer than 
that excellent maxim of Plato, viz. that we arc not bom for our- 
selves alone, but likewise for our country and friends; and if ac- { 
cording to the Stoics, the productions of the earth are for men, and 
men themselves for the good and assistance of one another; we ought[ 
certainly, in this respect, to comply with the design of nature, and 
promote her intention by contributing our share to the general inter- 
est, by mutually giving and receiving good turns, and employing all 
our care and industry, and even our substance, to strengthen that- 
love and friendship, which should alzvays prevail in human society. 

Since therefore the different sentiments and acts of justice 
and goodness are the only and true bonds, that knit men together, 
and are capable of contributing to the stability, peace, and 
prosperity of society; we must look upon those virtues, as so 
many duties, that God imposes on us, for this reason, because 
Whatever is necessary to his design is of course conformable to 
his will. 

* Sed quoniam (ut prsclare scriptum est a Platone) non nobis solutr 
n&ti sumus, ortusque nostri partem patria vintlicat, partem amici; atque 
(ut placet Stoicis) qu<e in terris giguntur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, 
homines autem hominum causa esse generates, ut ipsi inter se alii pro 
desse possent; in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, et communes utili- 
tates in medium afferre mutatione offieiorum, dando. accipiemlo; turn ar 
tibu?, turn opera, turn facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines so 
cietatem. Cic. de Offic. lib. i. cap. 7. 



NATURAL LAW. l|j 

XVHf. We have, therefore, three general principles of the Thess 
laws of nature relative to the abovementioned three states of cipleshave 
man. And these are, 1. Religion. 2. Self-love. 3. Sociability ail the re. 
or benevolence towards our fellow-creatures. Chirac*. 

These principles have all the characters above required. ters< 
They are true, because they are taken from the nature of man, 
in the constitution and state, in which God has placed him. They 
are simple and within every body's reach, which is an important 
point; because, in regard to duties, there is nothing wanting but 
principles, that are obvious to every one; for a subtlety of mind, 
that sets upon singular and new ways, is always dangerous. la, 
fine these principles are sufficient and yery fertile; by rsason they 
embrace all the objects of our duties, and acquaint us with the 
will of God in the several states and relations of man. 

XIX. True it is, that Puflendorf reduces the thing within a Rcr.wke 

' less compass, by establishing sociability alone, as the foundation S!Vf»o e!i? 
of all natural laws. But it has been justly observed, that this system, 
method is defective. For the principle of sociability does not 
furnish us with the proper and direct foundation of all our duties. 
Those which have God for their object, and those, which are re- 
lative to man himself, do not flow directly and immediately from 
this source, but have their proper and particular principle, l^et 
us suppose mnn in solitude; he would still have several duties to 
discbarge, such as to love and honour God, to preserve himself, 
to cultivate his faculties as much as possible, &c. I acknowledge, 
that the principle of sociability is the most extensive, and that 
ihe other two have a natural connection with it ; yet we ought 
not to confound them, as if they had not their own particular 
force, independent oi sociability. These are three different 
springs, which give motion and action to the system of humanity; 
springs distinct from one another, but which act all at tho same 
iimc pursuant to the views of the Creator. 

XX. Be it said nevertheless, in justification of Puffendorf, and The crit* 
according to a judicious observation made by Barbeyrac, that '[JjJ^J 8 
most of the criticisms on the former's system, 'as defective in its their can- 
principle, have been pushed too far. This illustrious restorer ot fapaJ?ainst 

he study of natural law declares, his design was properly no him in this 



122 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

more than to explain the natural duties of man.* - Now for this 
purpose, he had occasion only for the principle of sociability. 
According to him, our duty towards God form a part of natural 
theology; and religion is interwoven in a treatise of natural law, 
only as it is a firm support of society. With regard to the duties 
that concern man himself, he makes them depend partly on reli- 
gion, and partly on sociability.! Such is PuffendorPs system; 
he would certainly have made his work more perfect, if, embra- 
cing all the states of man, he had established distinctly the proper 
principles agreeable to each of those states, in order to deduce 
afterwards from them all our particular duties. For such is the 
just extent we ought to give to natural law. 

Of the XXI. This was so much the more necessary, as notwithstand- 

betwaea ln * om ^ ut ' es are re ^ at ' ve to different objects, and deduced from 
oat- natu- distinct principles, yet they have, as we already hinted, a natural 
cu s. connex i on . insomuch that they are interwoven, as it were, with 
one another, and by mutual assistance the observance of some 
renders the practice of others more easy and certain. It is cer- 
tain, for example, that the fear of God, joined to perfect submis- 
sion to his will, is a very efficacious motive to engage men to dis- 
charge what directly concerns themselves, and to do for their 
neighbour and for society whatever the law of nature requires. It 
is also certain, that the duties which relate to ourselves, contrib- 
ute not a little to direct us with respect to other men. For what 
good could society expect from a man, who would take no care 
to improve his reason, or to form his mind and heart to wisdom 
and virtue? On the contrary, what may we not promise our- 
selves from those, who spare no pains to perfect their faculties 
and talents, and are pushed on towards this noble end, either by 
the desire of rendering themselves happy, or by that of procur- 
ing the happiness of others ? Thus whosoever neglects his duty 
towards God, and deviates from the rules of virtue in what con- 
cerns himself, commits thereby an injustice in respect to other 



* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. i;i. § 19. Speciro. 
tontrover. eap, 5- $ 25. S,)icUegum controversiavum, cap. 1 \ 14. 
f See the Duties of Man and a Citizen, book i. chap, iii, $ 13. 



' NATURAL LAW. 123 

men, because he subtracts so much from the common happiness. 
On the contrary, a person, who is penetrated with such senti- 
ments of piety, justice, and benevolence, as religion and sociabil- 
ity require, endeavours to make himself happy; because, accord- 
ing to the plan of Providence, the personal felicity of every man 
is inseparably connected, on the one side with religion, and on 
the other with the general happiness of the society, of which he 
is a member; insomuch that to take a particular road to happi- 
ness is mistaking the thing, and rambling out of the way. Such is 
the admirable harmony, which the divine wisdom has established 
between the different parts of the human system. What could be 
wanting to complete the happiness of man, were he always atten- 
tive to such salutary directions ? 

XXII. But as the three grand principles of our duties are thus Of the op- 

connected, so there is likewise a natural subordination between that some- 

them, that helps to decide which of those duties ought to have times na P- 

pens be- 
the preference in particular circumstances or cases, when they lwCen 

have a kind of conflict or opposition, that does not permit us to thes£ ver .y 

„ ... duties. 

discharge them all alike. 

The general principle to judge rightly of this subordination is, 

•hat the stronger obligation ought always to prevail oveT the 

weaker. But to know afterwards which is the stronger obliga- 

tioo, we have only to attend to the very nature of our duties, and 

■Ueir different degrees of necessity and utility; for this is the 

right way to know in that case the will of God. Pursuant to 

»e ideas, are shall give here some general rules concerning the 

cases above mentioned. 

1. The duties of man towards God should always prevail over 
any other. For all obligations, that, which binds us to our all- 
wise and all-bountiful Creator, is without doubt the nearest and 

strongest. 

2. If what we owe to ourselves comes in competition with our 
doty to society in general, society ought to have the preference, 
Otherwise we should invert the order of things, destroy the 
foundations of society, and act directly contrary to the will of 
God, who by subordinating the part to the whole, has laid us 



ifci 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Natural 
law obli- 
gatory, 
and naiu- 
ral law 
of simple 
permis- 
sion. Gen- 
eral prin- 
ciple of 
the law of 
jpermis- 



tinder an indispensable obligation of never deviating from the su- 
preme law of the common good. 

3. But if, every thing else equal, there happens to be an oppo- : 
sition between the duties of self-love and sociability, self-love i 
ought to prevail. For, man being directly and primarily charged 
wth the care of his own preservation arid happiness, it follows 
therefore that, in a case of intire inequality, the care of our- 
selves ought to prevail over that of others. 

4. But if in fine the opposition is between duties relating to 
ourselves, or between two duties of sociability, we ought to pre- 
fer that, which is accompanied with the greatest utility, as being 
the most important.* 

XXIII. Whnt we have hitherto explained properly regards 
the natural law called obligatory, viz. that, which having for its 
object those actions, wherein we discover a necessary agreeable- 
riess or disagreeableness to the nature and state of man, l;iys us 
under an indispensable Obligation of acting or not acting after a 
particular manner. But, in consequence of what has been said 
above,! we must aknowledge that there is likewise a law of sim- 
ptk permission, which leaves us at liberty in particular cases to 
act or not, and, by laying other men under a necessity ot gifing 
US no let nor molestation, secures to us in this respect the exer- 
cise and effect of our liberty. 

The general principle of this law of permission is, that we 
may reasonably, and according uwe judge proper, do or omit 
whatever has net an absolute and essential agrees blenasa or dis- 
agreeableness to the nature and state of man; unless it be a thing 
expressly ordained or forbidden b\ some positive law, to which 
we are otherwise subject. 

The truth ot this principle is obvious. The Creator having 
invested man with several faculties, and, among the rest, with 
that of modifying his actions, as he thinks proper; it is plain that 
in every thing, in which he has not restrained the use of those 
faculties, either by an express command or a positive prohibi- 
tion, he leaves man at liberty to exercise thera according to his 

* See Barbeyrac's fifth note on sect. 15. of the third chapter, book ii 
©f the Law of Nature and Nations. 
i lee part h chap. 1. $ sect, 5 and 6. 



NATURAL LAW. 125 

tnvn discretion. It is on this law of permission all those rights 
•are founded, which are of such a nature, as to leave us at liberty 
to u^e them or not, to retain or renounce them in the whole or 
in part; and, in consequence of this renunciation, actions, in 
themselves permitted, happen sometimes to be commanded or 
forbidden by tlie authority of the Sovereign, and become obliga- 
tory by that means. 

XXIV. This is what right reason discovers in the nature and tvo spe- 

eon-titution of man, in his original and primitive state. But, as * ,es ° fna1> 

r ural law; 

man himself may make divers modifications in his primitive state, one primi- 
and enter into several adventitious ones; the consideration of JJJJ/g^ 
those new states fall likewise within the object of the law of ha- ondar>. 
lure, taken in its full extent; and the principles, we have laid 
down, ought to serve likewise for a rule in the states, in which 
! man engages h\ hie own ad and deed. 

Hence occasion baa been taken to distinguish two species of 
natural law; the one primary, the other secondary. 

The primary or primitive natural law is that which immedi- 
oiatel) arises from the primitive constitution of man, as God 
I himself ha? established it. independent of any human act. 

Secomlui \ natural law is that, which supposes some human act 
or establishment; as a civil state, property of goods, &c. 

It is . asy to comprehend, that this secondary natural law is 
only i nee of the former; or rather it is a just applica- 

il the general maxims of, natural law to the particular states 
of mankind, and to the different circumstances, in which they 
•ind thems* lve« by their own act; as it appears in fact, when we 
come to examine into particular duties. 

♦Some perhaps will be surprised, that in establishing the prin- 
ciples of natural law, we have taken no notice of the different 
opinions of writers concerning this subject. But we judged it 
more adviseable to point out the true sources, from which the 
principles were to be drawn, and to establish afterwards the 
principles themselves, than to enter into a discussion, which 
would have carried us too far fur a work of this nature. If we 
have hit upon the true one, this will be sufficient to enable us to 

* Set- Grotius, frights of War .ind Peace, book i. chap. i. fc 10. and Pu'f- 
fendorf. Law of Nature "irid Natrons* book ii. chap. iii. $ 52- 



126 THE PRINCIPLES OP 

judge of all the rest; and, if any one desires a more ample and 
more particular instruction, he may easily find it by consulting 
PufFendorf, who, relates the different opinions of civilians, and 
accompanies them with very judicious reflections.* 

CHAP. V. 

That Natural Laws have been sufficiently notified, of ther proper 
Characteristics, the Obligation they produce, <$»c. 

God has I. .XjLFTER what has been hitherto said in relation to the . 

r^otlfied Principles of natural law, and the way we come to know them, : 
the laws cf there is no need to ask, whether God has sufficiently notified 
man. re t0 tn0se ^ aws to man - ^ * s evident we can discover all their princi- 
ples, and deduce from them our several duties, by that natural 
light, which to no man has been ever refused. It is in this sense 
we are to understand what is commonly said, that this law is nat- 
urally known to all mankind. For, to think with some people, 
that the law of nature is innate, as it were, in our minds, and ac- 
tually imprinted in our souls from the first moment of our exis- 
tence, is supposing a thing, that is not at all necessary, and is 
moreover contradicted by experience. All, that can be said on 
this subject, is, that the most general and most important maxims 
of the law of nature are so clear and manifest, and have such a 
proportion to our ideas, ana such an agreeableness to our nature, 
that so soon, as they are proposed to us, we instantly approve of 
them; and as we are disposed and accustomed from our infancy 
to feel these truths, we consider them as born with us. 
Men'may H. But we must take care to observe, that when we say man > 

assist one ^ a y aC q mre fl ie knowledge of natural laws, by using his reason, 

anotner in * * ° J ° 

this res- we do not exclude the succours, he may receive elsewhere. Some 

pect ' there are, who, having taken a particular care to cultivate their 

minds, are qualified to enlighten others, and to supply, by their 

instructions, the rudeness and ignorance of the common run of 

mankind. This is agreeable to the plan of providence. God .- 

having designed man for society, nnd given him a constitution rela- 

* See PufFendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. iii. M, 1 4. 



NATURAL LAW. 327 

Uve to this end, the different helps, which men receive of one 
another, ought to he equally ranked among natural means, with 
those, which every one finds within himself, and draws from his 
own fund. 

In effect all men are not of themselves capable of unfolding 
methodically the principles of natural law, and the consequences 
thence resulting. It is sufficient, that middling capacities are 
able to comprehend at least those principles, when they are ex- 
plained to them, and to feel the truth and necessity of the duties 
that flow from them, by comparing them with the constitution of 
their own nature. But if there be some capacities of a still infe- 
rior order, they are generally led by the impressions of example, 
custom, authority, or some present and sensible utility. Be this 
as it will, every thing rightly considered, the law of nature is 
! sufficiently notified to empower us to affirm, that no man, at the 
age of discretion, and in his right senses, can allege for a just 
excuse an invincible ignorance on this article. 

III. Let us make a reflection, which presents itself here very _. 

1 J The marj- 

naturally. It is that whosoever attends seriously to the manner, ner, in 

in which we have established the principles of the laws of na- p^jjjjjjpj^ 
| ture, will soon find, that the method we have followed is a fresh ofthelawa 
! proof of the certainty and reality of those laws. We have waved have* been 
i all abstract and metaphysical speculations, in order to consult establish- 
plain fact, and the. nature and state of things. It is from the na- f res h proof 

! tural constitution of man, and from the relations, he has to other of the re- 
ality of 
beings, that we have taken our principles; and the system thence those 

resulting has so strict and so necessary a connexion with this * aws * 
nature and state of man, that they are absolutely inseparable. 
If to all this we join what has been already observed in the fore- 
going chapters, we cannot methinks mistake the laws of nature or 
doubt of their reality, without renouncing the purest light of 
reason, and running into Pyrrhonism. 

JY. But as the principles of the laws of nature are, through Natural 

the wisdom of the Creator, easy to discover, and as the knowl- * aws are 

the effect 
edge of the duties, they impose on us, is within the reach of the ofthedi- 

most ordinary capacities: it is also certain, that these laws are far Vine S°od- 

from being impracticable. On the contrary, they bear so m#ni- 



128 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

fest a proportion to the light of right reason, and to our most 
natural inclinations; they have also such a relation to our perfec- 
tion and happiness; that they cannot be considered otherwise, 
than as an effect of the divine goodness towards men. Since no 
other motive, but that of doing good, could ever induce a being, 
who is self-existent and supremely happy, to form creatures en- 
dowed with understanding and sense; it must have been in conse- 
quence of this same goodness, that he first vouchsafed to direct 
them by laws. His view was not merely to restrain their liberty, 
but he thought fit to let them know what agreed with them best, 
what was most proper for their perfection and happiness; and in 
order to add greater weight to the reasonable motives, that were 
to determine them, he joined thereto the authority of his com- 
mands.* 

This gives us to understand why the laws of nature are such as 
they are. It was necessary, pursuant to the views ot the Al- 
mighty, that the laws, he prescribed to mankind, should be suita- 
ble to their nature and state; that they should have a tendency ot 
themselves to procure the perfection and advantage of individu- 
als, as well as of the species; of particular people, as well as of 
the society. In short, the choice of the end determined the na- 
ture of the means. 
The laws V. In factv there are natural and necessary differences in hu- 
do not de- man ac * ,ons t an d in the effects, by them prqduced. Swae, i^rce 

pendonan of themselves with the nature and state of man, while other- 
arbitrary , 
Instttu- agree and are quite opposite thereto; some contribute to the pro- 

tion. duction and maintenance of order, others tend to subvert it. 

some procure the perfection and happiness of mankind, others 
are attended with their disgrace and misery. To refuse to ac- 
knowledge these differences would be shutting one's eyes to Um 
light, and confounding it with darkness. These are difference- 
of a most sensible nature; and, whatever a person ma\ l 
the contrary, sense and experience will always refute tho* 
and idle subtleties. 

Let us not therefore seek any where else, but in 
nature of human actions, in their essential diffie ren- 

* See part i. chap. s. sect. 3. 



NATURAL LAW. 129 



sequences, for the true foundation of the laws of nature, and why 
God forbids some things, while he commands others. These are 
not arbitrary laws, such as God might not have given, or have 
given others of a quite different nature. Supreme wisdom can, 
no more than supreme power, act any thing absurd and contra- 
dictory. It is the very nature of things, that always serves for 
the rule of his determinations. God was at liberty, without 
doubt, to create or not to create man j (o create him such as he 
to uive him a quite different nature. But, having deter- 
mined to form a rational and social being, he could not prescribe 
anv thing unsuitable to such a creature. We may even affirm, 
th;it tb< on, which makes the principles and rules of the 

, inl on tin- arbitrary will of God, tends to sub- 
Ibe very idea of natural law. For, if these 
laws were no* i aecessarj consequence of the nature, constitu- 
| man, it would be impossible for us to have a 
k, , u |, ,'_, oj il •- m, i x pt by a very clear revelation, or 
nil d promulgation on the part of God. But 
! it iff, that Lbe law of nature is, and ought to be, known by 
the mere light of reason. To conceive it therefore as depend- 
ing on in arbitrary will would be attempting to subvert it, or at 
dacing the thing to a kind of Pyrrhonism; by 
llM ,,„,. tt0 natural means of being sure, that God 
one thing rather than an other. Hence, if 
, ; nature depend originally on divine institution, as 
, to question j we must likewise agree, that this 
is not a mere arbitrary inatitotion, but founded, on one side, on 
ter€ aIK l constitutioo Of man ; and, on the other, on 
ft* wisdom Of God, who cannot desire an end, without desiring 
at the same tune the means that alone are fit to obtain it. 

\ I It is not ami- to observe here, that the manner, in which parens* 
iubhsh the foundation of the law of nature, does not differ ™ot^ 
i. the main from the principle, of Grotius. Perhaps this great jg^ 
m;m IIlUll have explained his thoughts a little better But we ofGroans, 
mwi 0Wfl) thai bis commentators, without excepting Puffendorf 
himself, have not rightly understood his meaning, and conse- 
\y have pasted a wrong censure on him, by pretending, that 



130 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

the manner, in which he established the foundation of the law of 
nature, is reduced to a vicious circle. If we ask, says PufTen- 
dorf,* which are those things, thai form the matter of natural laws ? 
The answer is, that they are those, which arc honest or dishonest of 
their own nature. If we inquire afterwards, what are those things, 
that are honest or dishonest of their own nature? There can be no 
other answer given, but that they are those, which form the matter 
of natural laws. This is what the critics put into the mouth of 
Grotius. 

But let us see whether Grotius says really any such thing. 
The law of nature, says he,t consists in certain principles of right 
reason, which inform us, that an action is morally honest or dishon- 
est, according to the necessary agreeablencss or disagreeable* 
has zvith a rational and social nature ; and consequently that God, 
who is the author of nature, commands or forbids such aaio7is. 
Here I can see no circle ; for putting the question whence comes 
the natural honesty or turpitude of commanded or forbidden ac- 
tions ? Grotius does not answer in the manner, they m;iko him ; 
on the. contrary, he says that this honesty or turpitude proceeds 
from the necessary agreeableness or disagreeableness of our ac- 
tions with a rational and social nature. J 
The effect VII. After having seen, that the laws of nature nre practicable 
of Satire 8 of themselves, evidently useful, highly conformable to the r 
is an obli- which right reason give us of God, suitable to the nature and ftfate 
Jonfoira. of man > P erfe< % agreeable to order, and in fine sufficiently noli- 
iRg there, tied ; there is no longer room to question, that law i with 

to our con- „ . , . ,, ... 

duct. a " these characteristics, are obligatory, and lay men under an in- 

dispensable obligation of conforming their conduct to them. It is 
even certain, that the obligation, which God imposes on us b\ this 
mean, is the strongest of all, by reason of its bein^ product 
the concurrence and union of the strongest motives, such as are 
.most proper to determine the will. In fact the counsels and max- 
ims of reason oblige us, not only because they are in themselves 
very agreeable, and founded on the nature and immutable re.a- 

* See PuffeuJoif, Law of Nature ar.d Nations, book ii.cli iii | 4 
Apol. £ 19. 

| See Grotius. R -hts of War ai\d Peace, br.ok i. chap, i § 10 

* See Barbty.-ac^ tiftii note on the Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. 
chap, in, sec 4, 



NATURAL LAW. 131 

lions of things ; but moreover by the authority of the supreme 
Being, who intervenes here, by giving us clearly to understand, 
he is willing we should observe them, because of his being the 
author of this nature of things, and of the mutual relation they 
have among themselves. In fine the law of nature binds us by 
an internal and external obligation at the same time; which pro- 
duces the highest degree of moral necessity, and reduces liberty 
to the very strongest subjection, without destroying it.* 

Thus the obedience, due to natural law, is a sincere obedience, 
and such a< ought to arise from a conscientious principle. The 
first effei t of those laws is to direct the sentiments of our minds, 
and tli I the heart. We should not discharge what they 

require ot us, were we externally to abstain from what they con- 
demn, but with regret and agaiost our "ill. And as it is not al- 
le to desire what ire are not permitted to enjoy ; so it is 
not only I what we arc commanded, but 

lik< wise I i give it out approbation, and to acknowledge its utility 
and jui 

\ 111. Another essential characteristic of the laws of nature Natural 

i-, that tl ' i sal, that is, they should oblige all men with- ,HWS are 

obligatory 

• "it ezi eption. 1 or mi a are Dot only equally subject to God's in resp-ct 

command, bat moreover ; nature having their founda- toal,men • 

: and -tate of man, and being notified to him 

it i- plaio in essentia] agreeableness to all 

mankind, and oblige them without distinction ; whatever dufer.- 

maj be bel mi in fact, and in whatever state 

i 1. Tin- i< what distinguishes natural from pos- 

. I isitivi law relates only to particular persons or 

1\. It is true that Grotiua»t and after him several divines and GrotiuV 

civilian! oretend Jtbat there nre divine, positive, and universal opinion 
1 wtih re- 

1 iws, which oblige all nv n, from the very moment they are made gardtodi- 

,. ntlj known to them. But, in the first place, were there J^'^ 1- 

| rs, ai they could not be discovered by the sole light universal 

ison, they must have been very clearly manifested to all ,aw * 

ind ; a thing, which cannot be fully proved ; and if it should 

vi. sect. 13. 
Kig'.fU ot War and Peace, book i. chap. i. \ 15. with Barbeyr*c's 
noies. 



132 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Natural 
laws are 
immuta- 
ble, and! 
admit of 
no dispen- 
sation. 



Ofthee- 
ternity of 
natural 
laws. 



be said, that they oblige only those, to whom they are made 
known ; this destroys the idea of universality, attributed to them 
by supposing that those laws were made for all men. Secondly 
the divine, positive, and universal laws, ought to be moreover of 
themselves beneficial to all mankind, at all times, and in all places ; 
and this the wisdom and goodness of God require. But for this 
purpose these laws should have been founded on the constitution 
of human nature in general, and then they would be true natural 
laws.* 

X. We have already observed, that the laws of nature, though 
established by the divine will, are not the effect of an arbitrary 
disposition, but have their foundation in the very nature and mu- 
tual relations of things. Hence it follows, that natural laws are 
immutable, and admit of no dispensation. This i- also a proper 
characteristic of these laws, which distinguishes them from all 
positive laws, whether divine or human. 

This immutability of the laws of nature has nothing in it repug- 
nant to the independence, supreme power, or liberty of an all 
perfect Being. Since he himself i- the author of our constitution, 
he cannot but prescribe or prohibit such things, a- have a neces- 
sary agreeableness or disagreeablenes, to thi* very constitution ; 
and consequently he cannot make any change, or <j;ive any dispen- 
sation in regard to the laws of nature.! It i- r glorious necessity 
in him not to contradict himself; it is a kind of impotence falsely 
so called, which, far from limiting or diminishing bis perfection?, 
adds to their external character, and points out all their excel- 
lency. 

XI. Considering the thing, as lias been now explained, we I 
say, if we will, that the laws of nature are eternal ; though, to tell 
the truth, this expression is very incorrect o( itself*, ami more 
adapted to throw obscurity, than clearness upon our ideas. Those, 
who first took notice of the eternity of the laws of nature, did it 
very probably out of opposition to the novelty and frequent mu- 
tations of civil laws. They meant only, that the law of nature is 
antecedent, for example, to the laws of Moses, of Solon, or of any 

• See Barbeyrac's sixth note on PufTendori's Law of Xaiure and Na- 
tions, book i. chap. xi. J 18. 

f Puftendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, book ii- chap, iii, sect. 6. and 
Giotius, Rights of War and Peace, book i. chap. i. 10. 



NATURAL LAW. 133 

other legislator, in that it is coeval with mankind ; and so far 
they were in the right. But to affirm, as a great many divines 
and moralists have done, that the law of nature is co-eternal with 
God, i< advancing a proposition, which reduced to its just value 
is not exactly true: by reason that, the law of nature being made 
for man, its actual existence supposeth that of mankind.— 
But if we are only to understand hereby, that God had the ideas 
thereof from all eternity, then we attribute nothing to the laws of 
nature but what is equally common to every thing, that exists.* 

We cannot finish this article better than with a beautiful pas- 
sage of Cicero, preserved by Lactantius.f Right reason, says 
flbifl j.hilosopher, is indeed a true law, ugrecable to nature, com- 
mon to all men, constant, immutable, aernal. It prompts men to 
their duty by its commands, and deters them from evil by its prohi- 
allowed to retrench any part of this law, nor to 
make any alterationt therein, much less to abolish it entirely. Neither 
the senate nor people can dispense with it; nor does it require any 

retation, being clear of itself and intelligible. It is the same 
at Home and Athens; the same today and tomorrow. It is the 
same eternal and invariable law, given at all times end places, to 
all nations ; because God, who is the author thereof, and has pub- 
lished it him 'i/s the sole master and sovereign of man- 
kind. Whosoever violates this law renounces his own nature, di- 
vests himself of humanity, and will be rigorously chastised for his 

Hence, though he were to escape what is commonly distin- 
guished by the no, ni- of punishm 

The immutability of the laws of nature is acknowledge! by all those, 
who r ason with anv exactness. St.e Inttit. l.b. 1. tit. 2, seel, 11. Roodt. 
Probahil. Juris, lib. "2 cap. 11. 

f Eat quidem vera lev r. eta ratio, na»u r ac congruen3, diffusa in omne^, 
■Platans, semp'.terna; quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude 
teterrea'; quae t amen nape probx>9 frustra j.ibet, autvetati nee impr<y. 
bos jubendo ant vetando movct. Huic lepi nee obrogari fas est, neque 
derogari ex hue aliquid lice'; neque t..ta abrogan potest. Necv>roaut 
per senaturr, ant per popul-un aolvi hac lejre possurmis; heque est quac- 
rendus explanator aut interprea ejus al us. Xec erit alia Kx Rorr.x, alia 
Athenis, alia nunc, alia p >a Inc.; sed omnes Rentes, et omni tempore, una 
lex et sempitema et i.nmuUbilis eontinebit; unusque erit communis quasi 
magister et imperator omnium Deus. Ille legia nujua inventor, discepta- 
tor, lutor; cui cjui roi parebit ipse se fugiet, ac naturam h- minis asper- 
nabitur; atque hoc ipso luet maximal pee. -as, etiamsi ex era suppUcia 
quae putaniur. effugerit. Cicero de R publ. lib. apud Laciant Instit. Di- 
vin. lib. 6. cap. 8. 



134 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

But let this suffice in regard to the law of nature considered,, 
as a rule to individuals. In order to embrace the entire system, 
of man, and to unfold our principles in their full extent, it is ne- 
cessary we say something likewise concerning the rules, which 
nations ought to observe between each other, and are commonly, 
called the law of nations* 

CHAP. VI, 



Aa 



Of the Law of Nations. 



How civil I. jfm_MONG the various establishments of man, the most 

societies 

are form- considerable without doubt is that of civil society, or the body. 

politic, which is justly esteemed the most perfect of societies, 
and has obtained the name of State by way of preference. 

Human society is simply of itself, and with regard to those, 
who compose it, a state of equality and independence. It is sub- j 
ject to God alone ; no one has a natural and primitive right to 
command ; but each person may dispose of himself, and of what \ 
he possesses, as he thinks proper, with this only restriction, that r 
he keep within the bounds of the law of nature, and do no preju- | 
dice or injury to any man. 

The civil state makes a great alteration in this primitive one. 
The establishing a sovereignty subverts this independence, 
wherein men were originally with regard to one another; and 
subordination is substituted in its stead. The sovereign becom- 
ing the depository as it were of the will and strength of each in- 
tlividual, which are united in his person, all the other membeis j 
of the society become subjects, and find themselves under an ob- 
ligation of obeying and conducting themselves pursuant to the 
laws, imposed upon them by the sovereign. 
The civil II. But how great soever the change mny be, which govern- 
notdes- S men * an ^ sovereignty make in the state of nature, 3'et we must 
troy, but not imagine, that the civil state properly subverts all natural so- 
ihe state cie ty> or tna *- it destroys the essential relations, which men have 
to nature, among themselves, or those between God and man. This would 
be neither physically nor morally possible ; on the contrary, 
the civil state supposes the nature of man such, as the Creator 



NATURAL LAW. 135 

j has formed it ; it supposes the primitive state of union and socie- 
ty, with all the relations this state includes ; it supposes in fine 
| the natural dependence of man with regard to God and his laws. 
•Government is so far from subverting this first order, that it has 
been rather established with a view to give it a new degree of 
force and consistency. It was intended to enable us the better 
to discharge the duties, prescribed by natural laws, and to attain 
more certainly the end, for which we were created. 

III. In order to form a just idea of civil society, we must say, True ide- 
jthat it is no more than natural society itself modified in such a man- sJ c ° et y 
jner, as to have a sovereign, that commands, and on whose will 

whatever concerns the happiness of society ultimately depends $ 
to the enu that, under his protection and through his care, man- 
kind may surely attain the felicity, to which they naturally as- 
pire. 

IV. All societies are formed by the concurrence or union of States are 
r 1 lL c ■ • j consider- 

'the wills of several persons, with a view 01 acquiring some ad- e d under 

; vantage. Hence it is that societies are considered as bodies, and the notion 

> ° or moral 

receive the appellation of moral persons ; by reason that those peisons. 

bodies are in effect animated with one sole will, which regulates 
all their movements. This agrees particularly with the body pol- 
itic or state. The sovereign is the chief or head, and the subjects 
the members ; all their actions, that have any relation to society, 
are directed by the will of the chief. Hence, so soon as states 
are formed, they acquire a kind of personal properties ; and we 
may consequently, with due proportion, attribute to them whatev- 
er agrees in particular with man ; such as certain actions and 
rights, that properly belong to them, certain duties, they are 
obliged to fulfil, &c. 

V. This being; supposed, the establishment of states introdu- What is 

r . the law of 

,ces a kind of society amongst them, similar to that, which is natu- nal i ons . 

rally between men ; and the same reasons, which induce men to 
maintain union among themselves, ought likewise to engage na- 
j lions or their sovereigns to keep up a good understanding with 
one another. 

It is necessary therefore there should be some law among na- 
tions, to serve as a rule for mutual commerce. Now this law 



136 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

can be nothing else but the law of nature itself, which is then 
distinguished by the name of the law of nations. Natural law, 
Bays Hobbes very justly,* is divided into the natural law of man, 
and the natural law of states; and the latter is what we call law 
of nations. Thus natural law and the law of nations are in real- 
ity one and the same thing, and differ only by an external denom- 
ination. We must therefore say, that the law of nations, prop- 
erly so called, and considered as a law proceeding from a superi- 
or, is nothing else but the law of nature itself, not applied to 
men, considered simply as such, but to nations, states, or their 
chiefs, in the relations they have together, and the several inter- 
ests they have to manage between each other. 
Certainty yi. There is no room to question the reality and certainty of 

t't this * J J 

law. such a law of nations obligatory of its own nature, and to which 

nations, or the sovereigns, that rule them, ought to submit. For 
if God, by means of right reason, imposes certain duties between 
individuals, it is evident he is likewise willing that nation?, which 
are only human societies, should observe the same duties be- 
tween themselves.f 

General VII. But in order to say something more particular concern- 

principle ..... , , , , r ■ 

of the law ,n g this subject, let us observe, that the natural state of nations, 

of nations; j n respec t to each other, is that of society and peace. This so- 

what poh- r 

ty, consists ciety is likewise a state of equality and independence, which es- 

in * tabiishes a parity of right between them ; and engages them to 

have the same regard and respect for one another. Hence the 
general principle of the law of nations is nothing more, than the 
general law of sociability, which obliges all nations, that have any 
intercourse with one another, to practise those duties, to which 
individuals are naturally subject. 

These remarks may serve to give us a just idea of that art, 
so necessary to the directors of states, and distinguished com- 
monly by the name of PoLty. Polity, considered with regard to 
foreign states, is that ability and address, by which a sovereign 
provides for the preservation, safety, prosperity, and glory of 
the nation he governs, by respecting the laws of justice an< 
humanity ; that is, without doing any injury to other states., 

* De Cive, cap. 14. sec. 4 
| See ohap. v. sec. 8. 



NATURAL LAW. 137 

but rather by procuring their advantage, so much as in reason 
can be expected. Thus the polity of sovereigns is the same, as 
prudence among private people ; and, as we condemn in the 
latter any art or cunning, that makes them pursue their own ad- 
vantage to the prejudice of others, so the like art would be cen- 
surable in princes, were they bent upon procuring the advantage 
of their own people by injuring other nations. The Reason of 
state, so often alledged to justify the proceedings or enterprises of 
princes, cannot really be admitted for this end, but inasmuch as 
it is reconcileable with the common interest of nations, or, which 
amounts to the same thing, with the unalterable rules of sinceri- 
ty, justice, and humanity. 

If III. Grotius indeed acknowledges, that the law of nature is Inqtitryln* 

common to all nations ; yet he establishes a positive law of na- t0 G . T0 ~ 
. J r tius's o- 

tions contradistinct from the law of nature; and reduces this law pinion 

ofnationstoa sort of human law, which has acquired a power ? on °® rn " 

of obliging in consequence of the will and consent of all or of a law of na- 

great many nations.* lie adds, that the maxims of this law of 

nations are proved by the perpetual practice of people, and the 

testimony of historians. 

Bat it has been justly observed that this pretended law of na- 
tions, contradistinct from the law of nature, and invested never- 
theless with a force of obliging, whether the people consent to 
it or not, is a supposition destitute of all foundation.! 

For 1. All nations are with regard to one another in a natural 
independence and equality. If there be therefore any common 
law between them, it must proceed from God their common 
sovereign. 

2. As for what relates to customs, established by an express or 
tacit consent among nations, these customs, are neither of them- 
selves, nor universally, nor always obligatory. For, from this 
only, that several nations have acted towards one another fpr a 
long time after a particular manner in particular cases, it does not 
follow, that they have laid themselves under a necessity of acting 

* See Grotius, Rights of War and Peace; preliminary discourse, § 18, 
and book i. chap. i. § 14. 

-j- See Pulfendort law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. Hi. f 23, 
with Barbeyrack's notes. 



138 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

always in the same manner for the time to come, and much less. 
that other nations are obliged to conform to those customs. 

3. Again, those customs are so much less capable of being an 
obligatory rule of themselves, as they may happen to be bad or 
unjust. The profession of a corsair or pirate was, by a kind of 
consent, esteemed a long while lawful between nations, that were 
not united by alliance or treaty. It seems likewise, that some 
nations allowed themselves the use of poisoned arms in time of 
Avar.* Shall we say, that these were customs authorised by the 
law of nations, and really obligatory in respect to different peo- 
ple ? Or shall we not rather consider them as barbarous prac- 
tices ; from which every just and well-governed nation ought to 
Tefrain ? We cannot therefore avoid appealing always to the law 
of nature, the only one, that is really universal, whenever we 
want to judge whether the customs established between nations, 
have any obligatory effect. 

4. All that can be said on this subject is, that when customs 
of an innocent nature are introduced among nations, each of them 
is reasonably supposed to submit to those customs, so long as 
they have not made any declaration to the contrary. This is 
all the force or effect, that can be given to received customs ; 
but a very different effect from that of a law properly so called. 

Tvvo sorts |x. These remarks give us room to conclude, that the whole 

nations; might perhaps be reconciled, by distinguishing two species of 

on ^ : ° t ^ ne ' laws of nations. There is certainly an universal, necessary, and 

andoblig-;- self- obligatory law of nations, which differs in nothing from the 

self the 11 law °^ nature > and * s consequently immutable, insomuch that 

other ar- the people or sovereigns cannot dispense with it, even by com- 
b trcfv 

and con mon consent, without transgressing their duty. There is besides 

vtntional. another law of nations, which we may call arbitrary and free, 
as founded only on an express or tacit convention ; the effect of 
which is not of itself universal ; being obligatory only in regard 
to those, who have voluntarily submitted thereto, and only so 
long, as they please, because they are always at liberty to 
change or repeal it. To this we must likewise add, that the 

^ * Pee Virgil, M ,eid, book x. ver, 139, with the 15th note of the Abbes 
des Fontaines. 



NATURAL LAW. 139 

whole force of this sort of law of nations ultimately depends on. 
the law of nature, which commands us to be true to our engage- 
ments. Whatever really belongs to the law of nations may be 
reduced to one or other of these two species ; and the use of this 
distinction will easily appear by applying it to particular ques- 
tions, which relate either to war, for example, to ambassadors, or 
to public treaties, and to the deciding of disputes, which some- 
times arise concerning these matters between sovereigns.* 

X. It is a point of importance to attend to the origin and na- Use of the 
ture of the law of nations, such as we have now explained them, foregoing 
For, besides that it is always advantageous to form just ideas of 
things, this is still more necessary in matters of practice and mo- 
rality. It is owing perhaps to our distinguishing the law of na- 
tions from natural law, that we have insensibly accustomed our- 
selves to form quite a different judgment between the actions of 
sovereigns and those of private people. Nothing is more usual 
than to see men condemned in common for things, which we 
praise, or at least excuse in the perous of princes. And yet it is 
certain, as we have already shown, that the maxims of the law of 
nations have an equal authority with those of the law of nature, 
and are equally respectable and sacred, because they have God 

* Let us remark here by the way, that the ideas of the ancient Roman 
lawyers, concerning- the law of nations, aye not always uniform;, which 
creates some confusion. Some there are, who understand by the law of 
nations those ruies of right, that are common to all men, and estabhsn- 
ed amongst themselves puisuant to the light of reason; in opposition to 
the particular laws of each people. (See the 9th law in the Digest, de Jus- 
titia and J arc, book i- tit. 1.) And then the law of Nations signified also 
the law of Nature. Q.hers distinguished between these two species, as 
ffipian has done in lav I. of the title now mentioned. They gave the 
name ot law of nations to that, which agrees w r ith man as such; in oppo- 
sition to that which suits him as an animal. (See PufFendorf, Law of 
Nature and Nations, book ii. chup. 3. \ 3. note 10.) Some, in fine, com- 
prised the one and the other under the idea of natural law. (See law XL 
Digest de Jusiitia and Jure.) And hence it comes, that the belter sort of 
La in wricers give indifferently the name of natural law, or the law of na- 
tions, to that which relates toeither. This we find in the following pas- 
sage of Cicero, where he says, that by the law of nature, that is, by the 
law of nations one man is not allowed to pursue his advantage at the ex- 
pense of another. Neqtte vero hoc solum natura, id est, jori: gsN ri- 
vw. .;onstitutum est, u\ non liceat sui com modi causa, aiteri n< .cere. 

De Offic. lib. 3. cap. 5 See Mr. Noodt's commentary on the Digest book 
i. tit. 1. where this able lawyer explains very well the ambiguity of the 
distinction of natural law, and the law of nations, according to the Af- 
ferent language of ancient civilians. 



140 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

aKke for their author. In short, there is only one sole and the 
same rule of justice for all mankind. Princes, who infringe the 
law of nations, commit as great a crime as private people, who 
violate the law of nature ; and, if there be any difference in the 
two cases, it must be charged to the prince's account * whose 
unjust actions are always attended with more dreadful consequen- 
ces, than those of private people.! 

CHAP. VII. 

Whether there be any Morality of Actions, any Obligation or Duty, 
antecedent to the Laws of Nature, and independent to the 
Idea of a Legislator ? 



Different I. J$_ HE morality of human actions being founded in gen- 

of ethic era ^ on tne relations of agreeableness or disagreeableness be- 

wrirers tween those actions and the law, according as we have shewn in 

pecttothe * ne eleventh chapter of the first part; there is no difficulty, 

first prin- w h en once we acknowledge the laws of nature, to affirm, that the 

eiple of 

morality, morality of actions depends on their conformity or opposition to 

those very laws. This is a point, on which all civilians and 
ethic writers are agreed. But they are not so unanimous in re- 
gard to the first principle, or original cause of obligation and mo- 
rality. 

A great many are of opinion, that there is no other principle 
of morality, but the divine will manifested by the laws of nature. 
The idea of morality, they say, necessarily includes that of obli- 
gation ; obligation supposes law ; and law, a legislator. It there- 
fore we abstract from all law, and consequently from a legislator, 

* See part i. chap. xi. § 12. 

f It is Monsieur Bernard, that furnishes us with these reflections. If 
a private person, says he, offends without cause a person of the sam • sta- 
tion, his actio 1 is termed an injustice; but if a prince attacks another 
prince without cause, if he invades ins territories, and ravages his towns 
and provinces, this is called waging war, and it would be temerity to 
think it unjust To break or violate contracts or agreements is esteem- 
ed a crime among private pe >ple ; bu*, among princes, to infringe the 
most solemn treaties is prudence, is understanding the art of government. 
True it is, that some pretest is always sought for, but those, who trump 
wp these pretexts, give themselves very little trouble whether they are 

thought just or not, &c. JVouvelks, de la repubUque des lettres JMars'170-i 

i'age340,3U, 



NATURAL LAW. Hl 

we shall have no sach thing as right, obligation, duty, or moral- 
ity, properly so called.* 

Others there are, who acknowledge indeed, that the divine will 
is really a principle of obligation, and consequently a principle 
i of the morality of human actions; but they do not stop here. — 
: They pretend, that antecedent to all law, and independent of a v 

! legislator, there are things, which of themselves, and by their 
i own nature, are honest or dishonest ; that, reason having once 
! discovered this essential and specific difference of human actions, 
! it imposes on man a necessity of performing the one and omitting 
' the other ; and that this is the first foundation of obligation, or 
the original source of morality and duty. 

II. What we have already said concerning the primitive rule Principles 
of human actions, and the nature and origin of obligation,! may t \^ s ques- 
help to throw some light on the present question. But in order tlon - 
1 to illustrate it better, let us turn back and resume the thing from 
J 1 its first principles, by endeavouring to assemble here, in a na- 
tural order, the principal ideas, that may lead us to a just conclu- 
', sion. 

1. 1 observe in the first place, that every action, considered 
j purely and simply in itself, as a natural motion of the mind or 
! body, is absolutely indifferent, and cannot in this respect claim 

I any share of morality. 

This is what evidently appears ; for as much as the same natu- 
, rol action is esteemed sometimes lawful and even good, and at 
J other times unlawful or bad. To kill a man, for instance, is a 
j bad action in a robber ; but it is lawful or good in an executioner, 

I I or in a citizen or soldier, who defends his life or country, unjustly 
attacked ; a plain demonstration, that this action considered in it- 

I self, and as a simple operation of the natural faculties, is abso- 
■ lutely indifferent, and destitute of all morality. 

2. We must take care to distinguish here between the physi- 
I cal and moral consideration. There is undoubtedly a kind of 
1 natural goodness or malignity in actions, which, by their own 

I proper and internal virtue, are beneficial or hurtful ; and pro- 
| duce the physical good or evil of man. But this relation be- 

* See Puflendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, book i. ch»P- i' 1 § 6 - 
t See part i. chap. v. and vi. ■ 



H2 



c 



Three 
rules of 
human ac- 
tions. 

1. Moral 
sense. 

2. Reason. 

3. The di- 
vine will. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

tween the action and its effect is only physical ; and, if we stop 
here, we are not yet arrived at morality. It is pity we are fre- i 
quently obliged to use the same expressions for the physical and 
moral ideas, which is apt to create some confusion. It were to 
be wished, that languages had a greater exactness in distinguish- ^ 
ing the nature and different relations of things by different 
names. 

3. If we proceed further, and suppose that there is some rule 
of human actions, and compare afterwards these actions with the 
rule ; the relation, resulting from this comparison, is what pro- 
perly and essentially constitutes morality.* 

4. Thence it follows, that, in order to know which is the prin- 
cipal or efficient cause of the morality of human actions, we must 
previously be acquainted with this rule. 

5. Finally let us add, that this rule of human actions may in 
general be of two sorts, either internal or external ; that is, it 
may either be found in man himself, or it must be sought for 
somewhere else. Let us now make an application of these prin- 
ciples. 

III. We have already seen t that man finds within himself sev- 
eral principles to discern good from evil, and that these princi- 
ples are so many rules of his conduct. The first directive prin- 
ciple, we find within ourselves, is a kind of instinct, commonly 
called moral sense; which, pointing out readily, though confu- [' 
sedly and without reflection, the most sensible and most striking 
part of I he difference between good and evil, makes us love the 
one, and give us an aversion for the other, by a kind of natural, 
sentiment. 

The second principle is reason, or the reflection we make on 
the nature, relations, and consequences of things; which gives us a 
more distinct knowledge, by principles and rules, of the distinc- 2 
tion between good and evil in all possible cases. 

But to these two internal principles we must join a third, 
namely the divine will. For man being the handy work of God, 
and deriving from the Creator his existence, his reason, and all 
his faculties ; he finds himself thereby in an absolute depen- 

* flee part i. chap, xi. § 1. 

f Part i. chap, v. & part ii. chap, iiS. 



NATURAL LAW. 143 

xlence on that supreme being, and cannot help acknowledging him 
I as his lord and sovereign. Therefore, as soon as he is acquain- 
ted with the intention of God in regard to his creature, this will 
(!of his master becomes his supreme rule, and ought absolutely to 

determine his conduct. 

IV. Let us not separate these three principles. They are These ^ 

(indeed distinct from one another, and have each their particular c jp| e s 

force : but in the actual state of man they are necessarily united. ° u £ ht to 

. , , be united. 

It is sense, that gives us the first notice ; our reason adds more 

jlight ; and the will of God, who is rectitude itself, gives it a new 
degree of certaint)' ; adding withal the weight of his authority. 
It is on all these foundations united, we ought to raise the edifice 
of natural law, or the system of morality. 

Hence it follows, that, man being a creature of God, formed 
with design and wisdom, and endowed with sense and reason ; 
the rule of human actions, or the true foundation of morality, is 
properly the will of the supreme being, manifested and interpre- 
ted either by moral sense or by reason. These two natural 
means, by teaching us to distinguish the relation, which human 
actions have to our constitution, or, which is the same thing, to 
the ends of the Creator, inform us what is morally good or evil, 
honest, or dishonest, commanded or forbidden. 

V. It is already a great matter to feel and to know good and Of the 

evil ; but this is not enough ; we must likewise join to this sense P rimitive 
k 1 1 j .... .. - . . cause of 

and knowledge an obligation of doing the one, and abstaining from obliga- 

the other. It is this obligation, that constitutes duty, without lion * 
jwhich there would be no moral practice, but the whole would 
(terminate in mere speculation. But which is the cause and prin- 
ciple of obligation and duty ? Is it the very nature of things, dis- 
covered by reason ? Oris it the divine will ? This is what we 
must endeavor here to determine. 

VI. The first reflection, that occurs to us here, and to which All rules 
'very few methinks are sufficiently attentive, is, that every rule a . re ot 

j whatsoever of human actions carries with it a moral necessity of selves ob- 
S conforming thereto, and produces consequently a sort of obliga- "£ ator y- 
;tion. Let us illustrate this remark. 

The general notion of rule is the idea of a sure and expeditious 
I method of gaining a particular end. Every rule supposes there- 



144 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

fore a design, or the will of attaining to a certain end, as the ef- 
fect we want to produce, or the object we intend to procure. 
And it is perfectly evident, that, were a person to act merely 
for the sake of acting, without any particular design or determin- 
ate end ; he ought not to trouble his head about directing his ac- 
tions one way more than another ; he should never mind either 
counsel or rule. This being premised, I affirm, that every man, 
who proposes to himself a particular end, and knows the means 
or rule, which alone can conduct him to it, and put him in pos- 
session of what he desires, finds himself under a necessity of fol- 
lowing this rule, and conforming his actions to it. Otherwise he 
would contradict himself; he would and he would not ; he would 
desire the end, and neglect the only means, which, by his own 
confession, are able to conduct him to it. Hence I conclude, 
that every rule, acknowledged as such, that is, as a sure and only 
mean of attaining to the end proposed, carries with it a sort of 
obligation of being thereby directed. For, so soon as there is a 
reasonable necessity to prefer one manner of acting to another, 
every reasonable man, who intends to behave as such, finds him- 
self thereby engaged and tied as it were to this manner, being 
hindered by his reason from acting otherwise. That is, in other 
terms, he is really obliged ; because obligation, in its original 
idea, is nothing more than a restriction of liberty produced by 
reason, inasmuch as the counsels, which reason gives us, are 
motives, that determine us to a particular manner of actiDg, pre- 
ferable to any other. It is therefore true, that all rules are obli- 
gatory. 
Obligation VII. This obligation indeed may be more or less strong, more 

"J ay e or less strict, according as the reasons, on which it is founded, 
more or ° 

less are more or less numerous, and have more or less power and ef- 

*** ficacy of themselves to determine the will. 

If a particular manner of acting appears to me evidently fitter 
than any other for my preservation aud perfection, fitter to pro 
cure my bodily health and the welfare of my soul ; this motiv( 
alone obliges me to act in conformity to it. And thus we have 
the first degree of obligation. If I find afterwards, that, beside; 
the advantage now mentioned, such a conduct will secure the 
respect and approbation of those, with whom 1 converse : this 



NATURAL LAW. 145 

is a new motive, which strengthens the preceding obligation, and 
adds still more to my engagement. But if, by pushing my reflec- 
tions still farther, I find at length, that this manner of acting is 
perfectly agreeable to the intention of my Creator, who is willing 
and intends I should follow the counsels, which reason gives me, 
as so many real laws he prescribes to me himself; it is visible, 
that this new consideration strengthens my engagements, ties the 
knot still faster, and lays me under an indispensable necessity of 
acting after such or such a manner. For what is there more 
proper to determine finally a rational being, than the assurance 
he has of procuring the approbation and benevolence of his su- 
perior, by acting in conformity to bis will and orders ; and of es- 
caping his indignation, which must infallibly pursue a rebellious 
creature. 

VIII. Let us follow now the thread of the consequences arising Reason %> 
from these principles. loneissuf- 

If it be true, that every rule is of itself obligatory, and that j m p 0S e 

reason is the primitive rule of human actions ; it follows, that some °bU- 

m ■ gation on 

reason only, independent ol the law, is sufficient to impose some mun . 

obligation on man, and consequently to furnish rojm for morality 

and duty, commendation and censure. m 

There will remain no manner of doubt on this subject, if, ab- 
stracting for a moment from superiority and law, we examine at 
first the state of man alone, considered merely as a rational be- 
in"-. Man proposes to himself his own good, that is, the wel- 
fare of his body and soul. Me searches afterwards for the means 
of procuring those advantages ; and so soon, as he has discov- 
ered them, he approves of some particular actions, and con- 
demns others ; and consequently he approves or condemns him- 
self, according as he acts after a manner conformable or oppo- 
site to the dictates of his reason. Does not all this evidently 
demonstrate, that reason puts a restraint on liberty, and lays us 
therefore under an obligation of doing or abstaining from particu- 
lar things ? 

Let us proceed. Suppose that man in the forementioned state, 
becomes the father of a family, and has a mind to act reasonably; 
would it be an indifferent thing to him to take care of, or to ne- 
glect his children, to provide for their subsistence and education, 
X 



14(i 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Objection. 
Nobody 
can oblige 
himself. 



Answer. 



or Jo neither one nor the other ? Is it not, on the contrary, evi- 
dent, that, as this different conduct necessarily procures either 
the good or evil of his family, the approbation or censure, which 
reason gives it, renders it morally good or bad, worthy of praise 
or blame ? 

It would be an easy matter to pursue this way of arguing, and 
apply it to all the states of man. But what we have already said 
shows it is sufficient to consider man, as a rational being to be 
convinced, that reason, pointing out the road, which alone can 
lead him to the end lie aims at, \nys him under a necessity of fol- 
lowing this road, and of regulating thereby his conduct; that con- 
sequently reason alone is sufficient to establish a S3 r stem, of mo- 
rality, obligation, and duties; because when once we suppose it is 
reasonable to' do or to abstain from certain things, this is really 
owning our obligation. 

IX. ct But the idea of obligation, some will say, imports neces- 
" sarily a being, that obliges ; and who ought to be distinct from. 
" the person obliged. To suppose that he, who obliges, and he 
" who is obliged, are one and the same person is supposing, that 
" a man may make a contract with himself; which is quite ab- 
" surd. Right reason is, in reality, nothing but an attribute of 
" the person obliged; it cannot be therefore a principle of obliga- 
" tion; nobody being capable of imposing on himself an indispen- 
£ ' sable necessity of acting or not acting after such or such a mnn- 
" ner. For supposing a necessity, it must not be removable at 
" the will and pleasure of the person subject to it ; otherwise it 
" would be void of effect. If therefore the person, on whom tie 
u obligation is imposed, is the same as he, who imposes it, he 
" can disengage himself from it whenever he pleases ; or rather, 
" there is no obligation ; as, when a debtor inherits the estate 
" and rights of his creditor, the debt is void. Now duty is a 
u debt, and neither of them can be admitted but between differ- 
" ent persons."* 

X. This objection is more specious, than solid. In fact those. 
who pretend that there is properly neither obligation nor morality 
without a superior and law, ought necessarily to suppose one 

* Nemo sibi debet says Seneca de Benef. lib. 5. cap. 8.) hoc verbum 
debere non habet, nisi inter duos, locum. 



NATURAL LAW. 147 

of these two things; 1. either that there is no other rule of hu- 
man actions besides law; 2. or, if there be any other, none but 
law is an obligatory rule. 

The first of these suppositions is evidently unsupportable; and 
after all, that has been said, concerning this subject, we think 
it quite useless to stop here to refute it. Either reason has been 
idly and without a design bestowed upon man, or we must allow 
it to be the general and primitive rule of his actions and con- 
duct. And what is there more natural than to think, that a ra- 
tional being ought to be directed by reason ? If we should en- 
deavor to evade this argument by saying, that, though reason 
be the rule of human actions, yet there is nothing but law, that 
can he an obligatory rule; this proposition cannot be maintain- 
ed unless we consent to give the name of obligation to some 
other restriction of liberty, as well as to that, which is produ- 
ced by the will and order of a stij eriur; and thee, it would be a 
mere dispute about words. Or else we must suppose, that 
there neither actually is, nor can even be conceived, any obliga- 
tion at all, without the intervention of the will of a superior; 
which is far from being exactly true. 

The source of the whole mistake, or the cause of the ambi- 
guity, i- our not ascending to the first principles, in order to de- 
termine (he original idea of obligation. We have already said, 
and again we s tv it, that every restriction of liberty, produced or 
approved by right reason, tonus a real obligation. That, which 
properly and formally obliges, is the dictate of conscience, or 
the internal judgment we pass on such or such a rule, the ob- 
servance whereof appears to us just, thai is conformable to the 
light of right reason. 

XI. " But does not this manner of reasoning, some will reply, x fresh 
" contradict the clearest notions, and subvert the ideas generally objection 
" received, which make obligation and duty depend on the in- 
*' tcrvention of a superior, whose will manifests itself by the 
11 law ? What sort of thing is an obligation, imposed by reason, 
" or which a man imposelh on himself? Cannot he always get 
" rid of it when he has a mind ; and if the creditor and debtor, 
'* as we have already observed, be one and the same person, 
M cm it be properly said, that there is any such thing as a 
M debt ?" 



148 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Answer. This reply is grounded on an ambiguity, or supposes the 
thing in question. It supposes all along, that there neither is, 
nor can be, any other obligation than that, which proceeds from 
a superior or law. I agree, that such is the common language 
of civilians; but this makes no manner of alteration in the nature 
of the thing. What comes afterwards proves nothing at all. 
It is true that man may, if he has a mind, withdraw himself 
from the obligations, which reason imposes on him; but, if he 
does, it is at his peril, and he is forced himself to acknowledge, 
that such a conduct is quite unreasonable. But to conclude 
from this, that reason alone cannot oblige us, is going too far; 
because this consequence would equally invalidate the obligation, 
imposed by a superior. For in fine the obligation, produced 
by law, is not subversive of liberty; we have always a power to 
submit to it or not, and run the hazard of the consequence. 
In short the question is not concerning force or constraint, it is 
only in relation to a moral tie, which, in what manner soever it 
be considered, is always the work of reason. 

Duty may XII. True it is, that duty, pursuant to its proper and strict 

betaken signification, is a debt: and that, when we consider it thus, it 

in a loose ° . 

or strict presents the idea of an action, which somebody has a right to 

sense. require of us. I agree likewise, that this manner of consider- 
ing duty is just in itself. Man constitutes part of a system or 
whole; in consequence whereof he has necessary relations to 
other beings; and the actions of man, viewed in this light, 
having always some relation to another person, the idea of duty, 
commonly speaking includes this relation. And yet, as it fre- 
quently happens in morality, that we give sometimes a more 
extensive, and at other times a more limited sense, to the same 
term, nothing hinders us from bestowing the more ample signi- 
fication on the word duty, by taking it in general for an action 
conformable to right reason. And then it may be very well 
said, that man, considered even alone, and as a separate being, 
has particular duties to fulfil. It is sufficient for this end, that 
there be some actions, which reason approves, and others, 
which it condemns. These different ideas have nothing in 
them, that is opposite; on the contrary they are perfectly re- 
conciled, and receive mutual strength and assistance from each 
other. 



NATURAL LAW. 140 

XN1. The result of what we have been now saying is as fol- Resuh of 

what has 
Jows - been hith- 

1. Reason being the first rule of man, it is also the first prin- erto said, 
ciple of morality, and the immediate cause of of all primitive ob- 
ligation. 

2. Man being, by his nature and state, in a necessary depend- 
ance on the Creator who has formed him with design and wisdom, 
and proposed some particular views to himself in creating him ; 
the will of God is another rule of human actions, another princi- 
ciple of morality, obligation, and duty. 

3. We may therefore say there are in general two sorts of mo- 
rality or obligations ; one antecedent to the law, and the work 
of reason ? the other subsequent to the law, and properly the 
effect thereof ; it is on this, that the foremcotioned distinction of 
internal and external obligation is founded.* 

4. True it is, that those different species of obligation have 
not all the same force. That, which arises from the law, is 
without doubt the most perfect ; it lays the strongest restriction 
on liberty, and merits therefore the name of obligation by way 
of preference. But we must not thence infer, that it is the only 
one, and that there can be none of any other kind. One obliga- 
tion may be real, though it be different from, and even weaker 
than another. 

5. It is so much the more necessary to admit these two sorts 
of obligation and morality, as that, which renders the obligation 
of law the most perfect, is its uniting the two species; being 
internal and external both at the same time.t For were there 
no attention given to the very nature of the laws, and were the 
things they command or prohibit not to merit the approbation or 
censure of reason ; the authority of the legislator would have 
no other foundation, but that of power; and laws being then 
no more than the effect of an arbitrary will, they would pro- 
duce rather a constraint, properly so called, than any real ob- 
ligation. 

These remarks are especially and in the exactest manner ap- 
plicable to the laws of nature. The obligation, these prodube, 

• See part i. cli^p. vi. sect. 13. 
f See part i, ohap. ix. sect. 12. 



150 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

is of all others the most efficacious and extensive ; because, on 
one side, the disposition of these laws is in itself very reasonable, 
being founded on the nature of the actions, their specific dif- 
ferences, and the relation or opposition they have to particular" 
ends. On the other side, the divine authority, which enjoins us 
to observe these rules, as laws he prescribes to us, adds a new 
force to the obligation they produce of themselves, and lays us^ 
under an indispensable necessity of conforming our actions to 
them. 

7. From these remarks it follows, that those two ways of es- 
tablishing morality, whereof one sets up reason and the other. 
the will of God for its principle, ought not to be placed in op- 
position, as two incompatible systems, neither of which can sub- 
sist without destroying or excluding the other. On the contra- 
ry, we should join these two methods, and unite the two princi- 
ples, in order to have a complete system of morality, really foun- 
ded on the nature and state of man. For man, as a rational be- 
ing, is subject to reason; and as a creature of God, to the will 
of the supreme Being. As these two qualities have nothing op- 
posite or incompatible in their nature, these two rules, reason 
and the divine will, are perfectly reconciled; they are even nat- 
urally connected, and strengthened by their junction. And i 
deed it could not be otherwise; for in fine God himself is the 
author of the nature and mutual relations of things; and particu-' 
larly of the nature of man, of his constitution, state, reason, and 
faculties; the whole is the work of God, and ultimately depends' 
on his will and institution. 

This man- XIV.. This manner of establishing the foundation of obligation" 

nei'of trsta- . . 

triishing an{ * " a{v ,s so ' ar ' rom weakening the system ot natural law or 

morality morality, that we affirm, it rather gives it a greater solidity and' 
•does wot _ " '. . ' , . & , & . , . I 

weaken force. lhis is tracing the thing to the very source; it is laying 

the system j ne foundation of the edifice. I grant that, in order to reason 

of natural „■',". 

4avv. well on morality, we ought to take things as they are, without 

making abstractions; that is, we should attend to the nature and 
actual state of man, by uniting and combining all the circum- 
stances, that essentially enter into the system of humanity. But' 
this does not hinder us from considering likewise the system 
of man in its particulars, and as it were by parts, to the end, 
that an exact knowledge of each of those parts may help us to 



NATURAL LAW. 151 

(understand better the whole. It is the only method we can take 

iin order to attain the end. 

| XV. What has been hitherto set forth may help to explain and Grotius* 

justify at the same time a thought of Groiius in his preliminary °P inion 
J J ° . • examined, 

(discourse, §11. This author having established, atter his man- 
ner, the principles and foundation of natural law, on the consti- 
tution of human nature, adds, that all he has been saying would in 
isome measure take place, were we even to grant there was no God ; 
\or that he did not concent himself about human affairs. It is obvi- 
ous, by his very manner of expressing himself, that he does not 
intend to exclude the divine will from the system of natural law. 
'This would be mistaking his meaning; because he himself estab- 
lishes this will of the Creator, as another source of right. All 
he means is, that, independent of the intervention of God, con- 
sidered as a legislator, the maxims of natural law having their 
foundation in the nature of things, and in the human constitution; 
reason alone imposes already on man a necessity of following 
|those maxims, and lays him under an obligation of conforming his 
conduct to them. In fact it cannot be denied but that the ideas 
of order, agreeableness, honesty and conformity to right reason, 
have at all times made an impression on man at least to a certain 
degree, and among nations some what civilized. The human mind 
is formed in such a manner, that even those, who do not compre- 
hend these ideas in their full exactness and extent have never- 
theless a confused notion thereof, which inclines them to acqui- 
escence so soon, as they are proposed. 

XVI. But while we acknowledge the reality and certainty of In order to 
those principles, we ought likewise to own, that if we proceed h - vea P er * 

i i l r ICCl sys- 

no farther, we are got but halt way our journey; this would be tern of mo- 
unreasonably attempting to establish a system of morality inde- hSk*"! 
'pendent of religion. For were we even to grant, that such a it with 
1 system is not destitute of all foundation ; yet it is certain it could re 1 £ loil * 
i never produce of itself so effectual an obligation, as when it is 
i joined with the divine will. Since the authority of the su- 
preme Being gives the force of laws, properly so called, to 
> the maxims of reason, these maxims acquire thereby the highest 
degree of strength, they can possibly have, to bind and subject the 
will, and to lav us under the strictest obligation. But (once more 



152 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

we repeat it) to pretend therefore, that the maxims and counsels 
of reason considered in themselves, and detached as it were, 
from God's command, are not at all obligatory, is carrying the 
thing too far; it is concluding beyond our premises, and admitting 
only one species of obligation. Now this is not only unconforma- 
ble to the nature of things hut as we have already observed, it is- 
weakening even the obligation, resulting from the will of the leg- 
islator. For the divine ordinances make a much stronger im- 
pression on the mind, and are followed with a greater subjection 
in the will, in proportion as they are approved by reason, as be- 
ing in themselves perfectly agreeable to our nature and extremely 
conformable to our constitution and state. 



CHAP. VIII. 

Consequences of the preceding Chapter; Reflections on the Distinc- 
tions of Just, Honest, and Useful. 



Hfrere is a 
great deal 
of ambigu- 
ity and 
mistake 
concern- 
ing this 
subject. 



I. JL HE reflections, contained in the foregoing chapter, 



give us to understand, that there is a vast deal of ambiguity an 



d 
mistake in the different sentiments of writers, in relation to mo- 
rality or the foundation of natural laws. They do not always as- 
cend to the first principles, neither do they define and distinguish 
exactly; they suppose an opposition between ideas, that are 
reconciled, and ought even to be joined together. Some rea-^ 
son in too abstract a manner on the human system; and, (oU 
lowing only their own metaphysical speculations, never attend 
sufficiently to the actual state of things, and to the natural depe n 
dance of man. Others, considering principally this depen- 
dance, reduce the whole to the will and orders of the sovereign 
master, and seem thus to lose sight of the very nature and inter- 
nal constitution of man, from which it cannot however be sepa- 
rated. These different ideas are just in themselves; yet we mus' 
not establish the one by excluding the other, or by explaining i 
to the other's prejudice. Reason, on the contrary, require? us 
to unite them, in order to find the true principles of the humar 



NATURAL LAW. 153 

system, whose foundations must be sought for in the nature and 
state of man. 

II. It is very common to use the words utility, justice, hon- Of just, 
esty, order, and fitness ; but these different notions are seldom f^'or- 
defined in an exact manner, and some of them are frequently der, and 
confounded. This want of exactness must necessarily create lness * 
ambiguity and confusion ; wherefore, if we intend to make 

things clear, we must take care to define and distinguish prop- 
erly. 

An useful action may methinks be defined that, which of itself 
tends to the preservation and perfection of man. 

A just action that, which is considered as conformable to the 
will of a superior, who commands. 

An action is called honest, when it is considered as conforma- 
I ble to the maxims of right reason, agreeable to the dignity of our 
nature, deserving of the approbation of man, and consequently 
procuring respect and honor to the person, who does it. 

By order we can understand nothing else, but the disposition 
of several things, relative to a certain end, and proportioned to 
; the effect we intend to produce. 

Finally, as to fitness or agreeableness, it bears a very great af- 

j finity with order. It is a relation ot conformity between several 

things, one of which is of itself proper tor the preservation and 

• perfection of the other, and contributes to maintain it in a good 

and advantageous state. 

III. We must not therefore confound the words just, useful, just, hon- 

and honest : for they are three distinct ideas. But, though dis- est » and 

J useful, are 

.! tinct from one another, they have no opposition ; they are three distinct 

relations, which may all agree, and be applied to one single ac- tmn E 8 » 

J IT aMC mU8t 

i tion, considered under different respects. And, if we ascend not be 
.; so high as the first origin, we shall find, that they are all derived c0 * foun d- 
J from one common source, or from one and the same principle, 
J as three branches from the same stock. This general principle 
. is the approbation of reason. Reason necessarily approves what- 
i ever conducts us to real happiness ; and as that, which is agreea- 
ij ble to the preservation and perfection of man, that, which is 
i conformable to the will of the sovereign master, on whom he 
5 depends, and that, which procures him the esteem and respect 

V 



154 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



But 

though 
they are 
distinct, 
yet they 
are natu- 
rally con. 
nected. 



Whether 
an action 
is just be- 
cause God 
com- 
mands it. 



of his equals ; as all this, I say, contributes to his happiness, 
reason cannot but approve of each of these things separately 
considered, much less can it help approving, under different res- 
pects, an action, in which all these properties are found united. 

IV. For such is the state of things, that the ideas of just, 
honest, and useful, are naturally connected, and as it were insep- 
arable ; at least if we attend, as we ought to do, to real, general 
and lasting utility. We may say, that such an utility becomes a 
kind of characteristic to distinguish what is truly just, or honest, 
from what is so only in the erroneous opinions of men. This is 
a beautiful and judicious remark of Cicero.* The language and 
opinions of men are very wide, says he, from truth and right rea- 
son, in separating the honest from the useful , and in persuading 
themselves that some honest tilings are not useful, and other things 
are useful but ?iot honest. This is a dangerous notion to human 
life. Hence we see, that Socrates detested those sophists, who first sep- 
arated these two things in opinion, which in nature are really joined. 

In fact the more we investigate the plan of divine providence, 
the more we find the Deity has thought proper to connect the 
moral good and evil with the physical, or, which is the same 
thing, the just with the useful. And though in some particu- 
lar cases the thing seems otherwise, this is only an accidental 
disorder, which is much less a natural consequence of the sys- 
tem, than an effect of the ignorance or malice of man. Where- 
to we must add, that, in case we do not stop at the first appear- 
ances, but proceed to consider the human system in its full ex- 
tent, we shall find, that, every thing well considered, and all 
compensations made, these irregularities will be one day or 
other redressed, as we shall more fully show, when we come to 
treat of the sanctions of natural laws. 

V. Here a question is sometimes proposed, whether a thine; he 
just because God commands it, or whether God commands it be 
cause it is just ? 

* In quo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via, sensimque eo deducta est, uJ 
honestatem ab utilitate secernens, et constituent honestum esse aliquod, 
quod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum : qua nulla pernicies 
major hominum vitse portuit adferri. Cic. de Offic. lib. 2. cap. 3. I;. --.que 
accepimus, Socratem exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum hxc natura coh<e- 
rentia opinione distraxissent. Idem. lib. 3. cap. 13- See likewise Grotius 
Rights of Wai- and Peace, preliminary discourse, § 17. and following ; and 
Fuffendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, book, ii. chap. iii,3 10, 11. 



NATURAL LAW. 155 

Pursuant to our principles, the question is not at all difficult. 
A thing is just because God commands it ; this is implied by the 
definition we gave of justice. But God commands such or such 
things, because these things are reasonable in themselves, con- 
formable to the order and end he proposed to himself in creating 
mankind, and agreeable to the nature and state of man. These 
ideas, though distinct in themselves, are necessarily connected, 
and can be separated only by a metaphysical abstraction. 

VI. Let us in fine observe, that this harmony or surprising In what 
agreement, which naturally occurs between the ideas of just, oJ^JJuV 
honest, and useful, constitutes the whole beauty of virtue, and and the 
informs us at the same time in what the perfection of man con- ^ mm 
sists. consists. 

In consequence of the different systems above mentioned, 
moralists are divided with regard to the latter point. Some 
place the perfection of man in such a use of his faculties, as is 
agreeable to the nature of his being. Others in the use of our 
faculties and the intention of our Creator. Some in fine pretend, 
that man is perfect, only as his manner of thinking and acting is 
proper to conduct him to the end he aims at, namely his hap- 
piness. 

But what we have above said sufficiently shows, that these 
three methods of considering the perfection of man are verv lit- 
tle different, and ought not to be set in opposition. As they are 
interwoven with one another, we ought rather to combine and 
unite them. The perfection of man consists really in the posses- 
sion of natural or acquired faculties, which enable us to obtain, 
and actually put us in possession of solid felicity; and this in con- 
formity to the intention of our Creator, engraved in our nature, 
and clearly manifested by the state, wherein he has placed 
us.* 

A modern writer has judiciously said, that to obey only through 
fear of authority, or for the hope of recompense, without esteeming 
or loving virtue for the sake of its own excellency, is mean and mer- 
cenary. On the contrary, to practise virtue with an abstract view 
of ils fttness and natural beauty, without having any thought of the 

• Theory of Agreeable Sensations, chap. viii. 



15U 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Creator and Conductor of the universe , is failing in our duty to the 
first and greatest of Beings. He only, who acts jointly through a 
principle of reason, through a motive of piety, and with a view of 
his principal interest, is an honest, wise, and pious man ; which 
constitutes, without comparison, the worthiest and completest of char- 
acters. 

CHAP. IX. 



What is 
meant by 
applying 
the laws 
to human 
actions. 



What is 

Consci- 
ence. 



Of the Application of Natural Laws to Human Actions ; and First 
of Conscience** 



i. -A-s 



k-S soon as we have discovered the foundation and rule 
of our duties, we have only to recollect what has been already 
said in the eleventh chapter of the first part of this work, con- 
cerning the morality of actions, to see in what manner natural 
laws are applied to human actions, and what effect ought from 
thence to result. 

The application of the laws to human actions is nothing else, 
but the judgment we pass on their morality, by comparing them 
with the law ; a judgment whereby we pronounce, that those ac- 
tions being either good, bad, or indifferent, we are obliged either 
to perform or omit them, or that we may use our liberty in this 
respect, and that, according to the side we have taken, we are 
worthy of praise or blame, approbation or censure. 

This is done in two different manners. For either we judge 
on this footing of our own actions, or of those of another per- 
son. In the first case, our judgment is called conscience ; but 
the judgment we pass on other men's actions is termed imputa- 
tion. These are undoubtedly subjects of great importance, and 
of universal use in morality, which deserve therefore to be treated 
with some care and circumspection. 

II. Conscience is properly no more than reason itself, con- 
sidered as instructed in regard to the rule we ought to follow, or 
to the law of nature ; and judging of the morality of our own 
actions, and of the obligations we are under in this respect, 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. iii. § 4, and follow- 
ing ; and the Duties of Man and a Citizen, book i. chap. i. sect. 5, o. 



NATURAL LAW. 157 

"by comparing them to this rule, pursuant to the ideas we enter- 
tain thereof. 

Conscience is also very frequently taken for the very judgment 
we pass on the morality of actions ; a judgment, which is the re- 
sult of perfect reasoning, or the consequence we infer from two 
express or tacit premises. A person compares two propositions, 
one of which includes the law, and the other the action ; and 
from them he deduces a third, which is the judgment he makes 
of the quality of his action. Such was the reasoning of Judas. 
Whosoever delivers up an innocent person to death commits a crime: 
here is the law. Nozu this is zvhat I have done ; here is the ac- 
tion. / have therefore committed a crime ; this is the consequence, 
or judgment, which his conscience passed on the action he com- 
mitted. 

III. Conscience supposes therefore a knowledge of the law; Consci- 

and particularly of the law of nature, which, beina; the primitive ence 8U ^" 
1 J » o i poses a 

source of justice, is likewise the supreme rule of conduct. And knowl- 
as the laws cannot serve us for rules, but inasmuch as they are f. ?? ° 
known, it follows therefore, that conscience becomes thus the im- 
mediate rule of our actions ; for it is evident we cannot conform 
to the law, but so far, as we have notice thereof. 

IV. This being premised, the first ride, we have to lay down First rule, 
concerning this matter, is, that we must enlighten our conscience, 

as well as consult it, and follow its counsels. 

We must enlighten our conscience ; that is we must spare no 
Care or pains to he exactly instructed with regard to the will of 
the legislator, and to the disposition of his laws, in order to ac- 
quire just ideas of whatever is commanded, forbidden, or per- 
mitted. For plain it is, that, were we in ignorance or error in 
this respect, the judgment we should form of our actions would 
be necessarily vicious, and consequently lead us aslray. But 
this is not enough. We must join to this first knowledge the 
knowledge also of the action. And for this purpose it is not only 
necessary to examine this action in itself; but we ought likewise 
to be attentive to the particular circumstances, that accompany it, 
and the consequences, that may follow it. Otherwise we should 
run a risk of mistake in the application of (he laws, whose gen- 



158 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

eral decisions admit of several modifications, according to the dif- 
ferent circumstauces, that accompany our actions ; which neces- 
sarily influences their morality, and of course our duties. Thus 
it is not sufficient for a judge to be well acquainted with the tenor 
and purport of the law, before he pronounces sentence ; he 
should likewise have an exact knowledge of the fact, and all its 
different circumstances. 

But it is not merely with a view of enlightening our reason, 
that we ought to acquire all this knowledge ; it is principally in 
order to apply it occasionally to the direction of our conduct. 
We should therefore, whenever it concerns us to act, consult 
previously our conscience, and be directed by its counsels. 
This is properly an indispensable obligation. For in fine con- 
science being, as it were, the minister and interpreter of the will 
of the legislator, the counsels it gives us, have all the force and 
authority of a law, and ought to produce the same effect upon 
us. 
Second V. It is only therefore by enlightening our conscience, that it 

Tules " r becomes a sure rule of conduct, whose dictates may be followed 
with a perfect confidence of exactty fulfilling our duty. For we 
should be grossly mistaken, if, under a notion that conscience is 
tho? immediate rule of our actions, we were to believe, that ev- 
ery man may lawfully do whatever he imagines the law com- 
mands or permils. We ought, first to know whether tins notion 
or persuasion is justly founded. For, as Puffendorf* observe-, 
conscience has no share in the directiou of human actions, but 
inasmuch as it is instructed concerning the law, whose office it 
properly is to direct our actions. If we have therefore a mind 
to determine and act with safety, we must on every particular 
occasion observe the two following rules, Which ore verv simple 
of themselves, easy to practice, and naturally follow our first 
rule, of which they are only a kind of elucidation. f 

Second rule. Before we determine to follow the dictates of 
conscience, we should examine thoroughly, whether we have 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, boi.k i. chap, iii. sect. 4. 
f Sze Barbeyrac's first note on the Duties of Man ar.d a Citizen, book 
h chap. v. sect. 5. 



NATURAL LAW. 159 

the necessary lights and helps to judge of the things before us. If 
we happen to want these lights and helps, we can neither decide, 
nor much less undertake any thing, without an inexcusable and 
dangerous temerity. And yet nothing is more common than to 
transgress against this rule. What multitudes, for example, de- 
termine on religious disputes, or difficult questions concerning 
morality or politics, though they are no way capable of judging 
or reasoning about them ? 

Third rule. Supposing that in general we have necessary lights 
and helps to judge of the affair before us, we must afterwards 
see whether we have actually made use of them; insomuch that, 
without a new inquiry, we may follow what our conscience sug- 
It happens every day, that, for want of attending to this 
rule, we let ourselves be quietly prevailed upon to do a great ma- 
ny things, which we might easily discover to be unjust, had we 
given heed to certain clear principles, the justice and necessity 
of which is univerally acknowledged. 

When we have made use of the rules here laid down, we have 
done whatever we could and ought; and it is morally certain, 
that, by thus proceeding we can neither mistake in our judgment, 
nor be wrong in our determinations. But if, notwithstanding all 
these precautions, we should happen to mistake, which is not ab- 
solutely impossible; this would be an infirmity inseparable from 
human nature, and would carry its excuse along with it in the 
eye of the supreme legislator. 

VI. We judge of our actions either before, or after we have Antece- 
done them; wherefore there is an antecedent and a subsequent ce jj l 
conscience. quentccn 

This distinction gives us an opportunity to lay down a fourth p^"^' 
rule; which is, that a prudent man ought to consult his conscience rule, 
before and after he has acted. 

To determine to act without having previously examined, 
whether what we are a going to do be good or evil, manifestly 
indicates an indifference for our duty, which is a most dangerous 
state in respect to man; a state capable of throwing him into the 
most fatal excesses. But as, in this first judgment, we may hap- 
pen to be determined by passion, and to proceed with precipita- 
tion or upon a very slight examen: it is therefore necessary to 



ISO THE PRINCIPLES OF 

reflect again on what we have done, either in order to be con- 
firmed in the right side, if we have embraced it; or to correct 
our mistake if possible, and to guard against the like faults for 
the future. This is so much the more important, as experience 
shows us, that we frequently judge quite differently between a 
past and a future transaction; and the prejudices or passions, 
which may lead us astray, when we are to take our resolution, 
oftentimes disappear either in the whole or part, when the action 
is over; and leave us then more at liberty to judge rightly of the 
nature and consequences of the action. 

The habit of of making this double examen is the essential 
character of an honest man; and indeed nothing can be a better 
proof of our being seriously inclined to discharge our several 
duties. 
Subse- VII. The effect resulting from this revisal of our conduct is 

science°is" ver ^ different, according as the judgment, we pass on it, ab- 
eitherqui- solves or condemns us. In the first case, we find ourselves in 
e ' ^ " a stste of satisfaction and tranquility, which is the surest and 
sweetest recompense of virtue. A pure and untainted pleasure 
accompanies always those actions, that are approved by reason; 
and reflection renews the sweets we have tasted, together 
with their remembrance. And indeed what greater happiness 
is there, than to be inwardly satisfied, and be able with a just 
confidence to promise ourselves the approbation and benevo- 
lence of the sovereign Lord, on whom we depend ? If on the 
contrary, consc'ence condemns us, this condemnation must be 
accompanied with inquietude, trouble, reproaches, fear, and 
remorse; a state so dismal, that the ancients have compared it 
to that of a man tormented by the furies. Every crime, says the 
satirist, it disapproved by the very person who commits it ; and the 
first punishment the criminal feels, is that he cannot avoid bei)ig 
self-condemned, were he even to find means of being acquitted before 
the praztor's tribunal. 

Exemplo quodcunque malo committitur, ipsi 
Displicet auctori; prima hac eht ultio, quod, se 
Judice, nemo nocens absolvitur, improba quumvis 
Qratio fallaci prcetoris vicerit urna, 

Juv. Sat. 13, ver. 1 



NATURAL LAW. 461 

He that commits a sin, shall quickly find 
The pressing guilt lie heavy on his mind ; 
Though bribes or favor shall assert his cause t 
Pronounce him guiltless, and elude the laws ; 
None quits himself ; his own impartial thought 
Will damn, and conscience will record the fault. 

Creech. 

Hence the subsequent conscience is said to be quiet or uneasy, 
good or bad. 

VIII. The judgment we pass on the morality of our actions Decisive 
is likewise susceptible of several different modifications, that con u i0US 
produce new distinctions of conscience, which we should here «c«ence. 
point out. These distinctions may, in general, be equally ap- s ;x t h! and 
plied to the two first species of conscience above mentioned ; seventh 
but they seem more frequently and particularly to agree with the 
antecedent conscience. 

Conscience is therefore either decisive or dubious, according 
to the degree of persuasion a person m.iy have concerning the 
quality of the action. 

When we pronounce decisively and without any hesitation, 
that an action is conformable or opposite to the law, or that it is 
permitted, and consequently we ought to do or omit it, or else 
that we are at liberty in this respect ; this is called a decisive 
conscience. If, on the contrary, the mind remains in suspense, 
through the conflict of reasons we see on both sides, and which 
appear to us of equal weight, insomuch that we cannot tell to 
which side we ought to incline, this is called a dubious con- 
science. Such was the doubt of the Corinthians, who did not 
know, whether they could eat things sacrificed to idols, or 
whether they ought to abstain from them. On the one side, 
the evangelical liberty seemed to permit it; on the other, they 
were restrained through apprehension of seeming to give thereby 
a kind of consent to idolatrous acts. Not knowing what resolu- 
tion to take, they wrote to St. Paul to remove their doubt. 
This distinction makes room also for some rules. 
Fifth rule. We do not entirely discharge our duty, by doing 
with a kind of difficulty and reluctance what the decisive con- 
science ordains ; we ought to set about it readily, willingly, and 
W 



162 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

with pleasure.* On the contrary, to determine without hes- 
itation or repugnance against the motions of such a conscience 
is showing the highest degree of depravation and malice, and 
renders a person incomparably more criminal, than if he were 
impelled by a violent passion or temptation.! 

Sixth rule. With regard to a dubious conscience, we ought to 
use all endeavours to get rid of our uncertainty, and to forbear 
acting so long as we do not know whether we do good or evil. 
To behave otherwise would indicate an indirect contempt of the 
law, by exposing one's self voluntarily to the hazard of violating 
it, which is a very bad conduct. The rule now mentioned 
ought to be attended to, especially in matters of great impor- 
tance. 

Seventh rule. But if we find ourselves in such circumstances, 
as necessarily oblige us to determine to act, we must then, by a 
new attention, endeavour to distinguish the safest and most prob- 
able side, and whose consequences are the least dangerous. 
Such is generally the opposite side to passion ; it being the safest 
way not to listen too much to our inclinations. In like manner, 
we run very little risk of committing a mistake in a dubious case, 
by following rather the dictates of charity, than the suggestion of 
self love. 

Scmpu- IX. Beside the dubious conscience, properlv so called and 

lous con- , . , ... . ., . r r J 

science. wmch we ma y likewise distinguish by the name of irresolute, 
Eighth there is a scrupulous conscience, produced by slight and frivo- 
lous difficulties that arise in the mind, without seeing any solid 
reason for doubting. 

Eighth rule. Such scruples as these ought not to hinder us 

from acting, if it be necessary ; and, as they generally arise either 

from a false delicacy of conscience, or from gross superstition, 

we should soon get rid of them, were we to examine the thing 

with attention. 

Right and X. Let us afterwards observe, that the decisive conscience, 

erroneous according as it determines good or evil, is either right or erro- 

science. neous. 

l nose, tor example, who imagine we ought to obstain from 
* See part ii. chap. v. § 7. 
f See Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, book ii. chap. xx. § 19. 



NATURAL LAW. 1S3 

strict revenge, though the law of nature permits a legitimate de- 
fence, have a right conscience. On the other hand those, who 
think that the law, which requires us to he faithful to our en- 
gagements, is not obligatory towards heretics, and that we may 
lawfully break through it in respect to them, have an erroneous 
conscience. 

Bat what must we do in case of an erroneous conscience ? 

Ninth rule. I answer, that we ought always to follow the dic- 
tates of conscience, even when it is erroneous, and whether the 
error be vincible or invincible. 

This rule may appear strange at first sight, since it seems to 
prescribe evil; because there is no manner of question, but that 
a man, who acts according to an erroneous conscience, espouses 
a bad cause. Yet this is not so bad, as if we were to determine 
to do a tiling with a firm persuasion of its being contrary to the 
decision of the law ; for this would denote a direct contempt of 
the legislator and In- orders, whirl) is a mo^t criminal disposition. 
Whereas tie first resolution, though bad in itself, is nevertheless 
the effect of a laudable disposition to obey the legislator, and con- 
form to ail will. 

Bui it does not thence follow, that we are always excusable 
in bein^ guided by the dictates of an erroneous conscience ; 
this is true only, when the error happens to be invincible. If 
on the contrary it i- surmountable, and we mistake with respect 
to what is commanded or forbidden, we sin either way, whether 
we act according to, or against the decisions of conscience. 
ThU -how- (to mention it once more) what an important concern 
it is to enlighten our conscience, because, in the case just now 
mentioned, the person with an erroneous conscience is actually 
under a melancholy necessity of doing ill, which ever side he 
t kes. But if we should happen to mistake with regard to an 
indifferent thing, which we are erroneously persuaded is com- 
manded or forbidden, we do not sin in that case, but when we act 
contrary to the light of our own conscience. 

XI. In fine there are two sorts 01 right conscience; the one Demon- 

clear and demonstrative, and the other merelv probable. s-.rative 

and v rob- 
1 he clear and demonstrative conscience is that, which is found- a >le con- 
self nee. 
Tenth 
rule. 



164 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

the nature of moral things will permit ; insomuch that one may 
clearly and distinctly prove the rectitude of a judgment, made on 
such or such an action. On the contrary, though we are convin- 
ced of the truth of a judgment, yet if it be founded only on ver- 
isimilitude, and we cannot demonstrate its certainty in a method- 
ical manner, and by incontestible principles, it is then only a pro- 
bable conscience. 

The foundations of probable conscience are in general author- 
ity and example, supported by a confused notion of a natural 
fitness, and sometimes by popular reasons, which seem drawn 
from the very nature of things. It is by this kind of conscience, 
that the greatest part of mankind are conducted, there being 
very few, who are capable of knowing the indispensable neces- 
sity of their duties, by deducing them from their first sources by 
regular consequences ; especialty when the point relates to max- 
ims of morality, which, being somewhat remote from the first 
principles, require a longer chain of reasonings. This con- 
duct is far from being unreasonable. For those who have not 
sufficient light for themselves to judge properly of the nature of 
things, cannot do better, than recur to the judgment of enlight- 
ened persons ; this being the only resource left them to act with 
safety. We might in this respect compare the persons above 
mentioned to young people, whose judgment has not yet ac- 
quired its full maturity, and who ought to listen and conform to 
the counsels of their superiors. The authority therefore and 
example of sage and enlightened men may in some cases, in de- 
fault of our own lights, prove a reasonable principle of determi- 
nation and conduct. 

But in fine, since those foundations of probable conscience are 
not so solid, as to permit us absolutely to build upon them, we 
must establish, as a Tenth Rule, that we ought to use all our en- 
deavours to increase the degree of verisimilitude in our opinions, 
in order to approach as near as possible to the clear and demon- 
strative conscience; and we must not be satisfied with probabil- 
ity, but when we can do no better. 



NATURAL LAW. 166 



CHAP. X. 



Of the Merit and Demerit of Human Actions ; and of their Imputat- 
ion relative to the Laws of Nature * t 

| 

I. IN explaining the nature of human actions, considered Distinc- 
with regard to right,! we observed, that an essential quality of p Uta biUt/ 
these actions is to be susceptible of imputation; that is, the agent and impu- 
may be reasonably looked upon, as the real author thereof, may ofthena- 
have it charged to his account, and be made answerable for it; lure of a 
insomuch that the good or bad effects, thence arising, may be cause . 
justly attributed and referred to him, as to the efficient cause, 
concerning which we have laid down this principle, that every 
voluntary action is of an imputable nature. 

We give in general the name of moral cause of an action to 
the person, who produced it, either wholly or in part, by a de- 
termination of his will; whether he executes it himself physic- 
ally and immediately, so as to be author thereof; or whether he 
procure it by the act of some other person, and becomes there- 
by its cause. Thus whether we wound a man with our own 
hands, or set assassins to waylay him, we are equally the moral 
cause of the evil thence resulting. 

It was observed likewise that we mu4 not confound the im- 
putability of human actions with their actual imputation. The 
former, as has been just now mentioned, is a quality of the ac- 

| tion; the latter is an act of the legislator, or judge, who lays to a 

i person's charge an action, that is of an imputable nature. 

II. Imputation is properly therefore a judgment, by which we Ofthe na- 

declare, that a person beins the author or moral cause of an ac- ture °f im- 
I . putation. 

tion commanded or forbidden by the laws, the good or bad ef- itsupposes 

' fects, that result from this action, ought to be actually attributed a knowl- 

to J edge of 

1 to him; that he is consequently answerable for them, and as the law, 

such is worthy of praise or blame, of recompense or punish- a c t ^ el i a t 8 

ment. 

* See on this and the following chapter, PuflkndjrPs Law of Nature 
and Nations, book i. chap. v. and chap, ix. 
f Part i. chap, iii- 



** Jfc 



iB9 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

This judgment of imputation, as well as that of conscience, is 
made hy applying the law to the action, and comparing one with 
the other, in order to decide afterwards the merit of the fact, 
and to make the author consequently feel the good or evil, the 
punishment or recompense, which the law has thereto annexed. 
All this necessarily supposes an exact knowledge of the law and 
of its right sense, as well as of the fact and such circumstances 
thereof, as may any way relate to the determination of the law. 
A want of this knowledge must render the application false, and 
the judgment erroneous. 
Examples. HI. Let us produce a few examples. One of the Horatii, 
who remained conqueror in the combat between the brothers of 
this name and the three (vuriatii, inflamed with anger against 
his sister, for bewailing the death of one of the Curiatti, her l 
lover, and for bitterly reproaching him therewith, instead of con- 
gratulating him for his victory, slew her with his own hand. 
He was accused before the Duumvirs; and the question was, 
whether the law against murderers ought to be npplied in the 
present case, in order to make him undergo the punishment ? 
this was the opinion of the judges, who in fact condemned the 
young Roman. But an appeal being made to the people, they 
judged quite otherwise. Their notion was, that the law ought 
not to be applied to the fact ; because a Roman lady, who ' 
seemed to be more concerned about her own particular interest, 
than sensible of the good of her country, might in some meas- 
ure be considered and treated, as an enemy; wherefore they 
pronounced the young man innocent. Let us add another ex- 
ample of an advantageous imputation, or of a judgment of recom- 
pense. Cicero, in the beginning of his consulate, discover- 
ed the conspiracy of Cataline, which menaced the republic with 
ruin. In this delicate conjuncture he behaved with so much 
prudence and address, that the conspiracy was stifled without ' 
any noise or sedition, by the death of a few of the criminals. 
And yet J. Caesar, and some other enemies of Cicero, accused 
him before the people for.baving put citizens to death contrary 1 
to rule, and before the senate or people had passed judgment' 
against them. But the people, attending to the circumstances 
of the fact, to the danger the republic had escaped, and to the 



; 



NATURAL LAW. 167 

important service Cicero had done, so far from condemning him 
as an infringer of the laws, decreed him the glorious title of fa- 
ther of his country. 

IV. In order to settle the principles and foundations of this Priciples 
matter, we must observe, 1. That we ought not to conclude * nt [j ot 
the actual imputation of an action merely from its imputability. to infer ac- 
An action, to merit actual imputation, must necessarily have the tattonfiom 
concurrence of these two conditions; first that it be of an im- imputabil- 
putable nature, and secondly that the agent be under some ob- 
ligation of doing or omitting it. An example will clear up the 

thing. Let us suppose two young men with the same abilities 
and conveniencies, but under no obligation of knowing algebra; 
one of them applies himself to this science, and the other does 
not; though the action of the one and the other's omission are 
by themselves of an imputable nature, yet in this case they can 
be neither good nor bad. But were we to suppose, that these 
two young men were designed by their prince, the one for some 
office of state, and the other for a military employment; in this 
case their application or neglect in instructing themselves in ju- 
risprudence, for example, or in the mathematics, would be just- 
ly imputed to them. The reason is, they are both indispensa- 
bly obliged to acquire such knowledge, as is necessary for dis- 
charging properly the offices or employments, to which they 
are called. Hence it is evident, that, as imputability supposeth 
the power of acting or not acting, actual imputation requires 
moreover, that a person be under an obligation of doing either 
one or the other. 

V. 2. When we impute an action to a person, we render 2. Imputa- 

Ihim, as has been already observed, answerable for the good or tlon 8up " 

* & posesscme 

| bad consequences of what he has done. Hence it follows, connexion 

| that, in order to make a just imputation, there must be some ne- the^aLi 
cessury or accidental connexion between the thing done or omit- and its 

| ted, and the good or bad consequences of the action or omis- queues, 
sion ; and besides, the agent must have had some knowledge 

iof this connexion, or at least he must have been able to have a 
probable foresight of the effects of his action. Otherwise the 
imputation cannot take place, as will appear by a few exam- 
ples. A gunsmith sells arms to a man, who has the appear- 



168 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

ance of a sensible, sedate person, and does not seem to have 
any bad design. And yet this man goes instantly to make an 
unjust attack on another person, and kills him. Here the gun- 
smith is not at all chargeable, having done nothing, but what he 
has a right to do ; and besides he neither could nor ought to 
have foreseen what happened. But if a person carelessly leave 
a pair of pistols charged on the table, in a place exposed to eve- 
ry body, and a child, insensible of the danger, happens to wound 
or kill himself; the former is certainly answerable for the mis- 
fortune ; by reason this is a clear and immediate consequence 
of what he has done, and he could and ought to have foreseen it. 
We must reason in the same manner with respect to an ac- 
tion productive of some good. This good cannot be attributed 
to a person, who has been the cause of it without knowledge 
or thought thereof. . But, in order to merit thanks and acknowl- 
edgment, there is no necessity of our being entirely sure of suc- 
cess ; it is sufficient there was room to reasonably presume it, 
and, were the effect absolutely to fail, the intention would not be 
the less commendable. 
S.Founda- VI. 3. But, in order to ascend to the first principles of this 
merit and tneor y» we must ° b s erve > that » as man is supposed to be obliged 
demerit, by his nature and state to follow certain rules of conduct, the 
observance of those rules constitutes the perfection of his nature 
and state ; and, on the contrary, the infringing of them forms 
the degradation of both. Now we are made after such a man- 
ner, that perfection and order please us of th( mehes ; while 
imperfection and disorder, and whatever relates thereto, natu- 
rally displease us. Consequently we acknowledge, that those, 
who, answering the end they were designed for, perform their 
duty, and contribute thus to the good and perfection of the hu- 
man system, are deserving of our approbation, esteem, and be- 
nevolence ; that they may reasonably expect these sentiments 
in their favor, and have some sort of right to the advantageous 
effects, which naturally arise from them. We cannot, on the 
contrary, avoid condemning those, who, through a bad use of 
their faculties, degrade their own state and nature ; we confess 
they are worthy of disapprobation and blame, and that it is agree- 
able to reason, the bad effects of their conduct should fall upon 
themselves. Such are the foundations of merit and demerit. 



NATURAL LAW. 16.9 

VII. Merit therefore is a quality, which entitles U9 to the ap- In what 
probation, esteem, and benevolence of our superiors or equals, JjJ^ 1 *,.*" 
and to the advantages thence resulting. Demerit is an opposite consists, 
quality, which, rendering us worthy of the censure and blame of 
those, with whom we converse, obliges us as it were to acknowl- 
edge, that it is reasonable they should entertain those sentiments 
towards us; and that we are under a melancholy obligation of 
bearing the bad effects, that flow from them. 

These notions of merit and demerit have therefore, it is plain, 
their foundation in the very nature of things; and are perfectly 
agreeable to common sense and the notions generally received. 
Praise and blame, where people judge reasonably, always follow 
the quality of actions, according as they are morally good or bad. 
This is clear with respect to the legislator; he must contradict 
himself in the grossest manner, were he not to approve what is 
conformable, and to condemn what is opposite to his laws. And 
as far as those, that depend on him, this very dependance obliges 
them to regulate their judgment on this subject. 

VIII. 4. We have already observed,* that some actions are 4. Merit 

"better than others, and that bad ones may likewise be more or m erithave 

less so, according to the different circumstances, that attend their de- 

traces* untl. 
them, and the disposition of the person, that does them. Merit go ^ im . 

and demerit have therefore their degrees; they may be great- putaiion. 
er or less. Wherefore when we are to determine exactly how 
far an action ought to be imputed to a person, we should have 
regard to these differences: and the praise or blame, the recom- 
pense or punishment, ought likewise to have their degrees in 
proportion to the merit or demerit. Thus, according as the 
good or evil proceeding from an action is more or less considera- 
ble ; according as there was more or less facility or diificulty t« 
perform or to abstain from this action; according as it was done 
with more or less reflection and liberty; and finally according as 
the reasons, that ought to have determined us thereto, or di- 
verted us from it, were more or less strong, and the intention 
ami motives were more or less noble and generous; the imputa- 
tion is made after a more or less efficacious manner, and its 
effects are more or less profitable or pernicious. 

* Part i. chap. xi. sect. 12. 

x 



i^O THE PRINCIPLES OF 

5. Imputa. IX. 5. Imputation, as we have already hinted, may be made 
ther'sim- b ^ different persons; and it is easy to comprehend, that, in those 
pleoreffi- different cases, the effects thereof are not always the same; but 
eacious. ^ nt t j. ie y mast De more or i ess important, according to the 

quality of the persons, and the different right they have in this 
respect. Sometimes imputation is confined simply to praise or 
blame; and at other times it goes further. This gives us room 
to distinguish two sorts of imputation, one simple, and the other 
efficacious. The first consists only in approving or disapproving 
the action; insomuch that no other effect arises from it with re- 
gard to the agent. But the second is not confined to blame or 
praise; it produces moreover some good or bad effect with re- 
gard to the agent; that is, some real and positive good or evil, 
that befals him. 

6. Effects X. 6. Simple imputation may be made indifferently by all, 
tl° U^r whether they have or have not a particular and personal inter- 
est in the doing or omitting of the action; it is sufficient they 
have a general and indirect interest. And as we may affirm, that 
all the members of society are interested in the due observ- 
ance of the laws of nature, hence they have all a right to praise 
or condemn another man's actions, according as they are con- 
formable or contrary to those laws. They have even a kind of 
obligation in this respect. The regard, they owe to the legisla- 
tor and his laws, requires it of them; and they would be want- 
ing in their duty to society and to individuals, were they not to 
testify, at least by their approbation or censure, the esteem they 
have for probity and virtue, and their aversion, on the contrary, 
to iniquity and vice. 

But with regard to efficacious imputation, in order to render 
it lawful, we should have a particular and direct interest in the 
performing or omitting of the action. Now those, who have 
such an interest, are firstly persons, whom it concerns to regu- 
late the actions; secondly such, as are the objects thereof, name- 
ly those, towards whom we act, and to whose advantage or 
prejudice the thing may turn. Thus a sovereign, who has en- 
acted laws, who commands certain things with a promise of 
recompense, and prohibits others under a commination of pun- 
ishment, ought without doubt to concern himself about the ob- 



NATURAL LAW. «g 

servance of his laws, and has consequently a right to impute the 
actions of his subjects after an efficacious manner, that is, to re- 
ward or punish them. The same may be said of a person, who 
has received some injury or damage by another man's action; this 
very thing gives him a right to impute the action efficaciously to 
its author, in order to obtain a just satisfaction, and a reasonable 
indemnification. 

XI. 7. It may therefore happen, that several persons have a 7 If all 
right to impute, each on bis side, the same action to the person, wh * £ re 

who did it; because this action may interest them in different re- concern- 

, , ed, do not 

apects. And, in th it case, if any ol the persons concerned has a \ mr;)nie an 

mind to relinquish his right, by not imputing the action to the action it is 
agent, so far as it concerns himself; this does not in any shape not to 
prejudice the right of the rest, which is no way in his power, h*ve been. 
When a man does me an injury, I may indeed forgive him, a9 to 
what concerns myself; but this does not diminish the right the 
sovereign may have to take cognizance of the injury, and to pun- 
ish the author, as an infringer of the law, and a disturber of the 
civil order and government. Rut if all those, who are interested 
in the action, are willing not to impute if, and jointly forgive the 
injury and the crime; in this case the action ought to be morally 
esteemed, as never committed, because it is not attended with 
any moral effect. 

XII. 8. Let us in fine observe, that there i9 some difference 8 rj;ft\ r . 
between the imputation of good and bad actions. When the ence be- 
legislator has established a certain recompense for a good action, i m p U ta-' 
he obliges himself to give this recompense, and he grants a right liou °f 
of demanding it to those, who have rendered themselves worthy bad ac- 
thereof by their submission and obedience. But with respect tions, 
to penalties, enacted against bad actions, the legislator may ac- 
tually inflict them, if he ha9 a mind, and has an incontestible 
light to do it; insomuch that the criminal cannot reasonably com- 
plain of the evil, he is made to undergo, because he has drawn 
it upon himself through his disobedience. But it does not 
thence ensue, that the sovereign is obliged to punish to the full 
rigour; he is always master to exercise his right, or to show 
grace ; to entirely remit, or to diminish the punishment; and he- 
may have very good reasons for doing either. 



in THE PRINCIPLES OF 



CHAP. XI. 



Application of those Principles to different Species of Actions, in 
order to judge in what Manner they ought to be Imputed. 

What ac- I. f f E might be satisfied with the general principles above 

lions arc 

actually ^d down, were it not useful to make an application of them, and 

imputed I to point out particularly those actions or events, for which we 
are, or are not answerable. 

1. And in the first place it follows, from what has been hither- 
to said, that we may impute to a person every action or omis- 
sion, of which he is the author or cause, and which he could or 
ought to have done or omitted. 
Actions of 2. The actions of those, who have not the use of reason, 
such, as suc jj as m f an t S} fools, and madmen, ought not to be imputed 
the use of to them. The want of knowledge hinders, in such cases, im- 
reason. putation. For these person* being incapable of knowing what 
they are doing, or of comparing it with the laws ; their actions 
are not properly human actions, nor do they include any morali- 
ty. If we scold or beat a child, it is not by way of punishment ; 
it is only a simple correction, by which we propose principally 
to hinder him from contracting a bad habit. 
Of what is 3* With regard to what is done in drunkenness, this state, 

done in voluntarily contracted, does not binder the imputation of a bad 
drunken- 
ness, action. 

Of things H. 4. We do not impute things, that are really above a per- 

thatare son's strength; no more than the omission of a thing com- 

impofrsi- ° ' . 

ble. Of manded, if there has been no opportunity of doing it. For 

the want ^ e j m p U t a tion of an omission manifestly supposes these twa 
tunity. things; first that a person has had sufficient strength and means 
to act j and secondly that he could have made use of those 
means, without prejudice to any other more indispensable duty, 
or without drawing upon himself a considerable evil, to which 
there was no obligation of being exposed. It must be under- 
stood however, that the person has not brought himself into 
an incapacity of acting through his own fault ; for then the 
legislator might as lawfully punish those, who have reduced 



NATURAL LAW. 1** 

themselves to this incapacity, as if they had refused to act, 
when they were capable of complying. Such was at Rome the 
case of those, who cut off their thumbs,' in order to disable 
themselves from handling arms, and be exempted from th jer- 
vice. In like manner a debtor is not excusable, when, thv \ 
his own misconduct, he has rendered himself unable to dis- 
charge his debts. And we even become deservedly responsible 
for a thing in itself impossible, if we have undertaken to do it 
when we kn3w, or might easily have known, that it - irpa A 
our strength; in case any bo;ly happens by this means to be in- 
jured. 

III. 5. The natural qualities of body or mind cannot of them- of nat " r ai 

• in i qualities'. 

selves be imputed, either as good or evil, nut a person is de- 
serving of praise when, by hi* application and care, these quali- 
ties are perfected, or the*e dele- i- F€ mended; and, or. the 
contrary, one is justly acronntable for the imperfections and in- 
firmities, that arise from bad conduct or neglect. 

6. The effects of external causes and events, of what kind so- Of events 

ever, cannot be attributed to a person either as t*ood or evil, but P rotluced 

by exter- 
inasmuch as he could and ought to procure, hinder, or direct nalcauses. 

them; and as he has been either careful or negligent in this res- 
pect. Thus we charge a good or bad harvest to a husbandman's 
account, according as he has tilled well or il! the ground, whose 
culture was committed to his care. 

IV. 7. As for things done through error or ignorance, we or what 
may affirm in general, that a person if not answerable for what is (ione 
he has done through invincible ignorance, especially as it is in- ignorance 
voluntary in its origin and cause. If a prince travels through or error - 
his own dominions disguised and incognito, his subject? are not 

to blame for not paying him the respect and honor due to him. 
But we should reasonably impute an unjust sentence to a judge, 
who, neglecting to instruct himself either in the fact or the law, 
should happen to want the knowledge neressary to decide with 
equity. But the possibility of getting instruction, and the care 
we ought to take for this purpose, are not strictly considered in 
the common run of life; we only look upon what is possible or 
impossible in a moral sense, and with a due regard to the actual 
state of humanity. 






«4 THE PRINCIPLES OF 



: 



Ignorance or error in point of laws and duties generally passes 
for voluntary, and does not obstruct the imputation of actions or 
omissions thence arising. This is a consequence of the princi- 
ples,* already established. But there may happen some particu- 
lar cases, wherein the nature of the thing, which of itself is diffi- 
eult to investigate, joined to the character and state of the per- 
son, whose faculties, being naturally limited, have likewise been 
uncultivated for want of education and assistance, renders the 
error unsurmountable, and consequently worthy of excuse. It 
concerns the prudence of the legislator to weigh these circum- 
stances; and to modify the imputation on this footing. 
Oftheef- V. 8. Though temperament, habits, and passions, have of 

lectof themselves a great force to determine some actions; yet this 

tempera- ° ' * 

menu hab- force is not such, as absolutely hinders the use of reason and lib- 

sions PaS " er ty' at * eas ' * n res P ect to the execution of the bad designs 
they inspire. That is what all legislators suppose; and a very 
good reason they have to suppose it.j Natural dispositions, hab- 
its, and passions, do not determine men invincibly to violate the 
laws of nature. These disorders of the soul are not incurable; 
with some pains and assiduity one may contrive to remove them, 
according to Cicero's observation, who alledges to this purpose 
the example of Socrates. | 

But if, instead of endeavouring to correct those vicious dis- 
positions, we strengthen them by habit, this does not render us 
inexcusable. The power of habit is indeed very great; it evea 
seems to impel us b}' a kind of necessity. And yet experience 
shows it is not impossible to master it, when we are seriously 
resolved to make the attempt. And were it even true, that in- 
veterate habits had a greater command over us than reason ; 
yet, as it was in our power not to contract them, they do not at 
all diminish the immorality of bad actions, and consequently 
they cannot hinder them from being imputed. On the contrary, '- 
as a virtuous habit renders actions more commendable; so the 
habit of vice cannot but augment its blame and demerit. In short, 
if inclinations ? passions, or habits, could frustrate the effect of 
laws, it would be needless to trouble our heads about any direc- 

* See part i. chap. i. § 12. f See paK i. chap. ii. J 16, 

4 Tusenl. quwst. lib. 4. cap. 37. 



NATURAL LAW. 17$ 



tion of human actions; for the principal object of laws in general 
is to correct bad inclinations, to prevent vicious habits, to hinder 
their effects, and to eradicate the passions; or at least to contain 
them within their proper limits. 

VI. 9 The different cases, hitherto exposed, contain nothing of forced 
very difficult or puzzling. There are some others a little more actl0ns - 
embarrassing, which require a particular discusssion. 

The first question is, what we are to think of forced actions ; 
whether they are of an imputable nature, and ought actually to 
be imputed ? 

I answer, 1. That a physical violence, and such as absolutely 
cannot be resisted, produces an involuntary action, which, so far 
from meriting to be actually imputed, is not even of an imputable 
nature.* In this rase the author of the violence is the true and 
only cause of the action, and as such is the only person answer- 
able for it; whilst the immediate agent being merely passive, 
the fadt can be no more attributed to him, than to the sword, 
to the stick, or to any other weapon, with which the blow or 
wound was given. 

2. But if the constraint arises from the apprehension or fear 
of some great evil, with which we are menaced by a person 
! more powerful than ourselves, and who is aide instantly to inflict 
it; it must be allowed that the action dune in consequence of this 
fear, does not cease to be voluntary, and therefore, generally 
speaking, is of an imputable nature.! 

In order to know aftei wards whether it ought actually to be 
imputed, it is necessary to inquire, whether the person, on 
whom the constraint is i. . under a rigorous obligation of 
doing or abstaining from a th»i. s . hazard of suffering the 

evil, with which he is menaced. If and he determines 

contrary to his duty, the constraint is Bfc ffi i^nt reason to 

screen him absolutely from imputation. For, generally speak- 
ing, it cannot be questioned but a lawful superior can lay us 
under an indispensable obligation of obeying his orders, at the 
hazard of bodily pain, and even at the risk of our lives. 

Vil. Pursuant to these principles, we must distinguish be- Forcedac- 

tween indifferent actions, and those that are morally necessary, tionsareei- 

* ther good, 

• See sect. }, f See part L chap. ii. sect* l^< duTeEent!^ 



176 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

An action indifferent in its nature, extorted by main force, can- 
not be imputed to the person constrained; because, not being 
under any obligation in this respect, the author of the violence 
has no right to require any thing of him. And, as the law of 
nature expressly forbids all manner of violence, it cannot au- 
thorise it at the same time, by laying the person, who suffers the 
violence, under a necessity of executing a thiug, to which he 
has given only a forced consent. Thus every forced promise 
or convention is null of itself and has nothing in it obligatory, as 
a promise or convention; on the contrary it may and ought to 
be imputed as a crime to the author of the violence. But were 
we to suppose that the person, who uses the constraint, ex- 
ercises in this respert his own right, and pursues the execution 
thereof; the action, though forced, is still valid and attended 
with all its moral effects. Thus a debtor, who, void of any prin- 
ciple of honesty, satisfies his creditor only through imminent fear 
of imprisonment, or of execution on his goods, cannot complain 
against his payment, as made by constraint and violence. For 
being under an obligation of paying his just debts, he ought to 
have done it willingly and of his own accord, instead of being 
obliged to it by force. 

As for good actions, to which a person is determined by force, 
and, as it were, through fear of blows or punishment, they pass 
for nothing, and merit neither praise nor recompense. The 
reason hereof is obvious. The obedience, required by the law. 
ought to be sincere ; and we should discharge our duties through 
a conscientious principle, voluntarily, and with our own consent 
and free will. 

Finally, with regard to actions manifestly bad or criminal, to 
which a person is forced through fear of some great evil, and 
especially death; we must iay down as a general rule, that the 
unhappy circumstances, under which a person labours, may 
indeed diminish the crime of a man unequal to this trial, who 
Commits a bad action in spite of himself, and against his own 
inward conviction ; yet the action remains intrinsically vicious, 
and worthy of censure; wherefore it may be, and actually is im 
puted, unless the exception of necessity can be alleged in the 
person's favor. 



NATURAL LAW. 177 

VIII. This last rule is a consequence of the principles, hith- Whya bad 
erto established. A man, who determines through fear of some Jhoueh 
great evil, but without suffering any physical violence, to do a forced, 
thing visibly criminal, concurs in some manner to the action, and 1^^^, 
acts voluntarily, though with regret. It does not absolutely sur- 
pass the fortitude of the human mind to resolve to suffer, nay to 
die, rather than be wanting in our duty. We see a great many 
people, who have a courage of this kind for frivolous subjects, 
which makes a lively impression on them; and though the thing 
be really difficult, yet it is not impossible. The legislator may 
therefore impose a rigorous obligation of obeying, and have just 
reasons for so doing. The interest of society frequently requires 
examples of undaunted constancy. It was never a question among 
civilized nations, and those, that had imbibed any principles of 
morality, whether, for example, it was lawful to betray one's 
country for the preservation of life ? And it is well known, that 
the opposite maxim was a received principle among the Greeks 
and Romans. Several heathen moralists have strongly inculcated 
this doctrine, namely, that the dread of pains and torments ought 
not to prevail upon any man to make him do things contrary to 
religion or justice. If you are summoned ay a witness, says a Latin 
poet, in a dubious and equivocal aj/'uir, tell the truth, and do not 
be afraid ; tell, it, were even Vhalaris to menace you with his bull 
unless you bore false witness. Fix it as a maxim in your mind y 
that it is of the greatest of evils to prefer life to honour; and never 
attempt to preserve it at the expense of the only thing, that can ren- 
der it desirable. 

Jlmbiguai si quando citabere testis 

Incertarque rei ; Phularis licet impcret, ut sis 
Falsus, ct adtnoto diclet penjuria tauro, 
Summum crede nefas animam prcrferre pudori\ 
FA propter vitam vivendi pcrdere causas. 

Juven. Sat. viii. ver. 80, 

And if a witness in a doubtful cause, 

Where a brib'd judge means to elude the laws: 



iff 



m THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Though Phalaris 9 brazen bull were there, 

And he would dictate what he'd have you swear. 

Be not so profligate, but rather choose 

To guard your honour, and your life to lose, 

Rather than let your virtue be betrayed, 

Virtue, the noblest cause, for which you're mode. 

Stepney^ 

Such is the rule. It may happen nevertheless, as we have al- 
ready hinted, that the necessity a person is under may furnish a 
favorable exception, so as to hinder the action from being impu- 
ted. To explain this, we should be obliged to enter into some 
particulars, that belong to another place. It is sufficient here to 
observe, that the circumstances a person is under give us fre- 
quent room to form a reasonable presumption, that the legislator 
himself excuses him from suffering the evil, with which he is 
menaced, and therefore allows him to deviate from ,the decision 
of the law; and this may be always presumed, when the side a 
person takes, in order to extricate himself from his perplexity, 
includes a less evil than that, with which he is menaced. 
Puffen- IX. But PufFendorf's principles concerning this question seem 

to be neither just in themselves, nor well connected. He lav? 
down as a rule, that constraint, as well as physical and actual 
violence, excludes all imputation, and that an action, extorted 
through fear, ought no more to be imputed to the immediate 
agent, than to the sword, which a person uses in giving a wound. 
To which he adds, that with regard to some very infamous ac- 
tions, it is a mark of a generous mind to choose rather to die, 
than to serve as an instrument to such flagitious deeds, and that 
cases like these ought to be excepted.* But it has been justly 
observed, that this author gives too great an extent to the effect 
of constraint; and that the example of the axe or sword, which 
are mere passive instruments, proves nothing at all. Besides if 
the general principle is solid, we do not see why he should have 



f See \he "Duties of Man and a Citizen, book i. chap. i. sect. 24. and 
the Law of Nature and Nations, book i. chap. v. sect, 9. with Barbeyrac*s 
notes. 



dorl 's 
opinion 



NATURAL LAW. 179 

excepted particular cases; or at least he ought to have given us 

some rule to distinguish those exceptions with certainty. 

X. 10. But if the person who does a bad action through fear, Of actions 

is generally answerable for it, the author of the constraint is not «J!?™ 

more per - 

less so ; and we may justly render him accountable for the sons than 

share he has had therein. on ® "* 

concem- 

This gives an opportunity to add a few reflections on those ed. 
cases, in which several persons concur to the same action; and 
to establish some principles, whereby we may determine in what 
manner the action of one person is imputable to another. This 
subject, being of great use and importance, deserves to be treated 
with exactness. 

1. Every man, strictly speaking, is answerable only for his 
own actions, that is for what he himself has done or omitted ; for 
with regard to another person's actions, they cannot be imputed 
to us, but inasmuch as we have concurred to them, and as we 
could and ought to have procured, hindered, or at least directed 
them after a certain manner. The thing speaks lor itself. For 
to impute another man's actions to a person is declaring, that the 
latter is the efficient, though not the only cause thereof; and 
consequently that this action depended in some measure on will, 
either in i is principle, or execution. 

2. This being premised, we may affirm that every man is 
under a general obligation of doing all he can to induce every 
other person to discharge his duty, and to prevent him from 
committing a bad action, and consequently not to contribute 
thereto himself either directly or indirectly, with a premeditated 
purpose and ivill. 

D. By a much stronger reason we are answerable for the ac- 
tions of those, over whom we have a particular inspection, and 
whose direction is committed to our care ; wherefore the good 
or evil done by those persons, is not only imputable to therm 
selves, but likewise to those, to whose direction they are sub- 
ject ; according as the latter have taken or neglected the care, 
that was morally necessary ; such as the nature and extent of 
their commission and power required. It is on this footing we 
impute, for example, to the father of a family, the good or bad 
conduct of his children. 



180 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

4. Let us observe likewise, that, in order to be reasonably 
esteemed to have concurred to another man's action, it is not at 
all necessary for us to be sure of procuring or hindering it, by 
doing or omitting particular things ; it is sufficient, in this res* 
pect, that we have some probability, or verisimilitude. And 
as, on the one side, this default of certainty does not excuse neg- 
lect ; on the other if we have done all, that we ought, the 
want of success cannot be imputed to us ; the blame in that case 
falls entirely upon the immediate author of the action. 

5. In fine, it is proper also to remark, that in the question 
now before us, we are not enquiring into the degree of virtue or 
malice, which is found in the action itself, and, rendering it bet- 
ter or worse, augments its praise or censure, its recompense or 
punishment. All that we want, is to make a proper estimate of 
the degree of influence a person has had over another man's ac- 
tion, in order to know, whether he can be considered as the moral 
cause thereof, and whether this cause is more or less effica- 
cious. To distinguish this properly is a matter of some impor- 
tance. 

Three XI. In order to measure as it were this degree of influence, 

moral cau- which decides the manner, wherein we can impute to any one 

ses; prin- another man's action, there are several circumstances and dis- 

oir)stl sub* 

altern,and tinctions to be observed, without which we should form a wrong 

collateral, judgment of things. For example, it is certain that a simple 
approbation, generally speaking, has much less efficacy to induce 
a person to act, than a strong persuasion, or a particular insti- 
gation. And yet the high opinion we conceive of a person, and 
the credit thence arising, may occasion a simple approbation to 
have sometimes as great, and perhaps a greater influence over a 
man's action, than the most pressing persuasion, or the strongest 
instigation from another quarter. 

We may range under three different classes the moral causes, 
that influence another man's action. Sometimes it is a principal 
cause, insomuch that the person, who executes, is only a subal- 
tern agent; sometimes the immediate agent on the contrary, i* 
the principal cause, while the other is only the subaltern ; and 
at other times they are both collateral causes, which have a? 
.equal influence over the action. 



NATURAL LAW. 181 

XII. A person ought to be esteemed the principal cause, who, 
by doing or omitting some things, influences in such a mannef 
another man's action or omission, that, were it not for him, this 
action or omission, would not have happened, though the imme- 
diate agent has knowingly contributed to it. An officer, by ex- 
press order of his general or prince, performs an action evident- 
ly bad. In this case the prince or general is the principal cause, 
and the officer only the subaltern. David was the principal cause 
of the death of Uriah, though Joab contributed thereto, being 
sufficiently apprized of the king's intention. In like manner 
Jezebel was the principal cause of the death of Naboth.* 

I mentioned that the immediate agent must have contributed 
knowingly to the action. For supose he could not know whether 
the action be good or bad, he can then be considered only as a 
simple instrument; but the person, who gave the orders, being 
in that case the only and absolute cause of the action, is the only 
one answerable for it. Such in general is the case of subjects, 
who serve by order of their sovereign in an unjust war. 

But the reason why a superior is deemed the principal cause 
of what is done by those, who depend on him, is not properly 
their depeodance; it is the order he gives them, without which it 
is supposed they would not of themselves have attempted the ac- 
tion. From this it follows, that every other person, who has the 
same influence over the actions of his equals, or even of his su- 
periors, may for the same reason be considered, as the principal 
cause. This is what we may very well apply to the counsellors 
of princes, or to the ecclesiastics who have an ascendancy over 
their minds, and who make a wrong use of it sometimes, in order 
to persuade them to things, which they would never have deter- 
mined to do of themselves. In this case, praise or blame fall* 
principally on the author of the suggestion or counsel. t 

* See 2 Sam. chap. ii. and 1 Kings, chap. xxi. 

■j- We shall transcribe here, -with pleasure the judicious reflections of 
M. Bernard (Nouvelles de la republiquedes letters, August 1702, p. 291.) 
In England it is very common to charge the faults of the prince to the 
ministers; and I own. that very often the charge is just. But the crimes 
of the ministers do not always excuse the faults of the sovereign; for af- 
ter all they have reason and understanding, as well as other people, and 
are masters to do as they please. If they let them. -elves be too much gov~ 



182 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

XIII. A collateral cause is he, who, in doing or omitting cer- 
tain things, concurs sufficiently, and as much as in him lies, to 
another man's action ; insomuch that he is supposed to co-ope- 
rate with him; though one cannot absolutely presume, that with- 
out his concurrence the action would not have been committed. 
Such are those, whose furnish succors to the immediate agent ; 
or those, who shelter and protect him; for example, he, who, 
while another breaks open the door, watches all the avenues of 
the house, in order to favor the robbery, &c. A conspiracy 
among several people renders them generally all guilty alike. 
They are all supposed equal and collateral causes, as being asso- 
ciated for the same fact, and united in interest and will. And 
though each them has not an equal part in the execution, yet 
their actions may be very well charged to one another's account. 

XIV. Finally a subaltern cause is he, who has but a small in- 
fluence or share in another man's action, and is only a slight 
occasion thereof by facilitating its execution; insomuch that the 
agent, already absolutely determined to act, and having all the 
necessary means for so doing, is only encouraged to execute his 
resolution; as when a person tells him the manner of going 
about it, the favorable moment, the means of escaping, fee or 
when he commends his design, and animates him to pursue it. 

May not we rank in the same class the action of a judge, who, 
instead of opposing an opinion supported by a generality of votes, 
but by himself adjudged erroneous, should acquiesce therein, ei- 
ther through fear or complaisance ? Bad example must be also 
ranked among the subaltern causes. For generally speak- 
ing, examples of this nature make impressions only on those 



erned by those, who have the freest access to them, it is their fault. They 
ought on several occasions to see with their own eves, and not to be led 
by the nose by a wicked and avaiicious courtier. But if they are unable 
to manage matters themselves, and to distinguish good from evil, they 
ought to resign the care of government to others who are capable; for I 
do not know why we may not apply to princes, who govern ill, the saying 
of Charles Borronieus, in respect to bishops, >vho do not feed properly 
their flocks. If they are incapable of such an employment, wht 

SO MUCH AMBITION? IF THEY ARE CAPABLE, WHY SO MUCH NEGLECT > 



NATURAL LAW. 183 

who are otherwise inclined to evil, or subject to be easily led 
astray; insomuch that those, who set such examples, contribute 
but very weakly to the evil, committed by imitation. And yet 
there are some examples so very efficacious, by reason of the 
character of the persons, who set them, and the disposition of 
those, who follow them, that, if the former had refrained from 
evil, the latter would never have thought of committing it. 
Such are the bad examples of superiors, or of men, who by their 
knowledge and reputation have a great ascendancy over others ; 
these are particularly culpable of the evil, which ensues from 
the imitation of their actions. We may reason in the same 
manner with respect to several other cases. According as cir- 
cumstances vary, the same things have more or less influence on 
other men's actions, and consequently those, who by so doing 
concur to these actions, ought to be considered sometimes as 
principal, sometimes as collateral, and sometimes, as subaltern 
causes. 

XV. The application of these distinctions and principles is Applied- 
obvious. Supposing every thing else equal, collateral causes these dis- 
ought to be judged alike. But principal causes merit without tinction* 
doubt more praise or blame, and a higher degree of recompense 
or punishment, than subaltern causes. 1 said, supposing every 
thing else ejual ; for it may happen, through a diversity of cir- 
cumstances, which augment or diminish the merit or demerit 
of an action, that the subaltern cause acts with a greater degree 
of malice than the principal one, and the imputation is thereby 
aggravated in respect to the subaltern. Let us suppose, for ex- 
ample, that a person in cool blood assassinates a man, at the in- 
stigation of one, who was animated thereto by some attrocious 
injury he had received from his enemy. Though the instigator 
is the principal author of the murder, yet his action, done in a 
transport of choler, will be esteemed less heinous, than that of 
the murderer, who, calm and serene himself, was the base in» 
strument of the other's passion. 

We shall close this chapter with a few remarks; and 1. 
though the distinction of three classes of moral causes in res- 
pect to another man's action, be in itself very well founded, we 



1U THE PRINCIPLES OF 

must own nevertheless, that the application thereof to particu- 
lar cases is sometimes difficult. 2. In dubious cases, we should 
not easily eharge, as a principal cause, any other person, than 
the immediate author of the action ; we ought to consider those, 
who have concurred thereto, rather as subaltern, or at the most 
as collateral causes. 3 In fine it is proper to observe, that 
Puffendorf, whose principles we have followed, settles very 
justly the distinction of moral causes ; but, not having exactly 
defined these different causes, in the particular examples he al- 
leges, he refers sometimes to one class what properly belonged 
to another. This has not escaped Mons. Barbeyrac, whose judi- 
cious remarks have been here of particular use to us.* 

CHAP. XII. 



Of the Authority and Sanction of Natural Laws;\ and I. of the 
Good or Evil, that naturally and generally follows from Virtue, 
@r Vice. 



iW. 



What is I. T ▼ E understand here, by the authority of natural laws, 

meant by , ~ \ J 

theauthor- lne torce the y receive from the approbation of reason, and 
of natural especially from their being acknowledged to have God for 
their author; this is what lays us under a strict obligation of 
conforming our conduct to them, because of the sovereign right, 
which God has over his creatures. What has been already 
explained, concerning the origin and nature, reality and cer- 
tainty of those laws, is, sufficient methinks to establish also 
their authority. Yet we have still some small matter to say 
in relation to this subject. The force laws, properly so cal- 
led, depends principally on their sanction. J This is what gives 
a stamp, as it were, to their authority. It is therefore a very 
necessary and important point, to inquire whether there be 
really any such thing, as a sanction of natural laws, that is ; 



* See Barbeyrac's notes onfthe Duties of a Man and a Citixen, book i. 
chap, i. sect. 27. 

f See Puffendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. it. } 2\. 

% See part i. chap. x. sect. 11. 



NATURAL LAW. 185 

whether they are accompanied with comminations and promises, 
punishments and rewards. 

II. The first reflection, that presents itself to our minds, is The ob- 

r r i servance 

that the rules of conduct, distinguished by the name ot natural of natura i 

laws, are proportioned in such manner to our nature, to the ,aws 

' * r forms the 

original dispositions and natural desires of our soul, to our con- happiness 

stitutton, to our wants and actuai situation in life, that it evidently of , man . 

and socie- 
appears they were made for us. For in general, and every ty. 

thing well considered, the observance of those laws is the only 

means of procuring a real and solid happiness to individuals, as 

well as to the public; whereas the infraction thereof precipitates 

men into disorders prejudicial alike to individuals, as to the 

whole species. This is, as it were, the first sanction of natural 

laws. 

III. In order to prove our point, and to establish rightly the Ecclaircis- 
state of the question, we must observe, I. that when the obser- ^"tue 
ranee of natural laws is said to be capable alone of forming the state of 
happiness of man and society, we do not mean, that this happi- t « lon# 
ness can be ever perfect, or superior to all expectation; hu- 
manity having no pretence to any thing of this kind ; and if vir- 
tue itself cannot produce this effect, it is not at all probable that 

vice has any advantage over her in this respect. 

2. As we are inquiring which is the proper rule, that man 
ought to go by, our question is properly reduced to this point, 
whether in general, and every thing considered, the observance 
of natural laws is not the properest and surest means to conduct 
man to his end, and to procure him the purest, the completest, 
and the most durable happiness, that can possibly be enjoyed in 
this world; and not only with regard to some persons, but to all 
mankind ; not only in particular cases, but likewise through the 
whole course of life. 

On this footing, it will not be a difficult task to prove, as well 
by reason as by experience, that the proper and ordinary effect 
of virtue is really such, as has been mentioned, and that vice, 
or the irregularity of passions, produces a quite opposite ef 
feet. 

Z 



m THE PRINCIPLES OF 

Proof of IV. We have already shewn, in discoursing of the nature and 
mentS'neii state of humanity, that, in what manner and light soever we con- 
truth by sider the system of humanity, man can neither answer his end, 
reason- ^^ p erfect hig talents and faculties, nor acquire any solid happi- 
ness, or reconcile it with that of his fellow creatures, but by the 
help of reason ; that it ought to be therefore his first care to im- 
prove his reason, to consult it, and to follow the counsels there- 
of; that it informs him, there are some things, which are fit, and 
others unfit for him ; that the former have not all an equal fit- 
ness, nor in the same manner ; that he ought therefore to make 
a proper distinction between good and evil, in order to regulate 
his conduct ; that true happiness cannot consist in things in- 
compatible with his nature and state ; and, in fine, that since the 
future ought to be equally the object of his views, as the pres- 
ent and past, it is not sufficient, in order to attain certain happi- 
ness, to consider merely the present good or evil of each action ; 
but we should likewise recollect what is past, and extend our 
views to futurity, in order to combine the whole, and see what 
ought to be the result thereof in the entire duration of our being. 
These are so many evident and demonstrable truths. Now the 
laws of nature are no more than consequences of these primi- 
tive truths ; whence it appears that they have necessarily, and of 
themselves, a great influence on our happiness. And how is it 
possible to call this in question, after having seen in the course 
of this work, that the sole method to discover the principles of 
those laws, is to set out with the study of the nature and state of 
man, and to enquire afterwards into what is essentially agreeable 
to his perfection and happiness. 
Proofs by V. But that, which appears so clear and so well established by 

expeu- reason, is rendered incontestible bv experience. In fact we 

ence. . 

1. Virtue generally observe, that virtue, that is, the observance of the laws 

the prin- °* nature » * s °* itse ** a source of internal satisfaction, and that 

ciple of an it is infinitely advantageous in its effects, whether in particular to 

satisfL- individuals, or to human society in general, whereas vice is at- 

tion; and tended with quite different consequences. 

principle Whatever is contrary to the light of reason and conscience 

of disquiet 

h trouble. 



NATURAL LAW. 187 

cannot but be accompanied witb a secret disapprobation of mind, 
and afford us vexation and shame. The heart is afflicted with 
the idea of the crime, and the remembrance thereof is always 
bitter and sorrowful. On the contrary, every conformity to right 
reason is a state of order and perfection, which the mind ap- 
proves ; and we are framed in such a manner, that a good action 
becomes the seed as it were of a secret joy; and we always re- 
collect it with pleasure. And indeed what can be sweeter or 
more comfortable, than to be able to bear an inward testimony to 
ourselves, that we are what we ought to be, and that we perform 
what is reasonably our duty, what fits us best, and is most con- 
formable to our natural destination ? Whatever is natural is agree- 
able ; and whatever is according to order, is a subject of satisfac- 
tion and content. 

VI. Besides this internal principle of joy, which attends the of exter. 

practice of natural laws, we find it produces externally all sorts nal . S°?, d9 

and evils, 
of good effects. It tends to preserve our health, and to prolong which are 

our days ; it exercises and perfects the faculties of the mind : it the conhe ' 

r ' qucuce of 

renders us fit for labour, and for all the functions of domestic and virtue and 

civil life ; it secures to us the right use and possession of all our Vice * 
goods and property ; it prevents a great number of evils, and 
softens those it cannot prevent ; it procures us the confidence, 
esteem, and affection of other men ; whence result the greatest 
comforts of social life, and the most effectual helps for the suc- 
cess of our undertakings. 

Observe on what the public security, the tranquility of fami- 
lies, the prosperity of states, and the absolute welfare of every 
individual are founded. Is it not on the grand principles of re- 
ligion, temperance, modesty, beneficence, justice, and sincerity ? 
Whence arise, on the contrary, the greatest part of the disor- 
I ders and evils, that trouble society, and break in upon the hap- 
I piness of man ? Whence, but from the neglect of those very 
principles ? Besides the inquietude and infamy, that generally 
accompanies irregularity and debauch, vice is likewise attended 
with a multitude of external evils, such as the enfeebling of the 
body and mind, distempers and untoward accidents, poverty very 
often and misery, violent and dangerous parties, domestic jars, en- 
mities, continual fears, dishonor, punishments, contempt, hatred, 



188 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

and a thousand crosses and difficulties in every thing we under- 
take. One of the ancients has very elegantly said,* that malice 
drinks one half her own poison. 
These dif- VII. But if such are the natural consequences of virtue and 
fects of " v * ce m res P ect to the generality of mankind, these effects are 

virtue and still greater among those, who by their condition, and rank have 

vice are , . n ' . _ . . , 

still great- a particular influence on the state of society, and determine the 

er among f a t e of other men. What calamities might not the subiects ap- 
tho< who ,,.,.'.. ," T 

arc invest- prebend, if their sovereigns were to imagine themselves superior 

ed wifh to ru j e an( j independent of all law ; if, directing everv thing 
power and r J 

authority, to themselves, they were to listen only to their own whims and 

caprice, and to abandon themselves to injustice, ambition, ava- 
rice, and cruelty ? What good, on the contrary, must notarise 
from the government of a wise and virtuous prince ; who, con- 
sidering himself under a particular obligation of never deviating 
from the rules of piety, justice, moderation, and beneficence, 
exercises his power with no other view, but to maintain order 
within, and security without, and places his glory in ruling his 
subjects uprightly, that is, in making them wise and happy ? 
We need only have recourse to history, and consult experience, 
to be convinced, that these are real truths, which no reasonable 
person can contest. 

Confirma- VIII. This is a truth so generally acknowledged, that all the 

tionofthis r & J , . - 

truth by institutions, which men form among themselves ior their com- 

the comes- mon ^ Rn( j a d V antage, are founded on the observance of the 

sion or ail b w 

nations. laws of nature ; and that even the precautions, taken to secure 

the effect of these institutions, would be vain and useless, were 
it not for the authority of those very laws. This is what is 
manifestly supposed by all human laws in general ; by the estab- 
lishments for the education of youth ; by the political regulations, 
which tend to promote the arts and commerce ; and by public 
as well as private treaties. For of what use would all those 
things be, or what benefit could accrue from them, were we not 
previously to establish them on justice, probity, sincerity, and the 
sacred inviolability of an oath, as on their real foundation and 
basis? 

* Seneca, ep. 82. Quemadodum Attalus noster dicere solebat, malitia, 
ipsa maximum partem veneni sui bibit. 



/ NATURAL LAW. 189 

IX. But in order to be more sensibly satisfied of this truth, Confirma- 

r c ■•* tionofthe 

let any one try, who pleases, to form a system ot morality, on same truth 

principles directly opposite to those, we have now established, by the ab. 
Let us suppose, that ignorance and prejudice take the place of the con- 
knowledge and reason ; that caprice and passion are substituted trary ' 
instead of prudence and virtue. Let us banish justice and benevo- 
lence from society, and from the commerce of mankind, to make 
room for unjust self-love, which calculating every thing for it- 
self, takes no notice of other people's interest, or of the public 
advantage. Let us extend and apply these principles to the par- 
ticular condition of human life, and we shall see what must be 
the result of a system of this kind, were it ever to be received 
and pass for a rule. Can we imagine it would be able to pro- 
duce the happiness of society, the good of families, the advan- 
tage of nations, and the welfare of mankind ? No one has ever 
yet attempted to maintain such a paradox ; so evident and glaring 
is the absurdity thereof. 

X. I am not ignorant, that injustice and passion are capable in Answer to 
particular cases of procuring some pleasure or advantage. But, * ome P*/"- 
not to mention that virtue produces much oftener and with great- jections. 
er certainty the same effects ; reason and experience inform us, 

that the good procured by injustice, is not so real, so durable, 
nor so pure, as that, which is the fruit of virtue. This is be- 
cause the former, being unconformable to the state of a rational 
and social being, is defective in its principle, and has only a de- 
ceitful appearance. * v It is a flower, which, having no root, with- 
ers and falls almost as soon as it blossoms. 

With regard to such evils and misfortunes, as are annexed to 
humanity, and to which it may be said, that virtuous people are 
exposed as well as others ; certain it is, that virtue has here also 
a great many advantages. In the first place, it is very proper of 
itself to prevont or remove several of those evils; and thus we 
observe that wise and sober people actually escape a great many 
precipices and snares, into which the vicious and inconsiderate 
are hurried. 2. In cases, wherein wisdom and prudence cannot 
prevent those evils, yet it gives the soul a sufficient vigor to sup- 

• See part i. chap. vi. sect. 3. 



190 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

port them, and counterbalances them with sweets and consola- 
tions, which contribute to abate in great measure their impres- 
sion. Virtue is attended with an inseparable contentment, of 
which nothing can bereave us ; and our essential happiness is 
very little impaired by the transitory, and in some measure, ex- 
ternal accidents, that sometimes disturb us. 

Surprised I am, says Isocrates,* that any one should imagine, 
that those, who adhere constantly to piety and justice, must expect to 
be more unhappy than the unrighteous, and have not a right to 
promise themselves greater advantages from the gods and men. For 
my part, I am of opinion, that the virtuous alone abundantly enjoy 
whatever is worthy of our pursuit ; and the wicked, on the contrary, 
are entirely ignorant of their real interests. He, that prefers in- 
justice to justice, and makes his sovereign good consist in depriving 
another man of his property, is like methinks to those brute crea- 
tures, that are caught by the bait. The unjust acquisition flatters 
his senses at first, but he soon finds himself involved in very great 
evils. Those on the contrary, who take up with justice and piety, 
are not only safe for the present, but have likewise reason to con- 
ceive good hopes for the remainder of their lives. I own indeed, 
that this does not always happen yet it is generally confirmed by ex- 
perience. Now in thirtgs, whose success cannot be infallibly foreseen, 
it is the business of a prudent man to embrace that side, which most 
generally turns out to his advantage. But 7iothing is more v.nrea- 






NATURAL LAW. 191 

sonable, than the opinion of those, who believing that justice has 
something in it more beautiful and more agreeable to the gods than 
injustice, imagine nevertheless that those, who embrace the former, 
are more happy than such as abandon themselves to the latter. 

XI. Thus, every thing duly considered, the advantage is with- Thead- 

p • » t i vantage 

out comparison on the side of virtue. It manifestly appears, a i wavs 

that the scheme of the divine wisdom was to establish a natural ranges it- 

connexion between physical and moral evil, as between the effect s - ldp oi 

and the cause ; and, on the contrary, to entail physical good, or virtue* wd 

' J * . ' , . this is the 

the happiness of man, on moral good, or the practice of virtue ; fi rs t S anc- 

insomuch that, generally speaking, and pursuant to the original jionoftbe 
institution of things, the observance of natural laws is as proper nature, 
and necessary to advance both the public and particular happi- 
ness, as temperance and good regimen is naturally conducive to 
the preservation of health. And as these natural rewards and 
punishments of virtue and vice are an effect of the divine institu- 
tion, they may be really considered, as a kind of sanction of the 
laws of nature, which adds a considerable authority to the maxims 
of right reason. 

XII. And yet we must acknowledge, that this first sanction General 
does not as yet seem sufficient to give all the authority and ^ culty 
weight of real laws to the counsels of reason. For, if we con- from the 
sider the thing strictly, we shall find, that, by the constitution of JjJ^" 
human things, and by our natural dependance upon one another, which ren- 
the general rule above mentioned is not so fixt and invariable, fi^t ^anc- 
but it admits of divers exceptions, by which the force and effect tion in - 
thereof must certainly be weakened. sufficient. 

1. Experience in general shows us, that the degree of happi- Thegoods 

ness or misery, which every one enjoys in this world, is not al- a " d ev,,s 
., • . , °* nature 

ways exactly proportioned and measured to the degree of virtue and for- 

or vice of each particular person. Thus health, the goods of dXibuf 

fortune, education, situation of life, and other external advan- tedune- 

tages generally depend on a variety of conjunctures, which ren- no^cl™* 

der their distribution very unequal ; and these advantages are cording to- 

frequently lost, by accidents, to which all men are equally sub- sontmer^ 

ject. True it is, that the difference of rank or riches does not »t. 



193 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

absolutely determine the happiness or misery of life; yet agree 
we must, that extreme poverty, the privation of all necessary 
means of instruction, excessive labour, afflictions of the mind, 
and pains of the body, are real evils, which a variety of casual- 
ties may bring as well upon virtuous as other men. 
The evils 2. Besides this unequal distribution of natural goods and evils, 
produced h ones t men are no more sheltered, than others, from divers evils 
tice, fall arising from malice, injustice, violence, and ambition. Such are 

as well tJie p ersecu tions of tyrants, the horrors of war, and so many 

upon the r * 

rmocent, other public or private calamities, to which the good and the 

* It- bad are indiscriminately subject. It even frequently happens, 

that the authors of all those miseries are those, who feel least 
their effects; either because of their extraordinary success and 
good fortune, or because their insensibility is arrived to that 
pitch, as to let them enjoy, almost without trouble and remorse, 
the fruit of their iniquities. 

Some* 3. Again. It is not unusual to see innocence exposed to cal- 

timeseven U mny, and virtue itself becomes the object of persecution. Now 

virtue it- . J J r 

self is the in those particular cases, in which the honest man falls, as it 

cause of were a victim to his own virtue, what force can the laws of na- 

persecu- 

tion. ture be said to have, and how can their authority be supported ? 

Is the internal satisfaction, arising from the testimony of a good 

conscience able alone to determine man to sacrifice his property, 

his repose, his honor, and even his life ? And yet those delicate 

conjunctures frequently happen; and the resolution then taken 

may have very important and extensive consequences in relation 

to the happiness and misery of society. 

Themeans XIII. Such is indeed the actual state of things. On the one 

which hu- g j^ e we g t ^ at j n gr enera i t ne observance of natural laws is 

man pru- ' & 

denceem alone capable of establishing some order in society, and of consti- 

ploys u> tuting the happiness of man ; but on the other it appears, that 
those dis- virtue and vice are not always sufficiently characterised by their 
Ukewise e ff ects > an< i by their common and natural consequences, to make 
insuffi- this order on all occasions prevail. 

Hence arises a considerable difficulty against the moral sys- 
tem by us established. All laws, some will say, ought to have a 
sufficient sanction to determine a reasonable creature to obev, bv 



NATURAL LAW. 193 

the prospect of its own good and interest, which is always the 
primum mobile of its actions. Now though the moral system, 
you have spoke of, gives in general a great advantage to its fol- 
lowers over those who neglect it; yet this advantage is neither 
so great, nor so sure, as to be capable of indemnifying us suffi- 
ciently in each particular case for the sacrifices, we are obliged 
to make in the discharge of our duty. This system is not there- 
fore as yet supported with all the authority and force, necessary 
ior the end, that God proposes; and the character of law, espe- 
cially of a law, proceeding from an all-wise being, requires still 
a more distinct, surer, and more extensive sanction. 

That legislators and politicians have been sensible of this de- 
ficiency is manifest, by their endeavouring to supply it in the 
best manner they are able. They have published a civil law, 
which tends to strengthen the law of nature; they have denoun- 
ced punishments against vice, promised rewards to virtue, and 
erected tribunals. This is undoubtedly a new support of justice, 
and the best method, that could be contrived to prevent the fore- 
mentioned inconveniences. And yet this method does not pro- 
vide against every disorder, but leaves still a great vacuum in the 
moral system. 

For 1. There are several evils, as well natural as arising from 
human injustice, from which all the powers of man cannot pre- 
serve even the most virtuous. 2. Human laws are not always 
drawn up in conformity to justice and equity. 3. Let them be 
supposed never so just, they cannot extend to every case. 4. 
The execution of those law* is sometimes committed to weak, 
ignorant, or corrupt men. 5. How great soever the integrity 
of a magistrate may be, still there are many things that escape 
his vigilance. He cannot see and redress every grievance. C. 
It is not an unexampled case, that virtue, im-trasS of finding a 
protector in its judge, meets with an implacable enemy. What 
resource shall be left to innocence in that case? To whom shall 
she fly for succor, if the very person, who ought to undertake 
her protection and defence, is armed against her 

A a 






194 THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Thediffi- XIV. Thus the difficulty still subsists; a great difficulty of 
poJed P is°o"f ver 7 S reat consequence, because on the one side it makes against 
great con- the plan of a divine providence, and on the other it may con- 
sequence. tr - bute tQ inundate what we have said in respect to the empire 
of virtue, and its necessary connexion with the felicity of man. 

So weighty an objection, that has been started in all ages, de- 
serves we should carefully endeavour to remove it. But the 
greater and more real it is, the more probably we may presume 
it has a proper solution. For how is it to be imagined, that the 
Divine Wisdom could have left such an imperfection, such an 
enigma in the moral order, after having regulated every thing se 
well in the physical world ? 

Let us therefore see whether some new reflections on the na- 
ture and distinction of man, will not direct us to a different place 
from the present life, for the solution we are here inquiring. 
What has been said concerning the natural consequences of vir- 
tue and vice on this earth already shows us a demi-sanction of 
the laws of nature. Let us try whether we cannot find an entire 
and proper one, whose species, degree, time, and manner, de- 
pend on the good will of the legislator, and are sufficient to make 
all the compensations, required by strict justice, and to place in 
this, as in every other respect, the system of the divine laws 
much above those of human institution. 



CHAP. XIII. 

Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul. That there is a Sanction? 
properly so called, in respect to Natural Lazv. 



State of I. JL HE difficulty, we have been speaking of, and whick 

the ques- r & 

tion. we attempt here to illustrate, supposes, as every one may see, 

that the human system is absolutely limited to the present life, 

that there is no such thing as a future state, and consequently 

that there is nothing to expect from the Divine Wisdom in favour 

©if the laws of nature, beyond what is manifested in this life. 



NATURAL LAW. 19* 

Were it possible, on the contrary, to prove that the present 
state of man is only the commencement of a more extensive sys- 
tem; and moreover, that the Supreme Being has really been 
pleased to invest the rules of conduct, prescribed to us by rea- 
son, with all the authority of laws, by strengthening them with a 
sanction, properly so called, we might in fine conclude, that 
there is nothing wanting to complete the moral system. 

II. The learned are divided in their opinions with respect to Division 

these important questions. Some there are, who maintain, that ^g How 

reason alone affords clear and demonstrative proofs, not only of it is possi- 

the rewards and punishments of a future life, but likewise of a fc now the 

state of immortality. Others on the contrary pretend, that, by w,tl . of 

J J ' . God in re- 

consulting reason alone, we meet with nothing but obscurity and 8 pect to 

uncertainty, and that, so far from finding any demonstration this tDiS P 0int » 
way, we have not even a probability of a future life. 

It is carrying the thing too far perhaps on both sides, to rea- 
son after this manner. Since the question is concerning a point, 
which depends entirely on the will of the Deity, the best way 
undoubtedly to know this will would be an express declaration 
on his side. But, confining ourselves within the circle of nat- 
ural knowledge, let us try whether independently of this first 
method, reason alone can afford us any sure light in relation to 
this subject, or furnish us with conjectures and presumptions suf- 
ficiently strong, to infer with any certainty the will of God. With 
this view let u~ investigate a little closer the nature and present 
state of man, let us consult the ideas, which right reason gives us 
of the perfection of the Supreme Being, and of the plan, he has 
formed with respect to mankind ; in order to know in fine the 
necessary consequences of the natural laws he has been pleased 
to prescribe. 

II!. With regard to the nature of man, we are first of all to Whether 
inquire, whether death be really the last term of our existence, i mm0 rul. 
and the dissolution of the body be necessarily fallowed by the 
annihilation of the soul; or whether the soul is immortal, that is, 
whether it subsists after the death of the body ? 

Now the immortality of the soul is so far from being in itself First 

J ° proof. The 

impossible, that reason supplies us with the strongest conjee- nature of 

tares, that this is in realitv the state for which it was design- the sou 

° seems en- 

^d. tuely dis- 



196 

tinct from 
that of the 
body. 



Beath 
does not 
therefore 
necessa- 
rily imply 
the anni- 
hilation of 
lb® souU 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

The observations of the ablest philosophers distinguish abso- 
lutely the soul from the body, as being in its nature essentially 
different. 1. In fact we do not find, that the faculties of the mind, 
the understanding, the will, liberty, with all the operations they 
produce, have any relation to those of extension, figure, and mo- 
tion, which are the properties of matter. 2. The idea we have 
of an extended substance, as purely passive, seems to be abso- 
lutely incompatible with that proper and internal activity, which 
distinguishes a thinking being. The body is not put into motion 
of itself, but the mind finds it inwardly the principle of its own 
movements; it acts, it thinks, it wills, it moves the body; it turns 
its operations, as it pleases ; it stops, proceeds, or returns the 
way it went. 3. We observe, likewise, that our thinking part is 
a simple, single, and indivisible being; because it collects all our 
ideas and sensations, as it were, into one point, by understanding, 
feeling, and comparing them, &c* which cannot be done by a be- 
ing composed of various parts. 

IV. The soul seems therefore to be of a particular nature, to 
have nothing in common with gross and material beings, but to 
be a pure spirit, that participates in some measure of the nature 
of the Supreme Being. This has been very elegantly expressed 
by Cicero. We cannot find, says he,* on earth the least trace of 
the origin of the soul. For there is nothing mixt or compounded in 
the mind ; nothing that seems to proceed from the earth, water, air, 
or fire. These elements have nothing productive of memory, un- 
derstanding, reflections; nothing that is able to recal the past, to 
foresee the future, and to embrace the present. We shall never 
find the source, whence man has derived those divine qualities, but 
by tracing them up to God. It follows, therefore, that the soul 
is endowed with a singulamature, which has nothing in it common 



* Aniniorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim in animis 
mixtum atque concreium, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse 
Vidtautur; mail ne aut humidum quidem aut stabile aut igneum. His 
enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim metnons, mentis, cogitationis ha'jeat; 
quod et preterits tene^t, et fatura provideat, et complecti possit prrestn- 
tia; quse sola divina sunt; nee invenitur unquam, unde ad hominem ve. 
iiire possent nisi a Deo. Singularis est igitur quaedt.m natura atque vi s 
animi, sejur-cta ab his uskatis notisque naturis. Ita quicquid est illud 
touod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod >iget : ccelesie et divinum, ob e. 
**mque rem> seternum sit aecesse est. Cic. Tuscul. disput. lib. 1. cap. 87 



NATURAL LAW. -197 

with those known and familiar elements. Hence, let the nature of 
a being, that has sensation, understanding, will, and a principle of 
life, be what it will, this being is surely heavenly, divine, and con- 
sequently imm ortal. 

This conclusion is very just. For if the soul be essentially 
distinct from the body, the destruction of the one is not necessa- 
rily followed by the annihilation of the other ; and thus far noth- 
ing hinders the soul from subsisting, notwithstanding the destruc- 
tion of its ruinous habitation. 

V. Should it be said, that we are not sufficiently acquainted with Objection* 
the intrinsic nature of substances to determine, that God could nswer - 
not communicate thought to some portion of matter ; I should 
answer, that we cannot however judge of things, but according to 

their appearance and our ideas ; otherwise, whatever is not 
founded on a strict demonstration must be uncertain, and this 
would terminate in a kind of pyrrhonism. All, that reason re- 
quires, is, that we distinguish properly between what is dubious, 
probable or certain ; and since all we know in relation to matter 
does not seem to have any affinity with the faculties of the soul; 
and as we even find in one and the other qualities, that seem in- 
compatible ; it is not prescribing limits to the Divine Power, but 
rather following the notions, that reason has given us, to affirm it 
is highly probable, that the thinking part of man is essentially 
distinct from the body. 

VI. But let the nature of the soul be what it will, and be it Confirma- 

L II J 1 ti0n °t tlle 

even, though contrary to all appearance, supposed corporeal; preceding 

still it would no ways follow, that the death of the bodv must trut b* . 
....... Nothmgm 

necessarily bring on the annihilation c: the soul. For wc do nuiureis 

not find an instance of any annihilation properly so called. The ^ ni J lh;la * 
body itself, how inferior soever to the mind, is not annihilated 
by death. It receives indeed a great alteration; but its sub- 
stance remains always essentially the same, and admits only a 
change of modification or furm. Why therefore should the soul 
be annihilated? It will undergo if you please, a great mutation ; 
it will be detached from the bonds that unite it to the body, and 
will be incapable of acting in conjunction with it. But is this an 
argument, that it cannot exist separately, or that it loses its es« 



.ISO THE PRINCIPLES OF 

sential quality, which is that of understanding ? This does not at 
all appear; for one does not follow from the other. 

Were it therefore impossible for us to determine the intrinsic 
nature of the soul, yet it would be carrying the thing too far, and 
concluding beyond what we are authorised by fact to maintain, 
that death is necessarily attended with a total destruction of the 
soul, The question is, therefore, reducible to this point; is God 
willing to annihilate, or to preserve the soul ? But, if what we 
know in respect to the nature of the soul does not incline us to 
think it is destined to perish by death, we shall see likewise, that 
the consideration of its excellency is a very strong presumption 
in favor of its immortality. 
Second VII. And indeed it is not at all probable, that an intelligent 

proof the beings capable of knowing such a multitude of truths, of making 
'tif thesoul. so many discoveries, of reasoning upon an infinite number of 
things, of discerning their proportions, fitness, and beauties: of 
contemplating the works of the Creator, of tracing them up to 
him, of observing his designs, and penetrating into their causes; 
4)f raising itself above all sensible things to the knowledge of 
spiritual and divine subjects; that has a power to act with liberty 
and discernment, and to array itself with the most beautiful vir- 
tues; it is not, I say, at all probable, that a being adorned with 
qualities of so excellent a nature, and so superior to those of 
brute animals, should have been created only for the short space 
of this life. These considerations made a lively impression upon 
the ancient philosophers. When I consider, says Cicero,* the sur- 
prising activity of the mind, so great a memory of what is past, 
and such an insight into futurity; when I behold such a number of 
arts and sciences, and such a multitude of discoveries; I believe, 
mid am firmly persuaded, that a nature, which contains so many 
things within itself, cannot be mortal. 
Gonfirma- VIII. Again, such is the nature of the human mind, that it 
Our facul- iS always capable of improvement, and of perfecting its faculties. 
ties are al- 
ways sus- 
ceptible of . , > 
•a greater Qi 11 " multa; Sic milti persuasi, sic sentio, cum tanta celentas ammo- 

degree of rum sit tanta memoria prseteritorum futurorumque prudentia, tot aries, 
perfection. t anl2e se ientiae, tot invents, non posse earn naturam, quae res eas contineat, 
esse mortalem, Vic. de Senec % cap. % 



NATURAL LAW. \9$ 

Though our knowledge it actually confined within certain limits, 
yet we see no bounds to that, which we are capable of acquiring, 
to the inventions, we are able to make, to the progress of our 
judgment, prudence, and virtue. Man is in this respect always 
susceptible of some new degree of perfection and maturity. 
Death overtakes him before he has finished, as it were, his pro- 
gress, and when he was capable of proceeding a great deal far- 
ther. How can it enter, says a celebrated English writer,* into 
the thoughts of ma ft, that the soul, which is capable of such immense . 

perfections, and of receiving new improvements to all eternity, shall 
fall away into nothing almost as soon as it is created ? Are such 
abilities made for no purpose ? A brute arrives at a point of perfec- 
tion, that he can never pass. In a few years he has all the endow- 
ments he is capable of; and, were he to live ten thousand more, 
would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus 
at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties to be full 
blown, and incapable of jurther enlargements, I could imagine it 
might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of anni- 
hilation. But can we bebeve a thinking being, that s in a perpet- 
ual progress of improvements, and travelling on from perfection to 
perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of its cre- 
ator, and made a few d\scovenes of his infinite goodness, wisdom, 
and power, must perish at its first setting out, and in the very be- 
ginning of its inquiries ? 

IX. True it is, that most men debase themselves in some meas- Objection. 
ure to an animal life, and have very little concern about the im- Answer ' 
provement of their faculties. But, if those people voluntarily 
degrade themselves, this ought to be no prejudice to such, as 

choose to support the dignity of their nature; neither does it in- 
validate what we have been saying in regard to the excellency of 
the soul. For, to judge rightly of things, they ought to be con- 
sidered in themselves, and in their most perfect state. 

X. It is undoubtedly in consequence of the natural sense of Third 
the dignity of our being, and of the grandeur of the end, we §J£wn 
are designed for, that we naturalty extend our views to futurity; from our 
that we concern ourselves about what is to happen after our disposi- 
death; that we seek to perpetuate our name and memory, and Jons and 

* S PICTATOR, Vol. II. No. Ill . 



200 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

are not insensible] to the judgment of posterity. These senti- 
ments are far from being the illusion of self-love or prejudice. 
The desire and hope of immortality is an impression, we receive 
from nature. And this desire is so very reasonable in itself, 
so useful, and so closely connected with the system of humanity, 
that we may at least infer from it a very probable induction in 
favor of a future state. How great soever the vivacity of this 
desire may be in itself, still it increases in proportion, as we take 
more care to cultivate our reason, and as we advance in the 
knowledge of truth and the practice of virtue. This sentiment 
becomes the surest principle of noble, generous, and public spir- 
ited actions; and we may affirm, that, were it not for this prin- 
ciple, all human views would be low, mean, and sordid. 

All this seems to point out to us clearly, that, by the institu- 
tion of the Creator, there is a kind of natural proportion and 
relation between the soul and immortality. For it is not by de- 
ceit and illusion, that the Supreme Wisdom conducts us to his 
proposed end. A principle so reasonable and necessary, a prin- 
ciple, that cannot but be productive of good effects, that raises 
man above himself, and renders him not only capable of the sub- 
limest undertakings, but superior to the most delicate tempta- 
tions, and such, as are most dangerous to virtue; such a princi- 
ple, I say, cannot be chimerical.* , 

Thus every thing concurs to persuade us, that the soul must 
subsist after death. The knowledge we have of the nature of 
the mind, its excellence and faculties ever susceptible of a higher 
degree of perfection, the disposition, which prompts us to raise 
ourselves above the present life, and to desire immortality, are 
all so many natural inclinations, and form the strongest presump- 
tion, that such indeed is the intention of the Creator. 



* Cicero gives an admirable picture of the influence which the desire 
and hope of immortality has had in all ages, to excite men to great and 
noble actions. " Nemo unquam," says he ''sine magna spe :mm.>rtalitatis 
" se pro patria offenet ad mortem, Licuit esse otioso Themistocli; licuit 
'• Epaminondaae; licuit, ne et vetere et externa quae -am mihi: sed nescio 
" quo modo in seret in mentibus quasi saeculorum quoddam auguvium fu- 
** turorum; idque in maximis ingenus altissimisque animis existit maxi- 
" me; et apparet facillime. Q^oquidem dempto, quis tam esset amens, 
"qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret. ,, Tuscul. Quscst. lib 1 
cap. 15. 



NATURAL LAW. 201 

XI. The clearing up of this first point is of great importance The sanc- 
»' • , ,1 i L tionofna- 

ln regard to our principal question, and solves already, in part, tura i i aws 

the difficulty we are examining. For, when once the soul is sup- will show 
posed to subsist after the dissolution of the body, nothing can future life, 
hinder us from saying, that whatever is wanting in the present 
state to complete the sanction of natural law will be executed 
hereafter, if so it be agreeable to the Divine Wisdom. 

We come now from considering man on the physical side, 
which opens us already a passage towards finding the object of 
our present pursuit. Let us see now whether, by viewing man 
on the moral side, that is, as a being capable of rule, who acts 
with knowledge and choice, and whether, raising ourselves af- 
terwards to God, we cannot discover new reasons and still stronger 
presumptions of a future life, of a state of rewards and punish- 
ments. 

Here we cannot avoid repeating part of those things, which 
have been already mentioned in this work, because we are upon 
the point of considering their entire result; the truth, we intend 
here to establish, being as it were the conclusion of the whole 
system. It is thus a painter, after having worked singly upon 
each part of his piece, thinks it necessary to retouch the whole, 
in order to produce what is called the total effect and harmony. 

XII. Man, we have seen, is a rational and free agent, who dis- First 
tinguishes justice and honesty, who finds within himself the prin- P roo *> 
ciples of conscience, who is sensible of his dependance on the from the 
Creator, and born to fulfil certain duties. His greatest ornament JJ^n'con- 
is reason and virtue; and his chief task in life is to advance in sidered ori 
that path, by embracing all the occasions, that offer, to improve, side™ 10 ™ 
to reflect, and to do good. The more he practises and confirms 
himself in sucli laudable occupations, the more he accomplishes 

the views of the Creator, and proves himself worthy of the ex- 
istence he has received. He is sensible, he can be reasonably 
called to an account for his conduct, and he approves or con- 
demns himself according to his different manner of acting. 

From all these circumstances it evidently appears, that man is 

Bb 



202 



Second 

proof, 

drawn 

from the 

perfec. 

t-tons of 

God. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF 

not confined, like other animals, to a mere physical economy, but 
that he is included in a moral one which raises him much higher, 
and is attended with greater consequences. For what appear- 
ance or probability is there, that a soul, which advances daily 
in wisdom and virtue, should tend to annihilation, and that God 
should think proper to extinguish this light in its greatest lustre ? 
Is it not more reasonable to think, that the good or bad use of 
our faculties will be attended with future consequences; that we 
shall be accountable to our Creator, and finally receive the just 
retribution we have merited ? Since, therefore, this judgment of 
God does not display itself sufficiently in this world, it is natural 
to presume, that the plan of the Divine Wisdom, with regard to 
us, embraces a duration of a much greater extent. 

XIII. Let us ascend from man to God, and we shall be still fur- 
ther convinced, that such in reality is the plan he formed. 

If God is willing, (a point we have already proved) that man 
should observe the rules of right reason, in proportion to his fac- 
ulties and the circumstances he is under; this must be a serious 
and positive will. It is the will of the Creator, of the Governor 
of the world, of the sovereign Lord of all things. It is therefore 
a real command, which lays us under an obligation of obeying. 
It is moreover the will of a Being supremely powerful, wise, 
and good ; who, proposing always, both with respect to him- 
self and to his creatures, the most excellent ends, cannot fail 
to establish the means, which in the order of reason, and pur- 
suant to the nature and state of things, are necessary for the 
execution of his design. No one can reasonably contest these 
principles; but let us see what consequences may be drawn from 
them. 

1. If it actually became the Divine Wisdom to give laws to 
man, this same wisdom requires these Jaws should be accompa- 
nied with necessary motives to determine rational and free agents 
to conform thereto in all cases. Otherwise we should be obliged 
to say, either that God does not really and seriously desire the 
observance of the laws he has enacted, or that he wants power 
or wisdom to procure it. 






NATURAL LAW. 203- 

2. If through an effect of his goodness, he has not th ought 
proper to let men live at random, or to abandon them to the ca- 
priciousness of their passions ; if he has given them a light to 
direct them; this same goodness must undoubtedly induce him 
to annex a perfect and durable happiness to the good use, that 
every man makes of this light. 

3. Reason informs us afterwards, that an all-powerful, all-wise, 
and all-bountiful Being is infinitely fond of order ; that the same 
perfections make him desire, that this order should reign among 
his intelligent and free creatures, and that it was for this very 
reason he subjected them to laws. The same reasons, that indu- 
ced him to establish a moral order, engage him likewise to pro- 
cure their observance. It must be therefore his satisfaction and 
glory, to render all men sensible of the difference he makes be- 
tween those, who disturb, and those who conform to order. He 
cannot be indifferent in this respect ; on the contrary, he is de- 
termined, by the love he has for himself and his perfections, to 
invest his commands with all the efficacy necessary to render his 
authority respected. This imports an establishment of future 
rewards and punishments ; either to keep a man within rule, as 
much as possible, in the present state, by the potent motives of 
hope and fear; or to give afterwards an execution worthy of his 
justice and wisdom to his plan, by reducing every thing to the 
primitive order he has established. 

4. The same principle carries us yet further. For if God 
be infinitely fond of the order, he has established in the moral 
world, he cannot but approve of those, who, with a sincere and 
constant attachment to this order, endeavour to please him, by 
concurring to the accomplishment of his views ; and he cannot 
but disapprove of such, as observe an opposite conduct,* for the 
former are, as it were, his friends, and the latter declare them- 
selves his enemies. But the approbation of the Deity imports 
his protection, benevolence, and love ; whereas his disapproba- 
tion cannot but be attended with quite contrary effects. If so 
how can any one imagine, that God's friends and enemies will be 
confuunded, and no difference made between them ? It is not 

* See part ii. chap. x. § 7. 



204 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

much more consonant to reason to think, that the Divine Justice 
will manifest at length, some way or other, the extreme differ- 
ence he places between virtue and vice, by rendering finally and 
perfectly happy those, who by a submission to his will, are be- 
come the objects of his benevolence ; and, on the contrary, by 
making the. wicked feel his just severity and resentment ? 

XIV. This is what our clearest notions of the perfections of 
the Supreme Being induce us to judge concerning his views, and 
the plan he has formed. Were not virtue to meet surely and 
inevitably with a final recompense, and vice with a final punish- 
ment, and this in a general and complete manner, exactly pro- 
portioned to the degree of merit or demerit of each person, the 
x plan of natural laws would never answer our expectations from 
a Supreme Legislator, whose prescience, wisdom, power, and 
goodness, are without bounds. This would be leaving the laws 
divested of their principal force, and reducing them to the qual- 
ity of simple counsels ; it would be subverting in fine the funda- 
mental part of the system of intelligent creatures, namely, that of 
being induced to make a reasonable use of their faculties, with a 
view and expectation of happiness. In short, the moral system 
would fall into a state of imperfection, which could be reconciled 
neither with the nature of man, nor with the state of society, nor 
with the moral perfections of the Deity. It is otherwise, when 
we acknowledge a future life. The moral system is thereby 
supported, connected and finished, so as to leave nothing wanting 
to render it complete. It is then a plan really worthy of God, 
and useful, to man. The Supreme Being does all he ought to do 
with free and rational creatures, to induce them to behave as 
they should; the laws of nature are thus established on the most 
solid foundations; and nothing is wanting to bind man by such 
motives, as are properest to make an impression. 

Hence if this plan be without comparison the most beautiful 
and the best; if it be likewise the most worthy of God, and the 
most connected with what we know of the nature, wants, and 
state of man; how can any one doubt of its being that, which 
the Divine Wisdom has actually chosen ? 



NATURAL LAW. 205 

XV. I acknowledge indeed, that, could we find in the present Theobjec- 

i life a sufficient sanction of the laws of nature, in the measure drawn 

; and plenitude above mentioned, we should have no right to press ft ' 0l P tne 

^resent 
this argument; for nothiug could oblige us to search into futurity state of 

for an entire unravelling of the divine plan. But we have seen tll,n g s » 

r serves to 

in the preceding chapter, that though by the nature of things, and prove the 

even by the various establishments of man, virtue has already ? entlm ent 
J . J it opposes, 

its reward, and vice its punishment; yet this excellent and just 

order is accomplished only in part, and that we find a great num- 
ber of exceptions to this rule in history, and the experience of 
human life. Hence arises a very puzzling objection against the 
authority of natural laws. But as soon as mention is made of 
another life, the difficulty disappears; every tiling is cleared up 
and set to right; the system appears connected, finished, and 
supported; the Divine Wisdom is justified. We find all the ne- 
cessary supplements and compensations to redress the present 
irregularities; virtue acquires a firm and unshaken prop, by fur- 
nishing the virtuous man with a motive capable of supporting 
him in the most dangerous difficulties, and to render him trium- 
phant over the most delicate temptations. 

Were this only a simple conjecture, it might be considered 
rather as a convenient than solid supposition. But we have 
seen, that it is founded also on the nature and excellence of the 
soul ; on the instinct, that inclines us to raise ourselves above 
the present life ; and on the nature of man, considered on the 
moral side, as a creature accountable for his actions, and obliged 
to conform to a certain rule. When besides all this we behold, 
that the same opinion serves to support, and perfectly crowns 
the whole system of natural law, it must be allowed to be no less 
probable than it is beautiful and engaging. 

XVL Hence this same opinion has been received more or less The belief 

at all times, and by all nations, according as reason has been ° ra fi' ture 

J & state has 

more or less cultivated, or as people have inquired closer into been re- 

the origin of things. It would be an easy matter to allege di- c *j lved »Y 

vers historical proofs, and to produce also several beautiful pas- tions. 

sages from the ancient philosophers, in order to show, that the 



206 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

reasons which strike us, made the like impressions on the wisest 
of the Pagans. But we shall be satisfied with observing, that 
these testimonies, which have been collected by other writers, 
are not indifferent on this subject ; because this shows, either the 
vestiges of a primitive tradition, or the voice of reason and na- 
ture, or both ; which adds a considerable weight to our argu- 
ment. 



CHAP. XIV. 

That the Proofs we have alleged have such a Probability and Fit- 
ness, as renders them sufficient to fix our Belief, and to determine 
, our Conduct. 

W 

The I. ▼ T E have seen how far our reason is capable of con 

!Tv eiven ducting us w * tn regard to the important question of the immortal - 
of the ity of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, 

of'natural Each °^ * ne proofs, we have alleged, has without doubt its par- 
laws are ticular force ; but joining to the assistance of one another, and 
acquiring a greater strength by their union, they are certainly 
capable of making an impression on every attentive and unpreju- 
diced mind, and ought to appear sufficient to establish the author- 
ity and sanction of natural law in as full an extent as we desire. 
Objec- U- If any one should say, that all our reasonings on these sub- 

uons. jects are only probability and conjecture, and properly reducible 

proofscon- to a plausible reason or fitness, which leaves the thing still at a 
mirtTthan S rea *er distance from demonstration; I shall agree, if he pleases, 
a fit or that we have not here a complete evidence ; yet the probability, 
Reason 1 . 6 me *hinks, is so very strong, and the fitness so great and so well 
General established, that this is sufficient to make it prevail over the con- 
answer. trary opinion, and consequently to determine us. 

For we should be strangely embarrassed, if in every question, 
that arises, we should refuse to be determined by any thing but 
a demonstrative argument. Most commonly we are obliged to 
be satisfied with an assemblage of probabilities, which, in a con- 
junct consideration, very seldom deceive us, and ought to supply 









NATURAL LAW. 207 

the place of evidence in subjects unsusceptible of demonstration. 
It is thus that in natural philosophy, in physic, criticism, history, 
politics, commerce, and generally in all the affairs of life, a pru- 
dent man is determined by a concurrence of reasons, which, 
every thing considered, he judges superior to the opposite argu- 
ments. 

III. In order to render the force of this kind of proof more What is 

obvious, it will not be amiss to explain here at first what we mean m ^ an u,^ yft 

1 suitable 

by a plausible reuson or fitness ; to inquire afterwards into the reason, 
general principle, on which this sort of reasoning is founded ; 
and to see in particular what constitutes its force, when applied 
to the law of nature. This will be the right way to know the 
just value of our arguments, and what weight they ought to have 
in our determinations. 

A plausible reason or fitness is that, which is drawn from the 
necessity of admitting a point as certain, for the perfection of 
a system in other respects solid, useful, and well connected, but 
which would be defective without this point; when there is no 
reason to suppose that it has any essential effect.* For example, 
upon beholding a great and magnificent palace, we remark an ad- 
mirable symmetry and proportion; where all the rules of ftftj 
which form the solidity, convenience and beauty of a building, 
are strictly observed. In short ail that we see of the building 
denotes an able architect. May it not therefore be reasonably 
supposed, that the foundation, which we do not see, is equally 
solid and proportioned to the great mass it bears ? Can it be 
imagined, that the architect's ability and knowledge should have 
forsaken him in so important a point ? In order to form such 
a supposition, we should have certain proofs of this deficiency, 
or have seen, that in fact the foundation is imperfect; otherwise 
we could not presume so improbable a thing. Who is it, that, on 
a mere metaphysical possibility of the architect's having neg- 
lected to lay the foundation, would venture a wager that the thjng 
is really so? 

IV. Such is the nature of fitness. The general foundation, GeneraJ 
of this manner of reasoning is, that we must consider not only *p« nda - 
-what is possible, but what is probable; and that a truth, of manner of 

reasoning. 
* See chap. viii. sect. £ 






208 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

tself very little known, acquires a probability by its natural con- 
nexion with other truths more obvious. Thus natural philoso- 
phers do not question that they have discovered the truth, when 
an hypothesis happily explains all the phenomena; and an event, 
very little known in history, appears no longer doubtful, when 
we see it serves for a key and basis to many other indubitable 
events. It is on this principle in a great measure, that moral 
certainty is founded,* which is so much used in most sciences, as 
well in the conduct of life, and in things of the greatest import- 
ance to individuals, families, and to the whole society. 
This kind V. But if this manner of judging and reasoning takes place so 
of fitness frequently in human affairs, and is in general founded on so solid 
strong in a principle; it is still much surer when we are to reason on the 
respect to wor k s f g oc | } t discover his plan, and to judge of his views and 
law. designs. For the whole universe, with the several, systems, that 

compose it, and particularly the system of man and society, are 
the work of a supreme understanding. Nothing has been done 
by chance, nothing depends on a blind, capricious, or impotent 
cause; every thing has been calculated and measured with a pro- 
found wisdom. Here therefore, more than any where else, we 
have a right to judge, that so powerful and so wise an Author, 
has omitted nothing necessary for the perfection of his plan ; and 
that consistent with himself he has fitted it with all the essential 
parts, for the design he proposed. If we ought to presume rea- 
sonably such a care in an able architect, who is nothing more 
than a man subject to error ; how much more ought wc to pre- 
sume it in a being of infinite wisdom ? 
This fit- VI. What we have been now saying shews, that this fitness is 

different not always of the same weight, but maybe more or less strong 
degrees, in proportion to the greater or Jess necessity, on which it is 
tojudge established. And to lay down rules on this subject, we may 
«f it. say in general, 1. That the more we know the views and design 

of the author ; 2. The more we are assured of his wisdom 



* See M. Bouliier's philosophical essay on the souls of brutes, &c. second 
edition ; to which has been joined a treatise of the true principles, tha* 
serve as a foundation to moral certainty. Amst. 1737. 



NATURAL LAW. |09 

and power; 3. The more this power and wisdom are perfect; 4. 
The more considerable are the inconveniences, that result from 
the opposite system; and the mure they border upon the absurd, 
the more pressing we find the consequences drawn from this sort 
of considerations. For then we have nothing to set in opposition 
to them by way of counterbalance; and consequently it is on that 
aide we are determined by right reafi 

VII. These principles are of themselves applicable to our sub- Applies.* 
ject, and this in so just and complete a manner, that the reason, ti°ese 
drawn from probability or fitness, cannot be carried any farther, principles 
After what h;is been said in the preceding chapters, it would be guD ; eC £ # 
entering into useless repetitions to attempt to prove here all the 
particulars; the thing sufficiently proves itself. Let us be satis- 
fied with observing, that the fitness in favor of the sain lion of na- 
tural laws is so much the stronger and more pressing, as the con- 
trary opinion throws into tbe system of humanity an obscurity 
and confusion, which borders rery much upon the absurd, if it 
does not come quite up to it. The plan of the Divine Wisdom 
becomes in respect to us an insoluble enigma; we are no longer 
able to account for any thing; and we cannot tell why so neces- 
sary a thing should be wanting in a plan so beautiful in other res- 
pects, so useful, and so perfectly connected. 

\ III. L t us draw a comparison between the two systems, to Comport- 
see which is most conformable to order, most suitable to the na- ^^pl^ 
ture and state of man, anil, in short, most reasonable and worthy *i e ays- 
of God. lems " 

Suppose, on one side, that the Creator proposed the perfection 
and felicity of his creatures, and in particular the good of socie- 
ty. That for this purpose, having invested man with understand- 
ing and liberty, and rendered him capable of knowing his end, of 
discovering and following the road tbat alone can conduct him to 
it, he lays him under a strict obligation of walking constantly in 
this road, and of ever following the light of reason, which ought 
always to direct his steps. That in order to guide him the better, 
he has given him all tbe principles necessary to serve him as a 
rule. That this direction and these principles, coming from a 
powerful, wise, and good superior, have all the characteristics ot 
a real law. That this law carries already along with it, even ia 



210 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

this life, its rewards and punishments; but that this first sanction 
being insufficient, God, in order to give to a plan so worthy of his 
wisdom and goodness its full perfection, and to furnish mankind, 
in all possible cases with necessary motives and helps, has more- 
over established a proper sanction in respect to natural law, 
which will be manifested in a future life; and that, attentive to 
the conduct of man, he proposes to make him give an account of 
his actions, to recompense virtue, and to punish vice, by a retri- 
bution exactly proportioned to the merit or demerit of each per- 
son. 

Let us set now in opposition to this first system the other, 
which supposes that every thing is limited, in respect to man, to 
the present life, and that he has nothing to hope or fear beyond 
this term; that God, after having created man and instituted so- 
ciety, concerns himself no more about them; that, after giving us 
a power of discerning good and evil by the help of reason, he 
takes no manner of notice of the use we make thereof, but leaves 
us in such a manner to ourselves, that we are absolutely at lib- 
erty to do as we please; that we shall have no account to give to 
our Creator, and that, notwithstanding the unequal and irregular 
distribution of the goods and evils of this life, notwithstanding 
the disorders caused by the malice or injustice of mankind, we 
have no redress or compensation ever to expect from God. 
The sys- IX. Can any one say, that this last system is comparable to the 
it™ !'• ^ first ? Does it set the divine perfections in so great a light ? Is 
natural it so worthy of the divine wisdom, bounty, and justice ? Is it so 
preferable P ro P er to stem tne torrent of vice, and to support virtue, in deli- 
to the op- cate and dangerous conjunctures ? Does it render the structure 

T^OSltC SVS* 

lem. °f society as solid, and invest the laws of nature with such an 

authority, as the glory of the Supreme Legislator and the good 
of humanity require ? Were we te choose between two socie- 
ties, one of which admitted the former system, while the other 
acknowledged only the latter, is there a prudent man, who would 
not highly prefer to live in the first of these societies ? 

There is certainly no comparison between these two sys- 
tems, in respect to beauty and fitness; the first is a work of the 
most perfect reason; the second is defective, and provides no 
manner of remedy against a great many disorders. Now even 



NATURAL LAW. 211 

this alone points out sufficiently on which side the truth lies; be- 
cause the business is to judge and reason of the designs and works 
of the Deity, who does every thing with infinite wisdom. 

X. Let no one say, that, limited as we are, it is temerity to de- Objec- 
cide after this manner; and that we have too imperfect ideas of Answer, 
the divine nature and perfections, to be able to judge of his plan 

and designs with any certainty. This reflection, which is in some 
measure true, and in some cases just, proves too much, if applied 
to our subject, and consequently has no weight. Let us but re- 
flect a little, and we shall find, that this thought leads us insensi- 
bly to a kind of pyrrhonism, which would be the subversion of all 
order and economy. For in fine there is no medium; we must 
choose one of the two systems above explained. To reject the 
first is admitting the second with all its inconveniences. This re- 
mark is of some importance, and alone is almost sufficient to show 
ns the force of fitnes9 in this case; because not to acknowledge 
tli*' solidity of this reason is to lay one's self under a necessity of 
receiving a defective system; a system loaded with inconvenien- 
ces, and whose consequences are very far from being reasonable. 

XI. Such are the nature arid force of the fitness, on which the 

proofs of the sanction of natural laws are established. All that of the in- 

remaini now. m t<> -<•«• what impression these proofs united ought ""*"?* 
' ° which 

to make on our minds, and what influence they should have over those 

our conduct. This is the capital point, in which the whole P ro ' ,<8 

1 ■ ought to 

ought to terminate. have over 

1. In the first place I observe, that though all that can be said ^1?°"" 
in favor of toe sanction of natural laws, were still to leave the Weshould 
ition undecided, yet it would be reasonable even in this very world oa S 
uncertainty to act, as it it had been determined in the affirmative, the foun- 
For it is evidently the safest side, namely that, in which there is the b e!u .f 
less at all events to lose, and more to gain. Let us state the of a future 
tiling as dubious. If there be a future state, it is not only an er- 
ror not to believe it, but likewise a dangerous irregularity to act, 
as if there were no such thing. An error of this kind is attended 
with pernicious consequences; whereas, if there is no such 
thing, the mistake in believing it produces in general none but 
good effects; it is not subject to any inconveniences hereafter, 
nor does it, generally speaking, expose us to any great difficulties 



fti$ THE PRINCIPLES OF 

for the time present. Be it therefore as it may, and let the casg 
be ever so unfavorable to natural laws, a prudent man will never 
hesitate which side he is to embrace, whether the observance, or 
the violation of those laws. Virtue will certainly have the pre- 
ference of vice. 

2. But if this side of the question is the most prudent and eli- 
gible, even under a supposition of doubt and uncertainty, how 
much more will it be so, if we acknowledge, as we cannot avoid, 
that this opinion is at least more probable than the other ? A first 
degree of verisimilitude, or a simple though slight probability, 
becomes aresonable motive of determination, in respect to every 
man, who calculates and reflects. And, if it be prudent to con- 
duct ourselves by this principle in the ordinary affairs of life, 
does prudence permit us to deviate from this very road in the 
most important affairs, such as essentially interest our felicity ? 

3, But in fine if proceeding still further, and reducing the 
thing to its true point, it is agreed that we have actually, if not a 
strict demonstration of a future life, at least a probability, founded 
on many reasonable presumptions, and so great a fitness, as bor- 
ders very near upon certainty; it is still more evident, that, in 
the present state of things, we ought to net on this footing, and 
are not reasonably allowed to form any other rule of conduct.* 

It is a tie- Xll. Nothing ipdeed is more, worthy of a rational being, than 

eessary ^ Q see k for evidence on every subject, and to be determined only 

conse- . 

qaence of by clear and certain principles. But since all subjects are not 

otirnature susce ptible thereof, and yet we are obliged to determine: what 

and state. 

would become of us, if we were always to wait tor a perfect de- 
monstration ? In failure of the highest degree of certainty, we 
must take up with the next to it; and a great probability becomes 
a sufficient reason of acting, when there is none of equal weight 
to oppose it. If this side of the question be not in itself evi* 
dently certain, it is as least an evident and certain rule, that, in 
the present state of things, it ought to have the preference. 

This is a necessary consequence of our nature and condition. 
As we have only a limited knowledge, and yet are under a ne« 



* See part i. chap. vi. |S 6 



NATURAL LAW. 213 

eessity of determining and acting ; were it requisite for this pur- 
pose to have a perfect certainty, and were we to refuse to ac- 
cept of probability, as a principle of determination ; we should 
be either obliged to determine in favor of the least probable side, 
am! contrary to verisimilitude, (which nobody methinks will at- 
tempt to maintain) or we should be forced to spend our days in 
dou.<t ami uncertainly; to Uncinate continually in a state of irres- 
solution, a ui to remaiu ever in suspense, without acting, without 
resolving upon any thing, or without having any fixt rule of con- 
duct ; which would be .a total subversion of the svstem of hu- 
manity. 

XI II. But if it be reasonable in general to admit of fitness and Reason 

probability, as the rule of conduct, for want of evidence; this l ays u9Un ' 

1 der an ob- 

rule becomes still more necessary and just in particular cases, in ligation of 

which, as hath been already observed, a person runs no risk in sa doin S' 
following it. When there is nothing to lose if we are mistaken, 
an.l a great deal to win if we are not ; what can we desire more 
for a rational motive of acting? Especially when the opposite 
side exposot u- to very great danger, in case of error; and af* 
fords us no manner of advantage, supposing we are in the right. 
Under such circumstances there is no room for hesitating ; rea- 
son obliges us to embrace the safest side ; and this obligation is 
so much the stronger, as it arises from a concurrence of motives 
of the greatest weight and solidity. 

In -hort if it be reasonable to embrace this side, even in case 
of an entire uncertainty, it is still more so w hen there is some 
probability in its favor; it becomes necessary if these probabili- 
ties are cogent and numerous ; and in fine the necessity still in- 
creases, if, at all events, this is the safest rod most advantageous 
part. What can any one desire more, in order to produce a real 
obligation,* according to the principles we have established in 
regard to the internal obligation imposed by reason ? 

XIV. Again. This internal and primitive obligation is con- It is a du- 
firmed by the Divine Will itself, and consequently rendered as l^ \ 5. 
strong, as possible. In fact, this manner of judging and acting self impo. 
being, as we have seen, the result of our constitution, such us ses on us * 

• See part i. chap. vi. sect. 9, and 13. 



gl4 THE PRINCIPLES OF 

the Creator has formed it ; this alone is certain proof, that it is 
the will of God we should be directed by those principles, and 
consider it a point of duty. For whatever, as we have already 
observed,* is inherent in the nature of man, whatever is a con- 
sequence of his original constitution and state, acquaints us 
clearly and distinctly with the will of the Creator, with the use 
he expects we should make of our faculties, and the obligations, 
to which he has thought proper to subject us. This is a point, 
that merits great attention. For if we may affirm, without fear of 
mistake, that the Deity is actually willing, that man should con- 
duct himself in this life on the foundation of the belief of a fu- 
ture state, and as having every thing to hope or to fear on his 
side, according as he has acted justly or unjustly; does there 
not thence arise a more than probable proof of the reality of 
this state, and of the certainty of rewards and punishments? 
Otherwise we should be obliged to say, that God himself deceives 
us, because this error was necessary for the execution of his de- 
signs, as a principle essential to the plan he has formed in respect 
to humanity. But to speak after this manner of the most perfect 
Being, of a Being, whose power, wisdom, and goodness, are infi- 
nite, would be using a language equally absurd and indecent. 
For this very reason, that as the abovementioned article of belief 
is necessary to mankind, and enters into the views of the Crea- 
tor, it cannot be false. Whatever the Deity sets before us as a 
duty, or as a reasonable principle of conduct, must be certainly 
true. 
€onc!u- -^V. Thus every thing concurs to establish the authority ot 

«ion. natural laws. 1. The approbation they receive from reason. 

2. The express command of God. 3. The real advantages, 
which their observance procures us in this world ; and in fine 
the great hopes and just fears, we ought to have in respect to 
futurity, according as we have observed or despised those laws. 
Thus it is that God binds us to the practice of virtue by such 
strong and so numerous connexions, that every man, who con- 
sults and listens to reason, finds himself under an indispensable 
obligation of rendering them the invariable rule of his conduct. 

That, X ^* Some P ern aps will object, that we have been too diffusive 

•which is 

already * See part ii. chap. iv. sect. 5. 



NATURAL LAW. 215 

in respect to the sanction of natural laws. True it is, that most probable 
of those, who have written concerning the law of nature, are oniv^set 
more concise on this article, and Puffendorf himself does not say intullevi- 

npn/»o t)V 

much about it.* This author, without absolutely excluding the revelation, 
consideration of a future lite from this science, seems never- 
theless to confine the law of nature within the bounds of the 
present life, as tending only to render us sociable.! And yet he 
acknowledges, that man is naturally desirous of immortality, and 
that this has induced heathens to believe the soul immortal; that 
this belief is likewise authorised by an ancient tradition concern- 
ing the goddess of revenge; to which he adds, that in fact it is 
very probable God will punish the violation of the laws of na- 
ture; but that there is still a great obscurity in this respect, and 
nothing but revelation can put the thing out of doubt. J 

But were it even true, that reason affords us nothing but prob- 
abilities in regard to this question, yet wo must not exclude from 
the law of nature all considerations of a future state; especially 
if these probabilities are so very great, as to border upon cer- 
tainty. The above article enters necessarily into the system of 
this science, and forms a part thereof so much the more essen- 
tial, that, were it not for this, the authority of natural law would 
be weakened, as we have already demonstrated; and it would be 
difficult (to say nothing more) to establish on any solid grounds 
several important duties, which oblige us to sacrifice our great- 
est advantages to the good of society or to the support of equity 
and justice. Necessary therefore it was to examine with some 
care, how far our natural light may lead us in respect to this 
question, and to show the force of the proofs, that our reason 
affords us, and the influence those proofs ought to have over our 
conduct. 

True it is, as we have already observed, that the best way to 
know the will of God in this respect, would be an express dec- 

* The re ider may see in a small treatise, intitled Judgment of an Anon- 
ymous, be. and inserted in the 5th edition of the Duties of a Man and a Cit- 
izen, the remarks, that Mr. Leibnitz, author of that treatise makes against 
Puffendorf upon this score. Barbeyrac, who has joined his own remarks 
to Mr. Leibnitz's work, justifies Puffendorf pretty well. And yet an at- 
tentive observer will find there is still something wanting te the entire 
justification of this author's system. 

f See Puffendorf 's Prt face on tl.e Duties of Man and a Citizen, sect.6,f. 

* See the Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. iii. sec. 21. 



%\G THE PRINCIPLES OF, &c. 

laration on his part. But if reasoning, as mere philosophers, 
we have not been able to make use of* so decisive a proof, no- 
thing can hinder us, as christian philosophers, from avaiing our- 
selves of the advantage we have from revelation, in ord^r to 
strengthen our conjectures. Nothing indeed can be a better ar- 
gument, that we have reasoned and conjectured right, than the 
positive declaration of the Deity on this important point. For, 
since it appears in fact, that God is willing to recompense virtue 
and to punish vice in another life, it is no longer possible to 
doubt of what we have advanced, namely, that this is extremely 
conformable to his wisdom, goodness, and justice. 1 he proofs, 
we have drawn from the nature of man, from God's designs in 
his favor, from the wisdom and equity, with which he governs 
the world, and from the present state of things are not a work of 
the imagination, or an illusion of selflove; no, they are reflections 
dictated by right reason. And when revelation comes up to their 
assistance, it sets then in full evidence what already had been 
rendered probable by the sole light of nature. 

But the reflection, we have here made, regards not only the 
sanction of natural laws, it may also be extended to the other 
parts of this work. It is to us great pleasure to see, that the 
principles we have laid down, are exactly those that the chris- 
tian religion adopts for its basis, and on which the whole struc- 
ture of religion and morality is raised. If on one side this re- 
mark serves to confirm us in these principles, by assuring us, 
that we have hit upon the true system of nature; on the other, it 
.ought to dispose us to have an infinite esteem for a revelation, 
which perfectly confirms the law of nature, and converts moral 
philosophy 'into a religious and popular doctrine; a doctrine. 
founded on facts, and in which the authority and promises of the 
Deity manifestly intervene in the fittest manner to make an im- 
pression upon man. This happy agreement between natural and 
revealed light is equally honorable to both. 

EXD OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 









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